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Abstract 
In 2008 the European Commission has put forward a Proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive with the aim to increase consumer confidence in 
the internal market.  Based on the principle of maximum harmonisation, the 
proposed Directive provided for amendments in the areas of unfair contract 
terms, consumer remedies, distance and doorstep selling. However, the 
disagreement of Member States regarding the contentious amendments to 
unfair contract terms and consumer remedies which involved a reduction of 
consumer protection led to those changes being dropped from the final 
Directive.  The shift to maximum harmonisation and the contentious 
amendments in the two areas constitute the starting point for the argument 
put forward in this thesis.  Increasing consumer confidence has not been the 
actual aim behind the Commission’s legislative efforts. 
With the application of the moral panic theory to the case of European 
Consumer Law, the aim is to show how the European Commission has used 
the consumer confidence justification as a smokescreen for the shift to 
maximum harmonisation which can better support its internal market project.  
The Consumer Rights Directive as adopted constitutes a compromise and 
only amends Distance Selling and Doorstep Selling Directives.  Although 
reduction to the level of consumer protection was prevented, the eventual 
approach followed under the Consumer Rights Directive still constitutes 
indication of the fact that the driving force has been the internal market.  The 
application of the Directive to the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus 
provides an opportunity to test the main argument of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Research 
Introduction  
The twentieth century has been characterized as the century of consumer 
society1 where people have exhibited increased consuming activity.  During 
the twentieth century, consumer goods had not only become widely 
available but in addition every aspect of daily life had turned out to be 
affected by the prevalence of consumption in society: from the food sector to 
the clothing sector, from the means of communication to the transportation 
used for travelling.2  All aspects of life have more or less been touched by 
consumption.3  In an era when consumption had become an indispensable 
aspect of people’s everyday life, the European Union, after a number of 
changes brought to its Constitution which will be analysed in a subsequent 
part of this study, gained competency to regulate within the area of 
Consumer Law.  The European Commission has thus gradually managed to 
become a key player in legislating in this area.  Nevertheless, the 
competency of the European Community to legislate within the particular 
field has been tied to the internal market project, which had implications for 
the subsequent development and shape of the European Consumer law.   
 
The consumer confidence argument, more particularly within the context of 
cross-border trade, has formed the justification that the Commission has 
employed through the years for the need to take action within the area of 
consumer protection at the European level.4  The former President of the 
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in his guidelines for the 
European Commission, had referred to the effect that consumer policy has 
on the integration of the internal market as well as to the fact that European 
                                            
1 Martyn J Lee, The Consumer Society Reader (Blackwell Publishers 2000) ix. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 317, 317. 
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consumers should not be discouraged from shopping across borders.5  For 
these reasons he emphasized the need to have an effective consumer policy 
which will boost consumer confidence.6  The desire to increase cross border 
trade across Europe should not nevertheless be considered as accidental 
since it comprises a valuable means for the integration of the internal 
market.  While the rate of cross-border border trade constitutes evidence of 
the degree of integration of the retail dimension of the internal market, the 
number of cross-border transactions is at the same time indicative of the 
extent to which traders are willing to trade throughout the internal market as 
well as an indication of the consumer confidence to enter into cross-border 
transactions within the internal market.7   
Cross border trade involves transactions made by consumers either when 
they travel abroad or through means of distance sale such as internet, 
phone or post.8  The particular type of trade widens the choices that are 
available for consumers as it provides them with the opportunity to buy 
goods or services which are not available in their own country 9 and in some 
instances at better prices.10   At the same time, cross-border trade furthers 
commercial opportunities for sellers who can offer their goods and services 
in other countries.  Cross border trade is thus a way of not only increasing 
consumer welfare but it at the same time increases competition within the 
internal market.11   
                                            
5 Commission Directorate-General for Health & Consumers ‘The Consumer Markets 
Scoreboard’ (2010) 3rd edn < 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/consumer_scoreboards/3_edition/docs/
cms_3_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2016. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 Commission, ‘ Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU’ (Staff Working Document) 
SEC(2009) 283 final, 9. 
10 Flash Eurobarometer 358, ‘Consumer Attitudes towards Cross-Border Trade and 
Consumer Protection’ (June 2013) 16 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_358_en.pdf> accessed 26 April 2016.  
11 Commission, ‘Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU’ (Staff Working Document) 
(n 9) 9. 
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The efforts made by the Commission, through a number of directives 
comprising the Consumer Acquis12, to increase consumer confidence and 
thus make consumers engage into cross border shopping seem to have 
been fruitless as the number of cross border transactions have remained 
steady over the last years.13  According to a Eurobarometer survey on 
Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Cross-border Trade and Consumer 
Protection which was undertaken in 2011, while the number of distance 
shopping, especially over the internet, had considerably increased, cross-
border distance shopping was still not widespread.14  While the Commission 
makes great efforts to promote cross-border trade within the internal market 
by harmonizing consumer rights, consumers seem unwilling to play the 
game of the Commission. 
While, as it has already been stated, the consumer confidence justification 
has formed the argument that the European Commission has employed 
throughout the years15, based on the same justification, the Commission has 
in 2008 put forward the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive.  The main 
objective of the proposal was again to enhance consumer confidence within 
the internal market by providing for the full harmonization of national 
consumer protection regimes so as to in this way increase cross border 
trade.  Nevertheless the increasing reference to the need to boost consumer 
confidence as well as the shift towards maximum harmonization raises 
concerns as to whether making consumers feel confident to shop cross 
border is what the Commission really aims to achieve.   
Scope of the Study 
Interestingly, it is the shift from minimum to maximum harmonization in the 
Consumer Rights Directive and the continuing reference to the consumer 
                                            
12 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) 317. 
13 Commission Directorate-General for Health & Consumers ‘The Consumer Markets 
Scoreboard’ (n 5). 
14 Flash Eurobarometer 332, ‘Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade and 
Consumer Protection’ (May 2012) 7 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_332_en.pdf> accessed 26 April 2016.  
15 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) 317. 
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confidence argument that have acted as an incentive for proceeding with a 
research on the real motives behind the legislative activity of the European 
Commission.  Although the internal market is as the Commission has itself 
stated the ultimate context for consumer policy16, at the same time it should 
not be disregarded that the consumer policy constitutes a great tool in the 
hands of the European Commission to indirectly improve the functioning of 
the internal market as consumption expands on many aspects of our lives.  
Nevertheless, with the recent development of the Consumer Rights 
Directive, the view adopted in this study is that the Commission has so 
overtly shifted the focus of the European Consumer law on the internal 
market project that not only consumers seem to have been put in the second 
place but in addition the real intentions behind the legislative activity of the 
Commission are becoming obvious.   
Accordingly, the main contention that is articulated in this study is that 
European Consumer Law has been used and is still used by the European 
Commission to achieve means other than consumer protection, albeit in the 
name of consumers.  What this argument denotes is that the Commission 
with its legislative efforts within the area of EU Consumer Law has shifted its 
focus on completing the internal market by thus putting the protection of 
consumers in second place. There are three issues that are brought forward 
with regard to this main formulation.  The first issue is the consumer 
confidence justification which is viewed as a rather constructed problem by 
the European Commission.  The second issue is the debate between 
minimum and maximum harmonization which raises the tension between 
consumer protection and the purpose of increasing cross border trade and 
thus completing the internal market.  The third issue to be considered is the 
Consumer Rights Directive which is regarded as the most explicit example of 
this trend and whose application within the domestic regimes of UK and 
Cyprus will form the test for the main argument that is put forward in this 
study.  
 
                                            
16 Commission, ‘EC Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 – Empowering consumers, 
enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them’ COM (2007) 99 final, 4.  
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EU Consumer Law and the Moral Panic argument 
The increasing use made to the consumer confidence justification, and more 
particularly its use in the latest shift to maximum harmonization in the 
Consumer Rights Directive17, constitutes an indication of the European 
Commission’s power to manipulate Consumer Law to the direction that 
better serves its interests.  Contrary to what the Commission passionately 
advocates, this study supports what was argued by Thomas Wllhemsson 
namely that maximum harmonization relates only minimally to the actual 
creation of consumer confidence.18  A purpose of this study is to present the 
argument that the European Commission has formed a moral panic around 
consumer confidence which had as a consequence its conception as a 
social problem.  Therefore, by employing the moral panic approach, the 
process by which the consumer confidence has been translated into a social 
problem can be examined.  
 
The idea of moral panic was first developed by Cohen who provided the 
definition of moral panic as:  
‘A condition, episode, a person or group of person emerges to become 
defined as a threat to societal values and interests, its nature is presented in 
a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media, the moral barricades 
are manned by for example politicians or other right-thinking people, socially 
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions, ways of coping 
are evolved or resorted to, the condition then disappears, submerges or 
deteriorates.  Panic might produce such changes as those in legal and social 
policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.’19 
                                            
17 The resulting approach is full targeted harmonisation, maximum harmonisation is the 
prevailing approach in most provisions, albeit with some limited exemptions where some 
discretion has been left to Member States.  Those issues will be better analysed in a later 
chapter. 
18 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) 318. 
19 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers (3rd 
edn, Routledge 2002) 1. 
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What Cohen denotes with the term moral panic is a less manifest social 
process20 which comes to the forefront when the actors involved, whether 
those are politicians, legislators or any other moral crusaders who try to 
persuade others, collaborate to define and combat a perceived threat 
through public discourse, legislation or public policy.21  However, this is not 
to say that they do so consciously but rather it is their activities in their entity 
that form and sustain a moral panic.22 Being a sociological concept, moral 
panics are thus an approach which can be employed to explain an 
overreaction to a perceived social problem, to bring to light the process by 
which a concern about a social problem is generated, a concern that 
although is not proportionate to the actual problem, it constitutes the 
justification for a change in the social or legal codes.23 
The enactment of legislation constitutes one of the forms which a moral 
panic may take.24  “How do laws get passed?” and “Why are they enforced” 
are questions to which moral panic can provide an answer to.25  The actors 
involved in the majority of moral panics have as their aim to affect the 
content and enforcement of the law which are the two most evident and 
extensively employed practices to combat an alleged threat.26  Laws are 
perceived to represent, and that is the reason they are actually passed, the 
views, ideology, interests and demands of the more powerful and influential 
groups within the society.   Although, this does not mean that the more 
powerful predominate over the less powerful on every issue that arises 
neither the less powerful will be unsuccessful in all instances. 27  Moral 
panics commence with a premise which assumes that something is wrong 
and should thus be addressed.  This event or condition may subsist although 
                                            
20 Charles Krinsky, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics (Ashgate 2013) 4. 
21 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the 
Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Macmillan 1978) 16. 
22 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers (n 19) 1; 
Krinsky, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics (n 20) 293. 
23 Amanda Rohloff and Sarah Wright, ‘Moral Panic and Social Theory: Beyond the 
Heuristic’ (2010) 58(3) Current Sociology 403, 2.  
24 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of 
Deviance (2nd edn, Wiley-Blakcwell 2009) 117. 
25 ibid 119. 
26 ibid 121. 
27 ibid 123. 
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in a less serious nature from that presented or it may not exist at all.  Claims 
and arguments are accordingly developed to support the presupposition that 
is put forward. 28 
 
Equally, the consumer confidence argument has been constantly presented 
by the European Commission as the main problem of European Consumer 
Protection and it has served as a longstanding justification for the EU’s 
intervention within the area of Consumer law with a series of minimum 
harmonization directives that formed the Consumer Acquis.  As the moral 
panic approach can provide the basis for explaining overreaction to a 
perceived social problem, this part of the study will accordingly examine 
whether the consumer confidence justification constitutes a rather 
constructed social problem around which the European Commission has 
formed a moral panic.   As already stated, by using the moral approach, the 
process by which a concern about a social problem is generated can be 
brought to light and for this purpose an examination of the development of 
the Consumer Acquis will be critically examined for determining whether the 
Commission, for the purpose of creating a perfect internal market, has 
manipulated European Consumer Law which, although in the name of 
consumer, may prove not to be for the protection of consumers.   
In addition, with consideration to what has earlier been stated namely that 
legislation is one of the forms that a moral panic may take this study views 
the Consumer Rights Directive as being the most manifest indication of the 
real intentions behind the Commission’s intervention within the field of 
consumer protection.  The initial purpose of the Commission was to 
implement a horizontal maximum harmonization directive which would cover 
four existing consumer protection directives.  Despite the great efforts of the 
Commission during the legislative process to defend maximum 
harmonization, what has in the end been achieved is a full targeted 
harmonization directive merely merging the existing Doorstep Selling and 
Distance Selling Directives under the Directive 2011//83 on Consumer 
                                            
28 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (n 24) 144. 
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Rights29 while important amendments to the Directive on Unfair Contract 
Terms as well as to the Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees 
Directive were left behind.30  Questions such as how do laws get passed and 
why certain laws are enforced are among the questions that the moral panic 
approach can give an answer to and will form part of the analysis of the 
process that preceded the Consumer Rights Directive.   
The three year period that passed from the time that it was initially proposed 
in 2008 until 2011 when it was finally adopted has included long discussions 
and changes to the scope of the Directive.  Accordingly, a critical 
examination of the process that preceded the adoption of the Consumer 
Rights Directive is also necessary at this point as it will contribute in 
determining the reasons that the adoption of the Directive was delayed as 
well as to look beyond the final choice of considerably reducing its scope.  
What do the disagreements among the relevant actors during this three year 
process reveal about their intentions, beliefs and views?  The answer to 
such questions can shed light in relation to the approach followed in the area 
of European Consumer Law and on deeper issues involved.   
 
Minimum and Maximum Harmonization 
The debate between minimum and maximum harmonization constitutes the 
second issue that arises in this study and also raises the tension between 
consumer protection and the internal market.  Minimum harmonization was 
the prevalent philosophy of European Consumer law for many years and 
enabled the European legislators to set the floor for the mandatory level of 
protection that Member States needed to provide for consumers.  Member 
States could at the same time create higher standards within their national 
regimes.  Nevertheless, the scene has been subjected to change with the 
shift towards maximum harmonization.  
                                            
29 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘What Does Consumer Law Reveal About The Nature Of The EU?’ in 
Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2012) 532. 
30 The only amendments brought to to the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms and to the 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees Directive were simply reporting requirements 
for Member States when adopting stringent, than those provided in the two Directives, 
provisions in relation to certain mentioned Articles. 
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Consumer confidence has been linked to the full utilisation of the internal 
market in the sense that if consumers do not have confidence in the internal 
market and in the protection of their interests, they will be unwilling to enter a 
cross border transaction.  It is in response to those problems that the 
Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive emerged with its main objectives 
being to enhance consumer confidence and to reduce business reluctance 
in an effort to reduce fragmentation by proposing a full harmonization 
measure.31  The consumer confidence argument has formed once again the 
justification that the Commission has used for the adoption of the Consumer 
Rights Directive.32  Arguments that have been made and which this study 
supports suggest that the real intention of the Commission is in essence the 
encouragement of business while the effect that this will have for consumers 
is taken for granted33, a fact which became obvious with the approach of 
maximum harmonization. 
Vanessa Mak has argued that with consideration to the twin objectives that 
the EU Consumer law seeks to achieve, namely the advancement of internal 
market on the one hand and the strengthening of consumer protection on 
the other hand, it is not surprising, according to her own view, that the 
Commission ended up with a proposal for a maximum harmonization 
directive.34 Geraint Howells has contended that the European consumer law 
will not be for the benefit of consumers anymore as it was previously the 
case with the minimum standards that the EU provided.  According to his 
argument, maximum harmonization on the other hand will turn EU consumer 
law into a guardian of the interests of traders.35  Along the same line of 
argument, there were authors who have expressed the view that consumer 
                                            
31 Sarah Edgar, ‘Cross-border B2C e-commerce in the EU and the introduction of the 
Consumer Rights Directive: A cure for fragmentation?’ (2012), 11 < 
http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/892/204/RUG01-001892204_2012_0001_AC.pdf> 
accessed 17 April 2016. 
32 ibid 9-10. 
33 ibid 15. 
34 Vanessa Mak, ‘Two Levels, One Standard? The Multi-level Regulation of Consumer 
Protection in Europe’ (2010) TISCO Working Paper Series on Banking, Finance and 
Services  01/2010, 7 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585786> 
accessed 24 April 2016. 
35 Geraint G Howells, ‘The Rise of European Consumer Law – Whither National Consumer 
Law?’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 63, 65. 
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protection policy has become an internal market policy36 aiming at boosting 
cross border trade.  Part of this study will be accordingly devoted on the 
debate between maximum and minimum harmonization and will, by 
examining existing commentary, demonstrate what each approach in 
essence promotes. This thesis will in addition provide the reasons why there 
is a weak connection between maximum harmonisation and the desire to 
increase consumer confidence and which constitute further evidence that the 
consumer confidence argument has been hijacked. 
A further argument which adds to the debate between minimum and 
maximum harmonization relates to the resulting definition of consumer which 
will also form part of this examination.  The definition of consumer 
constitutes an issue which is substantively connected with the notion of 
consumer confidence and cannot be ignored in this study.  The 
Commission’s view that the maximum harmonization of different national 
consumer policies will increase consumer confidence seems to be based on 
a single standard consumer.  What is accordingly presumed is the existence 
of a European consumer who is present in every country across Europe.  
The situation is nevertheless more complex than suggested by the maximum 
harmonization approach.  The EU not only includes 495 million consumers 
coming from 28 different countries but in addition, European Consumers 
come from various and greatly different economic and political 
circumstances while each consumer has its own unique historical and 
cultural development.37  Consumer consumption patterns vary among the 
different EU Member States and this is not attributed to a single reason.  
Consumption behaviour is subject to various psychological, sociocultural and 
situational factors.38  
 
                                            
36 Howells, ‘The Rise of European Consumer Law – Whither National Consumer Law?’ (n 
35) 65. 
37 Michael R Solomon, Gary Bamossy, Søren Askegaard and Margaret K Hogg, Consumer 
Behaviour – A European Perspective (4th edn, Pearson Education 2010) 4. 
38 Leon G Schiffman and Leslie Lazar Kanuk, Consumer Behaviour, (8th edn, Pearson 
Prentice Hall 2004) 121. 
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Meanwhile, the definition of consumer has lost its protective outlook since 
the focus has now shifted on the competent consumer who, according to the 
Commission, once the laws across all European Member States are 
harmonized, will be able to make the greatest possible use of the internal 
market.  Nevertheless, if consumer confidence was the real aim behind the 
legislative activity of the Commission and especially behind the Consumer 
Rights Directive with the more radical approach of maximum harmonization 
that it provides, the question that is accordingly posed is why the position of 
vulnerable, poor and uneducated consumers is nowhere mentioned and not 
envisaged in the Consumer Rights Directive39.  The situation becomes even 
worse with consideration to the fact that maximum harmonization will render 
national legislators unable to extend the protection to those categories of 
consumers. The new outlook given to the definition of consumer is viewed in 
this study is another indication of the Commission’s real intention which is in 
essence to create a perfect internal market and accordingly only the more 
powerful consumers are seen as better positioned to act as the driving force 
for the attainment of this goal.   
 
Harmonizing European consumer law in order to increase consumer 
confidence is not as a straightforward issue as it has been presented.  As 
Alberto Alemanno has enunciated EU should, apart from paying 
consideration to the social, economic and environmental impact of all policy 
options, also pay regard to the behavioural impact they have.40  Until now, 
EU has relied on the assumption that people’s behaviour can change 
through rules, regulations and incentives.41  While the time for the EU to 
begin designing policies that reflect how people really behave and not how 
they are assumed to behave has come42, the Commission continues to 
                                            
39 Although the Unfair Commercial Practices Directives deals to some extent with 
consumer vulnerability, the argument made here relates simply to the Consumer Rights 
Directive. 
40 Alberto Alemanno, ‘The EU needs to embrace behavioural insights in the design of its 
policies’  (2012) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/26/eu-behavioural-insights-
policies/> accessed 30 July 2013. 
41 ibid. 
42 Alemanno, ‘The EU needs to embrace behavioural insights in the design of its policies’  
(n 40). 
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focus on an approach that better serves the objectives of the internal market 
and is more consistent with the internal market project. 
An insight into sociological and consumer behaviour literature will provide 
the underlying basis for the analysis of this part.  What are the factors that 
really influence consumers’ behaviour as well as in what ways do the culture 
in one country may influence people’s choices and consumption lives are 
questions that this part will examine.  A purpose of this consideration is to 
show that the choice of consumers to enter into a cross border transaction is 
connected with issues that go beyond legislation issues and alterations in 
law.  Engaging into sociological and consumer behaviour literature can 
provide an insight on what affects people’s consumption activity and choices 
and thus provide an awareness of the complexity involved in this area.  
Simply expecting that altering the law will at the same time alter consumer’s 
beliefs, habits and traditions is regarded as an elusive view that the 
European Commission has chosen to develop upon.  This may be the 
perfect point to allude that having the same legal standards across all 
Member States serves others’ interests rather than those of consumers as 
the consumer confidence justification suggests.  
 
The Consumer Rights Directive and its application to the national 
regimes of UK and Cyprus 
The third issue that arises with regard to the main assumption of this study is 
the Consumer Rights Directive.  While it constitutes one of the most recently 
adopted directive within the area of European Consumer Law, this study 
takes the view that it is at the same time the most explicit example of the 
manipulation of the European Consumer Law by the European Commission.  
The third part of this study will engage into a comparison between the 
application of the Consumer Rights Directive into the UK and Cypriot regime 
in order to test the main hypothesis that is developed in this thesis.  The 
view adopted in this study supports that consumer protection has turned into 
a by-product of European Consumer Law while the driving force behind 
legislating in the area is to promote the internal market project.  The aim is 
accordingly to determine the consequences of the Directive and what it 
13 
 
really means for consumers and to demonstrate how the ultimate 
consequence of the EU’s approach will not necessarily assist the consumer 
although it professes this is its aim. 
 
A brief reference to key points in relation to what a comparative study is as 
well as which particular method will be employed is a helpful starting point 
before moving on with details of the comparison that will be undertaken in 
this study.  To begin with, comparative law has been characterized as an 
intellectual activity with law being its object and comparison being its 
process.43  It has always been regarded as a unique type of legal research 
and study.44  The term comparative law refers to the study of legal traditions 
and legal rules on a comparative basis.45  Nevertheless, a true comparative 
law bears the element of internationalism by thus going beyond an ordinary 
comparison between the different rules situated in a single legal system 
which is a task that lawyers normally do.46  What is accordingly required for 
a comparative legal study is the comparison of two or more different legal 
systems or selected aspects of two or more legal systems.47 
 
The reason for employing a comparison in this study goes beyond the 
traditional purposes of comparative law which is either to understand one’s 
own legal culture by comparing it to another legal culture48 or to determine 
the better law.49  Edward J Eberle has in a paper called ‘The Method and 
Role of Comparative Law’ published in 2009, referred to the possibility of 
using comparative law beyond those traditional purposes and undertaking it 
in more expansive projects.  What Eberle has suggested is the use of 
                                            
43 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kӧtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press 1998) 2. 
44 Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge – Cavendish 
2007) 1. 
45 ibid 3. 
46 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kӧtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (n 43) 2. 
47 De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (n 44) 3. 
48 Edward J Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8(3) Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 451, 453. 
49 Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 342. 
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comparative law in providing an answer to public policy questions, questions 
that may go beyond national borders and acknowledged consumer 
protection as being one of the areas that comparative law could accordingly 
be used.50   
In our case, the efforts of the European Commission to harmonize the 
different consumer protection regimes across the European Community 
have intensified over the last years with the Consumer Rights Directive 
being the apogee of those efforts.  As it has earlier been stated in this 
introductory chapter, concerns exist as to whether the real aim behind the 
legislative efforts of the Commission is rather to complete the internal market 
than to provide consumers with adequate protection.  The role of the 
comparative law thus becomes even more crucial as in the current case an 
understanding of the relevant legal regimes of UK and Cyprus and an 
understanding of the effects that the Consumer Rights Directive will have on 
the existing national provisions of each Member State respectively and will 
accordingly aid in providing an answer to the hypothesis that is brought 
forward in this study. 
 
The comparison between the effects of the Consumer Rights Directive on 
UK and Cyprus will adopt a functionalist perspective.  Functionalist 
comparative law is factual and focuses on the effects of rules.51  In our case, 
focusing on the effects that the Consumer Rights Directive will have on the 
two national legal regimes contributes in providing an answer to the main 
hypothesis of this study.  According to Zweigert and Kӧtz, as in all 
intellectual activity, every research of comparative law commences with 
either the posing of a question or the setting of a working hypothesis.  While 
there is not just a single function of functionalist comparative law, the 
function of comparison in this study is that of tertium comparationis.52  
Comparability is achieved by laying a third invariant element, a common 
problem between the two legal systems that will be compared and which 
                                            
50 Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (n 48) 454. 
51 Reimann and Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (n 49) 342. 
52 ibid 367. 
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acts as ‘a common comparative denominator’.53  Following this approach, 
the comparison can accordingly serve as an experiment by which the 
hypothesis of the study can be tested.54  The common problem between the 
two legal systems in the current study against which the comparison will be 
made is that the Consumer Rights Directive does not really aim at providing 
consumers with protection and will accordingly diminish the level of 
protection that is offered to consumers in the two relevant Member States. 
While functionalism has been criticized for failing to take into consideration 
the cultural, political and social context within which legal rules exist, this 
study takes the view that merely comparing the words on page, that is the 
text of the legislation, is not enough.  Accordingly, in order to better 
comprehend what the law in a particular legal system is and its function 
within a society, factors affecting the law such as culture, custom, philosophy 
or ideology will, where feasible, be considered.55  The importance of 
contextual factors lies in the fact that because they may vary from country to 
country, they may for this reason give rise to different results in different 
countries.56 
 
A purpose of this examination will be to provide an answer as to whether the 
Consumer Rights Directive really increases the level of consumer protection 
provided in each or whether the improvements brought remain minimal due 
to the fact that the whole process has been driven by the purpose to benefit 
the internal market.  An important aspect to that is the need to determine 
whether and what important aspects of consumer protection in the domestic 
laws of UK and Cyprus will have to be sacrificed because of the maximum 
harmonization.  This further supports the view that the real purpose behind 
the Consumer Rights Directive has not been to increase consumer 
confidence as the European Commission has repeatedly put forward and 
                                            
53 Roger Merino Acuña, Comparative Law from Below – The construction of a critical 
project in Comparative Legal Studies (Lambert Academic Publishing 2012) 5. 
54 Reimann and Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (n 49) 367. 
55 Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (n 48) 452. 
56 Christopher A Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism and the Future of Comparative 
Law’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1879, 1898. 
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that the Consumer Rights Directive is another indication of the moral panic 
that the European Commission has created to support the internal market 
project. 
Methodology 
This study will undertake the research by employing both a doctrinal and a 
qualitative method in order to examine commentary and texts on the issues 
that arise.  Legislation as well as existing empirical research will be 
examined for the purposes of this study.  The doctrinal methodology is rarely 
discussed in the methodology section of research publications and this is 
attributed to the fact that it constitutes a process of analysis rather than a 
method for data collection.57  Nevertheless, a brief reference to both 
methods as well as the reason why they are employed in this research 
cannot be ignored. 
 
Doctrinal research is also known as library based research and it constitutes 
the most common methodology for researches within the area of law.58  A 
doctrinal research, apart from asking what the law is on given issue, it 
additionally examines the development and application of law.59  Doctrinal 
research involves the locating and analysing of primary sources of law in 
order to determine the nature and parameters of law, although this does not 
constitute a simple description of the law.60  Doctrinal approach is by its 
nature inferential as it can provide explanations as to why laws are 
enacted.61   
 
                                            
57 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 1, 100. 
58 Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of 
research: merits and demerits’ (2012) 2(7) Educational Research Journal 252, 252. 
59 Adilah Abd Razak, ‘Understanding Legal Research’ (2009) 4 Integration & Dissemination 
19, 20 <http://econ.upm.edu.my/researchbulletin/artikel/Vol%204%20March%202009/19-
24%20Adilah.pdf> accessed at 26 July 2013. 
60 Hutchinson and Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (n 57) 113. 
61 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007) 20. 
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The task of doctrinal or library-based research is to provide the right answer 
to a set of questions.  This means that the methodology is employed for the 
purpose of addressing specific enquiries which determine the piece of 
information that the researcher will need to locate.62  In addition, doctrinal 
research provides the researcher with the opportunity to, after undertaking a 
background research of secondary sources, to critically analyse existing 
research literature, both theoretical and empirical.63  Doctrinal research not 
only requires extensive knowledge on a given issue but also certain skills 
such as precise judgement, detailed description, depth of thought and 
accuracy.  Since doctrinal research involves a high level of critical analysis, 
the voice and experience of the researcher unavoidably affect the outcome 
of the research. 
 
The analytical aspect of a doctrinal research is a qualitative one.64  While the 
doctrinal method is employed by the researcher to define the law, a 
consideration of any problems that exert influence on the law as well as of 
the policy which underpins the law, giving emphasis, for example, on any 
flaws in the policy, can add to that.65  Research dealing with given problems 
and policies can include the consideration of any social factors that are 
involved or the social impact that the law in question has.66  Nevertheless, 
the assessment of the problem in question and the evaluation of the policy 
may require some engagement with qualitative method67 as in the current 
case where an examination of surveys and interviews that have previously 
been conducted can be adduced in order to further complete the overall 
argument. 68  Although, this thesis as a doctrinal research may not involve 
                                            
62 Singhal and Malik, ‘Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of research: merits and demerits’ 
(n 58) 252. 
63 Hutchinson and Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (n 57) 113. 
64 ibid 116. 
65 McConville and Chui, Research Methods for Law (n 61) 20. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid. 
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any empirical method, this does not mean that inferences will not be drawn 
from the materials that will be found69 for the purposes of this study. 
 
As it has earlier been stated, doctrinal research is employed in order to 
provide answers to questions and this method will in our case aid in 
providing an answer to the question whether the European Commission, 
through its legislative efforts within the area of EU consumer law aims to 
complete the internal market rather than to provide consumers with 
adequate protection.  A reason for engaging into a doctrinal research is 
because it provides the opportunity to not only determine what is the law in 
relation to consumer protection at the EU level but furthermore it provides 
the possibility of critically examining its development and application.  A 
further reason for engaging into a doctrinal research is since it presupposes 
extensive knowledge on the issue that is being researched, an analysis of 
existing theoretical and empirical literature is required which can as in the 
current study achieve to demonstrate deeper thought and accuracy on the 
issues involved. 
 
The place of this study in the relevant body of knowledge 
A considerable amount of research exists in relation to the European 
Consumer Law and more particularly in relation to its instrumentalization for 
the purposes of the internal market.  Wihelmsson has referred to the EU 
Consumer Law as being a Janus-faced policy with its two sides being the 
internal market on the one hand and the protective goals on the other 
hand.70  Nonetheless, the importance of this study lies in the fact that the 
approach taken differs from existing literature as it will draw a number of 
arguments together in order to support the main contention of this study.  
 
                                            
69 McConville and Chui, Research Methods for Law (n 61) 19. 
70Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4). 
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Arguments that the European Commission has made use of the European 
Consumer Law in an effort to build and complete the internal market, have 
already been put forward by authors such as Micklitz.71  While the argument 
that is formulated in this study is not new, the current study aims at unfolding 
not only how the Commission has achieved to drive EU Consumer Law to 
the direction that it better serves its interests but also how this trend is 
becoming more obvious from the actions of the Commission.  An attempt to 
come to a conclusion as to what are the real interests behind the shifting of 
the focus on the internal market project will also be made in this study. 
 
In addition, while much have been written on the notion of consumer 
confidence by authors such as Poncibo72 and Wihelmsson73, the moral panic 
approach applied to it in this study will aid in presenting how the consumer 
confidence justification was developed as a social problem and also how the 
European Commission has formed a moral panic around it.  An examination 
of the reasons why the consumer confidence justification and the consumer 
protection at the EU level more generally have been so strongly inflated can 
add to the existing literature. 
 
Insofar as the debate between minimum and maximum harmonization is 
concerned, existing literature has touched upon issues whether 
harmonization is what consumers really need as well as upon what each 
approach in essence promotes.  While existing literature will be reviewed for 
the purposes of this study, a step forward will be taken.  Following the 
argument of Alemanno and the reference that he has made in relation to the 
need to consider the behavioural effect that EU Consumer legislation has74, 
consumer behaviour and sociological literature will contribute into providing 
                                            
71 Micklitz, ‘What Does Consumer Law Reveal About The Nature Of The EU?’ in Jones, 
Menon and Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (n 29). 
72 Cristina Poncibo, ‘Some Thoughts on the Methodological Approach to EC Consumer 
Law Reform’ 21(3) Loyola Consumer Law Review 353. 
73 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) . 
74 Alemanno, ‘The EU needs to embrace behavioural insights in the design of its policies’  
(n 40). 
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additional evidence for the view that maximum harmonization does not really 
aim at providing consumers with adequate protection.  This argument also 
complements Howells’s argument that maximum harmonization is the 
guardian of the interests of traders.75 
 
Nevertheless, the originality of this study is primarily attributed to the 
Comparison that is made between the effects of the Consumer Rights 
Directive on the consumer protection of UK and Cyprus with the latter’s 
position being the substantive element of the originality of the current study 
as the effect that the Consumer Rights Directive will have on the Cyprus Law 
has not until that time been subject to examination.  The relevant 
comparison will provide additional evidence for arguments such as that of 
Weatherill who argued that the Consumer Rights Directive does not deserve 
its name76 by thus suggesting that the particular Directive does not really 
provide consumers with adequate protection. 
 
Structure of the Study 
The current study consists of eight chapters.  Following the introduction, 
Chapter Two of this study will provide a review of how the European 
Commission gained competence to legislate within the area of consumer 
protection as well as where its power come from and how EU consumer 
protection developed.  Chapter Three will apply the moral panic approach to 
the consumer confidence justification in order to explain how the European 
Commission has constructed a social problem around it so as to be able to 
use its legislative competence within the area of Consumer Law.  For this 
purpose, this chapter will include an examination of the development of the 
Consumer Acquis while Chapter Four will be devoted on the process that 
preceded the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive. 
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Further on, the focus of Chapter Five will be on the shift from minimum to 
maximum harmonization and will accordingly examine existing commentary 
in relation to both approaches.  The aim behind this examination is to 
present on the one hand how the debate between the two is another 
evidence of the Commission’s purposes and on the other hand how each 
approach relates to the tension between the protection of consumers and 
the internal market.  Chapter Five will also show the weak connection 
between the shift to maximum harmonisation and increasing consumer 
confidence while it will also be focused on the definition of consumers 
accruing from the Commission’s approach.  This part will partly be dedicated 
on an examination of the resulting definition of consumer while it will 
additionally, by providing an insight into consumer behaviour and 
sociological literature, present the factors which influence consumers’ 
behaviour and consumption activity.  This can shed light on the fact that 
increasing consumer confidence is not an easy task that can be achieved 
with a shift towards maximum harmonization as the Commission puts 
forward. 
 
Chapters Six will examine the actual provisions of the Consumer Rights 
Directive as eventually adopted and the approach followed in it while 
Chapter Seven will engage into an examination of the effects that the 
Consumer Rights Directive will have on the UK and Cyprus consumer 
protection respectively.  The function of this chapter is to test the theory that 
has been developed throughout the study.  The relevant comparison will 
provide additional evidence for the main contention of this study which raises 
concerns as to whether the purpose behind European Consumer Law is 
really to provide protection to consumers.  Finally, this study will end up with 
a last chapter which will draw the conclusions of this study together. 
Summary 
The aim of this study is to bring together a number of arguments to support 
the main contention of this study, namely that European Consumer Law is 
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manipulated for the purpose of increasing cross border trade and thus 
completing the internal market while consumer protection, which should be 
the primary purpose of it, has been put in the second place.  By following a 
chronological order, the way in which the Commission acquired its 
competency to regulate within the area of consumer protection as well as the 
development of the Consumer Acquis and subsequently the process 
towards the Consumer Rights Directive will all be the subject of examination.  
Their analysis will provide evidence for the resulting transformation of the 
European Consumer Law and its use by the European Commission for 
purposes beyond consumer protection.  To add to this argument, the effect 
that the contentious Consumer Rights Directive, has brought on the national 
regimes of UK and Cyprus will also be considered.  Meanwhile, the 
consumer confidence justification, the resulting definition of consumer as 
well as the debate between maximum and minimum harmonization could of 
course not be disregarded in this study. 
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Chapter 2 - The Development of European Consumer Law 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis examines the way in which European Consumer 
Law has developed and in more particular the way in which the European 
Commission acquired competency to regulate within the area of consumer 
protection through Treaty Revisions.  The first Resolutions and Consumer 
Policy Strategies that were meanwhile adopted as well as the principle of 
subsidiarity which have enabled the Commission to pursue its objectives by 
furthering the Commission’s ability to legislate in the area will also form part 
of this examination.  However, before moving on, it would be helpful to make 
a brief historical reference on how the European Union was initially created 
and developed as we know it today.  The purpose of this historical review 
reflects how the economic emphasis has always been there since the early 
formation of both the European Union and consumer policy itself.  While, as 
this historical reference will show, consumer protection has always been 
connected to the internal market, the current thesis voices a concern; 
consumer protection has perhaps been used as a smokescreen by the 
European Commission to promote the internal market. 
 
The first step towards economic integration which constitutes a predecessor 
of as well as the first step towards what is today the European Union is the 
European Coal and Steel Community which was initially established in 1951 
by the Treaty of Paris.77  The European Coal and Steel Community became 
a reality after a proposal that was put forward in 1950 by the Foreign 
Minister of France, Robert Schuman in an effort to put their coal and steel 
                                            
77 Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez – Solórzano Borragan, European Union Politics (4th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2013) 12. 
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resources together.78   The European Coal and Steel Community constituted 
the first major step that was taken towards European Integration particularly 
after the World War II79 as well as the first organization of Western Europe 
resembling a supranational authority with economic objectives aiming at 
creating a common market in coal and steel, common policies and 
eliminating any barriers that impeded trade in the particular commodities.80  
Its Member States were limited to six and those included France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.81  Its formation was seen 
as a result of an initial integrationist desire which at the same time set the 
scene for the subsequent development of the Community.82 
 
After a Dutch proposal in 1952 which supported the idea of creating a 
common external tariff by which the Member States of the then Community 
would be free from quotas and tariffs obligations, the Foreign Ministers of the 
countries involved agreed to make a new step towards the building of 
Europe.  This had as a result efforts being made in order to put in place a 
customs’ union as well as a common market and which ended up with the 
formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 known as 
the Common Market.83  With the Treaty establishing the EEC which was 
signed in 1957 in Rome, referred to as the Treaty of Rome, the European 
Economic Community was initially created with its members being only the 
six Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community.  With its far-
reaching implications, the important point in relation to the Treaty of Rome 
was that it dictated its signatories to create a common market which equated 
to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as well as to 
deploy common policies which would apply to all of its Member States.84  
                                            
78 Cini and Pérez – Solórzano Borragan, European Union Politics (n 77) 15-16. 
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The approach that the European Economic Community followed was broad 
with its objective being the integration of its Member States economies.  
While the purpose was initially to achieve integration within the economic 
area85, the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome referred to the fact that the 
longer-term goals of the EEC, wider in nature, would lay the base for 
creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.  The latter 
could perhaps be taken as an indication that integration would step in other 
areas such as political and social.  The aim of the Community was extended 
from merely achieving a Common Market to an internal market with the latter 
term having been introduced by the Single European Act of1986.  The 
internal market, as Article 14 EC of the Single European Act provides, 
constitutes an area in which no internal frontiers exist while the movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is free.   
The Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty on European Union, created a 
three-pillar structure under the umbrella of the European Union, a structure 
which still exists today.86  In addition, the Maastricht Treaty renamed the 
European Economic Community to European Community87 which signified 
the expansion of its competency to areas which go beyond the economic 
sphere.88  Along with the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community the European Community fall under 
the umbrella of the European Communities under the then newly introduced 
Pillar 1. While one may assume that the European Community enjoyed from 
the beginning an integrated regulatory system which would cover every 
policy area so as to help it achieve an integrated market for Europe, this was 
not the case.  The Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 
5(1) in more particular have formed a cornerstone of the Community’s 
constitution,89  What was provided was that ‘the Community shall act within 
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the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein.’90   
The European Community had power to legislate only within the areas that 
the Treaty of Rome provided to it competency to do so.  For some years, this 
limitation on the Community’s power barred it from adopting measures in 
relation to consumer protection which were unconnected to competition or to 
the common market project.  Accordingly, this constituted an impediment for 
the development of an explicit consumer protection policy.91  The 
Community’s limited competence led to the consumer policy being a tool 
which was used for competition and common market purposes.  
Nevertheless, its competence could be, and was in fact, increased by 
amendments to its Constitution, through Treaty Revisions.92   While 
consumer protection was eventually transformed into an overt European 
Law policy, the link between consumer policy and the promotion of the 
internal market project is still the case as this study supports and the latter 
objective comprises the driving force behind legislating in the area. 
The case of the EC consumer policy constitutes an example of this situation 
where the European Community after gradual Treaty changes has achieved 
to gain competency within an area.  With an analysis of the different 
developments that came through the various EU Treaties, the purpose is at 
the first point to show that consumer policy was always there, albeit in a less 
explicit form, as well as to pave the way for the argument that the fact that 
EU consumer policy acquired a separate legal title under European law was 
not accidental but rather its existence serves purposes that extend beyond 
merely providing consumer protection.  As it has earlier been stated the 
European Economic Community and its predecessor the European Coal and 
Steel Community were largely driven by economic objectives, with that being 
the economic cooperation between their Member States.  While initially the 
aims were to create a common market for their coal and steel productions, 
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this subsequently turned into a more general project of creating a common 
market for their commodities in general as a means of integrating the 
economies of the then Member States.   
The removal of the word Economic from the former’s name with the 
Maastricht Treaty aimed to reflect the change by which the cooperation 
between Member States would no longer be merely an economic one as it 
would be extended to other, not economic, fields, of which consumer 
protection forms part.  Nevertheless, with the approach followed within the 
European consumer policy, it seems that the shift from economic goals to 
social goals, especially in relation to consumer protection, was not really 
ever effectuated.  It was rather a change which constituted a smokescreen 
behind which the European Commission has striven to achieve its economic 
objectives closely connected to the internal market project as this thesis will 
show.  Accordingly, it may be suggested that the beginnings of the 
predecessors what we call today the EU, have largely survived nowadays 
even despite the decision to shift to other areas not economic in nature.  
This leads us to the view taken in this study and which supports the 
argument that increasing cross border trade, a direct consequence of and an 
opportunity provided by market integration, was always the primary purpose 
despite any references to the contrary that were at different points made. 
 
Treaty Amendments 
Treaty of Rome 1957 
At the early stages of its formation, the European Union was a political 
institution whose powers, political in nature, were considerably narrow under 
the Treaty of Rome, known as the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community.93  With the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the 
broader responsibilities of the European Union aimed at, among others, 
establishing a common market, a common commercial policy, as well as a 
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common agricultural policy.94  The particular Treaty made only minimal 
reference to the concept of consumer.  The underlying basis of the Treaty of 
Rome rested on a belief that the consumer is the ultimate beneficiary who 
will enjoy the economic objectives of the Community.  The view was that 
turning national markets of small scale into a large single market will boost 
competition which at the same time increases the choice of goods and 
services that are available for consumers.  Consumers are ultimately 
benefited by the improvements that this will cause to the quality of the goods 
and services and by the subsequent reduction in the prices.95  With a list of 
consumer rights and interests being absent from the Treaty of Rome, the 
consumer would simply reap the benefits flowing from the market 
integration.96 
The agreement for the Treaty of Rome came in 1957 while the treaty 
entered into force in the following year.  “Consumer” was mentioned at five 
different points.97  Those included first of all Article 39 which referred to the 
five objectives that the common agricultural policy would seek to achieve 
and amongst those there was the need “to ensure that supplies reach 
consumers at reasonable prices”.  In addition Article 40 which provided for a 
common organization of agricultural markets stipulated that “any 
discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community” 
should be excluded.  Article 85(3) contains an exemption from Article 85(1) 
which prohibits the agreements that have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition and this is where it allows 
consumers “a fair share of the resulting benefit”.  Further on, there was 
Article 86 which provided a list of abusive conduct by dominant firms within 
the common market and this included the situations where there is a “limiting 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers”.  The fifth reference made to consumer in Article 92(2) 
acknowledged the fact that any aid granted by a Member State which has a 
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social character and is granted to individual consumers is compatible with 
the common market.   
As Stephen Weatherill has rightly put forward those references to the 
consumer within the original Treaty of Rome are rather incidental and none 
of them constitutes an indication that there was an attempt to develop a 
regime providing for the consumer rights or interests.98  What was rather 
assumed under the Treaty of Rome is that, as it has earlier been stated, the 
consumer will derive the benefits that flow from the market integration in the 
sense that they will be in a position to enjoy a more efficient market which 
will generate more competition resulting in wider choice, lower prices and 
products and services of better quality for the consumers.99  The tension 
between the economic goal of establishing a single market and the 
consumer interest can be traced back to that point and this was the 
beginning as well as the first indication of the tension that we evidence.  
Other provisions found within the Treaty of Rome whose purpose is to 
eliminate the barriers to the free circulation of goods, persons and services, 
found under Articles 30, 48 and 59 of the relevant Treaty had as an indirect 
purpose to benefit consumers.100 Accordingly, what could be argued is that 
the particular Articles constitute, implied though not directly expressed, 
instruments of consumer policy.101  Nevertheless, an explicit basis for 
legislating within the area of consumer protection was entirely absent and for 
this reason, since the European Community can only act in those areas in 
which it enjoys competence to do so, any legislative action having an effect 
upon consumers could only be indirect.102   
While several provisions of the Treaty of Rome were either directly or 
indirectly related to the consumer, at the same time there was no provision 
offering the European Community competency to adopt secondary 
legislation “in the name of consumer protection”.103  Meanwhile, the power of 
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the European Community under Article 100 of the same Treaty to 
approximate the laws of the Member States has initially been a general one 
and it only required such approximation “to the extent required for the proper 
functioning of the common market”104 without again any reference being 
made to the field of consumer protection.   
 
While this meant that the European Community had no competence in the 
field of consumer protection, a number of amendments brought to the EU 
constitution had as a consequence consumer protection gaining a legal 
basis under EU law.105  During the period of 1976-1981, the role of the 
European Commission, as the legislative body of the European Community, 
was considerably confined in the field of consumer protection with its only 
power being the coordination of the Member States’ national consumer 
policies.106  Such coordination should not nevertheless be considered as 
accidental or insignificant.  It could be taken as a first step towards 
integrating the national markets of the different Member States as well as a 
step closer to European economic integration.    By employing a rather 
social welfare outlook, the main preoccupation was to protect consumers 
against information deficits, misleading advertising, risks to their health and 
safety as well as to provide them with appropriate rights.107  The protection 
that then European consumer policy sought to provide to consumers was 
limited to merely provide consumers with certain basic rights as a first step 
towards empowering them and giving them voice in the enforcement of their 
rights.  
Meanwhile, the fact that Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome provided a 
general power to the Council to adopt, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission, to issue directives for the approximation of the national laws of 
Member States, generally and not particularly in relation to consumer 
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protection, provided that those laws affect either the establishment or the 
functioning of the common market108 could be fairly regarded as the first step 
that showed the connection between the economic goal of establishing the 
single market and the consumer interest may be Article 100.  The early task 
of the Commission, based on this Article, by which it aimed to coordinate the 
different national consumer policies was at the same time an indication that 
consumer protection policy would not be an independent policy but rather a 
policy linked to economic integration.  
 
The Single European Act 1986 
While the Treaty of Rome made no reference to the existence of consumer 
protection as a policy as well as no indication existed that a separate regime 
would be created, the Single European Act was the first step in turning 
consumer policy into a separate and autonomous European legal policy.109  
With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 and in particular Article 
100a, a mandate was imposed on the European Commission to take 
regulatory measures in order to approximate the laws of the different 
Member States for the purpose of completing the internal market in a 
number of areas, including the area of consumer protection.  According to 
Article 100a, the competence of the Commission to make legislative 
proposals was tied to the achievement of the objectives contained in Article 
8a, namely to progressively establish the internal market by December 
1992.110  During the late 1980s, this objective turned into the most important 
feature of the Community policy.  The Single European Act which was 
entered into force in 1987 signified the outset for the initiatives in the area of 
consumer protection to be viewed as forming a part of the internal market 
strategy.111  Although, the Single European Act required the European 
Commission to “take as a base a high level of protection” as subsection (3) 
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of Article 100a stipulated, consumer protection nonetheless constituted a 
rather complementary policy for the purpose of establishing the internal 
market. 
The Single European Act heightened the concerns of actors, such as the 
United Kingdom, who until the adoption of the particular Treaty feared that 
the process of completing the common market would unavoidably lead to a 
gradual broadening of the European Commission’s competence and 
unavoidably to an expansion of the European Commission’s power.112  
Member States such as the United Kingdom had from that point formed the 
opinion that the European Community’s programme would not merely result 
in losing their national sovereignty but it would also raise the tension that 
subsisted up to that point between regional and national authorities.113  This 
was an initial indication of the fear that the Commission might misuse its 
authority to adopt common market legislation so as to extend its influence to 
other policy areas that were within the competency of the Member States’ 
national legislation. 
The Single European Act has been seen as the Act which not only gave 
shape to the subsequent Community agenda and to its modus operandi114 
as it formed the beginning for the subsequent tie between the internal 
market project and the field of consumer protection but it was also a step 
towards expanding the jurisdictional limits of the Community as well as their 
content.115  While the competency of the Commission within the area of 
consumer protection was initially limited with any legislation that would be 
adopted at the regional level affecting the consumer only indirectly, with the 
changes of the Single European Act consumer policy started taking a 
different shape.  As it has earlier been referred to, consumers were regarded 
as the ultimate beneficiaries from the competition that market integration 
would bring.  Nevertheless, the important point about the Single European 
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Act is that with its adoption, the single market project was seriously put on 
the European agenda.116 
The Single European Act was not only the first time that the area of 
consumer protection was recognized as a legislative area, although a 
separate title was not introduced117, but of equal importance was the 
introduction of the Qualified Majority Voting in the Council.  With the latter 
development, the consequence was that Member States disagreeing with a 
harmonization measure could only simply vote against it without having the 
power to veto it.  This meant that not only Member States which are in a 
minority position in the Council may find themselves being outvoted and 
bound by legislation to which they disagree but also this development 
opened the way for a dynamic regulatory activity during the 1990s.118 
The shift towards the Qualified Majority Voting is neither insignificant nor 
random119 as the purpose behind this change was to push forward the 
legislative programme by removing the power of Member States to veto 
Community legislation in the field of harmonization.120  As Howells and 
Weatherill have argued, this shift to qualified majority was required in order 
for the deepening of the integrative process to become a reality.121  The shift 
from unanimous vote towards qualified majority vote was thus regarded as 
being necessary in order to guarantee the adoption of controversial 
legislation whose aim is to remove national borders.122  This development 
was however not a welcome change for all the Member States of the 
European Community.  Member States such as Greece, Spain and 
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Poland123 opposed to further extending qualified majority voting within the 
EU Council of Ministers while Member States such Austria, Sweden and 
Finland which are the latest members of the EU, also expressed their 
reservations towards the majority voting.  On the contrary, the founding 
States of the European Community were those which were in favour of 
moving from the unanimous to the qualified majority voting.124  What this 
shows is that the founding and at the same time the most powerful Member 
States of the Community had as their purpose to smooth the path towards 
legislations that would not be welcomed by all Member States.  Qualified 
majority voting was probably a route towards achieving their purpose and 
thus adopting legislation which would not otherwise pass had the unanimous 
voting been in place.125   
While the SEA 1986 may be taken as the first step in providing the 
opportunity for the subsequent instrumentalization of the European 
consumer and the European consumer law for the purposes of perfecting 
the internal market126, the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was a 
further major development towards this direction.   
 
Maastricht Treaty 1992 
The agreement for the Maastricht Treaty came in 1992 and was then signed 
by the then Members of the European Community in the Netherlands.  As it 
has been earlier referred to, an important point in relation to the particular 
Treaty is that it has created the European Union as we know it but the 
significance that it had at the same time for consumer protection cannot be 
disregarded.  A special section in relation to consumer protection was for the 
first time provided in the particular Treaty.  This led to explicitly confirming 
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the power of the European Union to regulate within the particular area which 
until to that time was a rather indirect and implicit policy area.127 
The separate title provided to consumer protection under Article 129a of the 
Maastricht Treaty accordingly granted competence to the European 
Community to legislate within the field of consumer law.  According to Article 
129a, the Community shall, by supplementing the national policies of the 
Community Member States, “contribute to the attainment of a high level of 
consumer protection”.128  This objective included the protection of the health, 
safety and economic interests of consumers as well as the provision of 
adequate information to consumers.129  Consumer protection was offered a 
separate title under Title XI and conferred on the EC legislative competence 
within the area of consumer protection which was for the first time explicitly 
contained in a European Treaty.  This had at the same time constituted the 
first major step that was made towards the development of a more 
transparent as well as effective European consumer protection regime.130  
The Maastricht Treaty officially added consumer protection to the activities of 
the Community which are contained in Article 3 of the same treaty.  
According to Article 3(s) the Community shall contribute to the strengthening 
of consumer protection.   
The Maastricht Treaty seemed to have provided a departure from the 
attainment of economic goals and the focus of the regulatory policy-making 
of the European Community had taken a rather social character by 
implementing policies for example within areas such as education, public 
health and which consumer protection forms a part.  There have been made 
arguments suggesting that the expansion of the European Community’s 
competence in, amongst others, the area of consumer protection was critical 
as it would prevent the situation where the increasing focus of the European 
Commission on the completion of the internal market would undermine the 
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national consumer protection measures.131  Nonetheless, with the 
developments that followed within the particular area, there are doubts as to 
this expansion really prevented the European Consumer law from being too 
focused on the internal market.   
The insertion of consumer protection as a separate title within the particular 
Treaty may be regarded as a milestone for the EC consumer policy.  
Nonetheless, regard must be paid to the fact that the term internal market 
was not absent from the Maastricht Treaty either.  More particularly, the high 
level of consumer protection would be, according Article 129a (1)(a), 
attained through “measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context 
of the completion of the internal market”.132  
The competence of the Community to harmonize the national laws of the 
various Member States has remained tied to the purpose of achieving 
market integration and this is evident from the subsequent adoption of the 
various consumer protection directives which will be examined at a later 
point.133 Their adoption has been primarily, either indirectly or directly tied to 
the internal market project.  Accordingly, the fact that consumer protection 
was since the Maastricht Treaty offered explicit and separate competence, 
has not, as Weatherill and Howells have in the same line of argument put 
forward, changed the primary role of harmonization in shaping consumer 
policy at the European level.134 
The fact that Maastricht Treaty inserted a separate title for consumer 
protection does not only constitute the point at which a more explicit 
consumer policy actually began to rise but it the same time reflects a change 
in how the concept of consumer protection was conceived.  The early 1990s 
then constitute the point at which the importance of the role of consumers 
within the integration process began to be acknowledged.  Consumers could 
in their entirety perfect or break the internal market and therefore it is not 
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surprising that the Maastricht Treaty resulted with a more independent legal 
basis for the European consumer policy for which the purpose was to 
strengthen consumer protection within the European Community.  
Nevertheless the fact that there was again reference to the internal market 
reasserted the assisting and secondary role of the European consumer 
policy.135  Accordingly the Maastricht Treaty used two pillars as a basis for 
consumer protection.  While consumer protection was on the one hand an 
internal market policy, it on the other hand had a rather supporting character 
which would aid the corresponding national legislations. 136 
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 
Some years later with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 
which was put into effect in 1999, Article 129a as contained in the Maastricht 
Treaty became Article 153.  Nevertheless, by following a similar approach, 
Article 153(1) provided that “in order to promote the interests of consumers 
and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall 
contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of 
consumers as well as to promoting their right to information, education and 
to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”.137  The list of 
objectives that consumer protection would seek to achieve was largely 
extended with the Treaty of Amsterdam.  The Treaty of Amsterdam, instead 
of referring to the ‘interests’ of consumers, referred to them as the ‘rights’ of 
consumers. 
 
The second paragraph of Article 153 provides for the first time within the 
history of the European consumer policy that “consumer protection 
requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other 
Community policies and activities”. 138   The importance of this Article is that 
it does not only give consumer protection credibility as a separate 
Community competence but it additionally puts it within the wider European 
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policy-making framework.139  The insertion of the particular clause within the 
Treaty of Amsterdam signifies or rather confirms the importance and 
relevance of consumer policy within the European Community.140  The 
Treaty of Amsterdam accordingly brought a strengthening of the consumer 
protection policy and of its provisions as contained within the Treaties.141  
This constitutes evidence of the efforts that were then made to both 
incorporate consumer protection into other European policies as well as to 
turn it into a more transparent policy.142   
However, reference to the internal market project was not absent from the 
Treaty of Amsterdam either.  Paragraph 3(a), provided for once again a 
possible route to law-making within the particular area which is tied to the 
common market project.  What the particular section provided is that 
pursuant to Article 95 which formerly was Article 100a, the measures 
adopted shall contribute to the completion of the internal market143 by thus 
cross referring to the traditional competence of the Community in relation to 
consumer protection at the European level.144  In addition to that, Paragraph 
(3)(b), which may be seen as an innovation within the particular area, 
provides an additional route through which Community legislation could be 
adopted and this was through measures aiming to “support, supplement and 
monitor the policy pursued by the Member States”.  Article 95 which in 
essence portrayed the rather subordinate role of the European Consumer 
Policy, is now Article 114 of the consolidated version of Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, an amendment brought by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
Both Article 153 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and, as it has earlier been 
mentioned, its corresponding Article 129 of the Maastricht Treaty have 
constituted a novelty for the European consumer policy in the sense that 
                                            
139 Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 89) 16. 
140 Cseres, Competition Law and Consumer Protection (n 109) 200. 
141 Frank McDonald, ‘Consumer Protection policy in the European Union’ (2000) 12(1) 
European Business Journal 39, 42; Burns and Harrison, ‘Setting strategies for a new 
Europe’ (n 130) 25. 
142 Burns and Harrison, ‘Setting strategies for a new Europe’ (n 130) 26. 
143 Treaty of Amsterdam, art 153(3)(a). 
144 Howells and Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (n 120) 128. 
39 
 
they constitute the first attempts to formally and explicitly put forward a legal 
base for the European consumer policy.  Despite the potential that Article 
153 provided by which a European policy in relation to consumer protection 
could be developed independent from the harmonization and the internal 
market process, the subsequent development of European consumer policy 
have, as it will be presented at a later point in this study, remained tied to the 
harmonization process for the purposes of the internal market project.  What 
can be also argued by an examination of the paragraphs contained under 
those Articles is that they are in essence connected with the pre-existing 
policy, which was adopted in the form of Resolutions.145  Those resolutions, 
which will be analysed in the next part of this Chapter, bear the same 
character with Article 129 and Article 153 contained under the Maastricht 
Treaty and Treaty of Amsterdam respectively.  It is nonetheless important to 
clarify at this point that the successor of Article 153 is now Article 169 after 
the Treaty of Lisbon which consolidated the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and follows the exact same wording.   
  
Council Resolutions of 1975, 1981, 1986 and 1989 
This part of Chapter 2 will be devoted on an analysis of the four Council 
Resolutions that were passed at four different points with the first being 
adopted a number of years after the Treaty of Rome and the last one being 
adopted soon after the Single European Act.  Council resolutions set up 
political commitments or positions and they are adopted by the Council after 
a debate during a Council meeting.146  They are not foreseen in the Treaties 
and therefore they are not legally binding but only set up the political position 
on topics which relate to the EU’s areas of activity.147  
While consumer protection did not form a separate European policy until the 
adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, the First Council Resolution of 
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1975 contradicts this position. The Council Resolutions examined in this part 
perhaps prepared the ground for the development of consumer policy that 
would follow.  Although the formal recognition for a consumer protection 
policy at the European level came later on, the Council Resolution of 14 April 
1975 on a preliminary programme for a Community consumer protection and 
information policy may be reasonably taken to be the very first attempt to 
create a more systematic framework for the development of European 
consumer policy although a legal basis providing for the adoption of 
legislation in relation to the interests of consumers was entirely absent at 
that point. 
As early as 1972, during the Paris summit, the Heads of the then Community 
Member States had emphasized the need to coordinate as well as to 
strengthen consumer protection through the implementation of a relevant 
Community policy.148  Three years after the Paris Summit, the Council 
Resolution of 1975149 was a confirmation of the fact that the European 
Economic Community would proceed with the implementation of a consumer 
protection and information policy.  The particular Resolution as well as the 
Annex to it with the title “Preliminary programme of the European Economic 
Community for a consumer protection and information policy” were the very 
first steps taken and signified that a consumer policy would begin to emerge 
at the European level.   
According to the Annex to the Council Resolution of 1975, changes that 
emerged within the market, such as new methods of manufacture and 
retailing, new means of communication as well as the expansion of markets, 
resulted in an increased abundance and complexity of goods and 
services.150  This situation eventually turned the consumer into a unit in a 
mass market where he was for the first time the subject of advertising 
campaigns as well as the subject of pressure by the producers and 
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distributors of goods and services who were better positioned to determine 
market conditions.151   
The new changes to the market had shifted the balance between the 
consumers and suppliers in favour of the latter.  It was accordingly 
acknowledged that there was a need to keep consumers better informed of 
their rights and thus make freer choices within the market as well as to 
protect them against any abuse from producers or distributors.  Rights such 
as the right to the protection of their health and safety, the right to the 
protection of their economic interests, the right of redress, the right to 
information and education and the right to be heard were all listed within the 
Annex to the First Council Resolution.152  The rights included within the 
Annex to the Resolution along with the reference to the fact that the balance 
within the market has shifted to the favour of traders were both early 
indications of the conception of consumer as the weaker party within the 
transaction and may be accordingly argued that it was at that point the 
particular conceptualization of consumer began to emerge.   
While, the Second Council Resolution of 3 June 1981153 followed the same 
line with the First Resolution, by stressing again the importance of 
implementing a consumer protection and an information policy which would 
aid in improving the quality of life by protecting the health, safety and 
interests of consumers and by again referring to the five fundamental 
consumer rights, a greater step was made by a Third Resolution which was 
put forward in 1986.154  The Third Council Resolution of 23 June 1986, 
following the path of the two previous resolutions, had once again 
reemphasized the importance of having in place a consumer protection and 
information policy so as to achieve the tasks that the Community had set 
and which were above mentioned in relation to the two previous Resolutions 
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but, it gave extra weight to consumer protection in terms of product quality 
and safety.   
However, the importance of the latter Resolution is the reference that it 
made on the first place to “a high level of consumer protection” which 
signified that consumer protection at the European Level would go beyond 
simple standards.  Reference was made to the connection between 
consumer protection and internal market as it was emphasized that 
measures providing for a high level of consumer protection could be adopted 
at the Community level by thus contributing in achieving the internal 
market.155  With consideration to the aim of completing the internal market, 
the Council had fixed its goals and in this way invited the Commission to 
submit proposals to achieve that end.  It should be born in mind that the 
Third Council Resolution was adopted by the time the European Community 
had already set the goal of completing the internal market by the end of 
1992 and only one year after the Single European Act which is the point at 
which consumer protection started taking shape at the European level with 
its subsequent connection with the internal market also beginning to emerge. 
The fact that the Community had set the objective of completing the internal 
market by 1992 had implications not only for the Third Council Resolution, 
but it also affected the fourth Council Resolution of 9 November 1989 which 
set the future priorities of the European Community.156  By setting the future 
priorities of the Community, the particular Resolution was a further indication 
of the fact that a consumer protection policy began to be formulated.  An 
initial reference to the adoption of harmonization measures which would 
prevent obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market.  Of greater 
importance was the emergence, for the first time, of the term consumer 
confidence.  What was provided was that the Commission, in adopting 
harmonization measures which would have as their aim the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market, would need to take as a base a high 
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level of protection so as to ensure consumer confidence in the internal 
market. 157  
While no power was assigned to the European Community to adopt any 
consumer protection policy measures, what was achieved through the years 
was the smoothening of the path towards the formal recognition of the 
Community’s competence to regulate consumer protection.  The fact that the 
Commission gain competence in the area has also made it easier for the 
Commission to pursue its goals which as this study supports go beyond 
simply providing consumer protection.   As it has been made evident from an 
analysis of the four Resolutions, there was from an early point, an initial 
interest in the consumer which was confined at providing consumers who 
were seen as the weakest party within a transaction with the basis standard 
of protection.  Consumer protection had gradually not only attracted more 
attention with a higher level of protection beginning to be seen as required 
but the connection between it and the internal market began to take shape.  
While the four particular Resolutions ensured some level of intervention by 
the Community in relation to consumer protection, nevertheless in order for 
the Community to engage into more expansive projects such as 
harmonization, the Treaty amendments which provided more power and 
ground for the European Commission to use consumer protection policy as a 
basis or even as a tool for legislating were thus required.  What could be 
highlighted at this point is that the four Resolutions also reflect the changes 
that were brought to the Community’s constitution.  After the adoption of the 
Single European Act in 1986 the connection between consumer protection 
and the internal market began which began to take shape was at the same 
time reflected within the relevant Resolutions.  
Action Plans and Community Policies 
While the four Resolutions that were cited above led to consumer protection 
being gradually developed, the Treaty Revisions, and particularly the Single 
European Act, was the first step towards the formal recognition of consumer 
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protection as being a European policy.  Soon after the Single European Act 
1986, the Commission had on 3 May 1990, proceeded with its first action 
plan, the Three Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy for the period of 1990-
1992.158  The purpose of the particular document was to lay down a more 
coherent outline for the subsequent formulation of a policy.  The Community 
had from an early point supported the view that consumer confidence is a 
vital aspect of the internal market and for this reason consumer 
representation, consumer information, consumer safety and consumer 
transactions should attract the Community’s focus.  The points covered 
under the Action Plan 1990-1992 were accordingly those which contributed 
to the increase of consumer confidence which following the Commission’s 
argument contributes to the internal market project.  In addition, the fact that 
the European Commission issued its first Action Plan in relation to shaping 
of the consumer policy at the Community level further stressed out the 
importance of the particular policy within the Community context. 
The Commission had in its first Three-Year Action Plan, made clear that its 
focus would turn on four main areas which were considered as the most 
important for building consumer confidence and those were Consumer 
Representation, Consumer Information, Consumer Safety and Consumer 
Transactions.  By the time the 1990-1992 Action Plan was put forward, the 
Doorstep Selling Directive, forming part of the Consumer Acquis had already 
been adopted while the Action Plan encouraged the implementation of, 
amongst others, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Distance Selling 
Directive which are also part of the Consumer Acquis.  At the same time, the 
Action plan had in the context of the actions that would be taken set as a 
further objective to examine any possible initiatives that would aid in 
simplifying cross border consumer contracts, guarantees as well as after 
sales service.159   
The importance of consumer protection was soon reasserted in the Second 
Commission Three-Year Action Plan for 1993-1995 and thus, soon after the 
Maastricht Treaty, the particular documented with its title being “Placing the 
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single market at the service of European consumers” was a further indication 
of the early connection between consumer protection and the single market 
that began to take shape.160  In line with the previous Action Plan, the 
Second Three-Year Action Plan again showed a commitment to only certain 
areas which were seen as relevant to increasing consumer confidence and 
those included Consumer Information and Concertation, Consumer Safety, 
Access to Justice as well as Financial Services. 
The Third Three-Year Action Plan dealt with the period 1996-1998 and 
amongst others, what was in essence acknowledged was that there were 
certain details within the internal market which should be addressed in order 
for the internal market to be complete.161  The focus of consumer policy 
envisaged for the particular period was broader and it was expanded on 
issues such as the protection of the interests of consumers within the supply 
of essential services of public utility as well as to adopt measures that would 
provide the opportunity to consumers to benefit from the information society.  
While reference to the need to increase consumer confidence within the 
internal market was missing in the particular document, the subsequent 
consumer policy strategies showed a change in the approach and consumer 
policy had gradually took a different character.   
It seems that the subsequent policy strategies that followed, in particular the 
Commission’s Three-Year Action Plan for the period 1999-2001 and the 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, had shifted their focus to the 
advantages that consumers should enjoy as a result of an integrated market.  
The Community had, in an effort to ensure that the benefits that accrue from 
an integrated market reach consumers, tried to address the lack of 
consumer confidence that had by then become evident. Accordingly, the 
Community had for the years 1999-2001 expressed a commitment to not 
only ensuring a high level of health and safety of consumers but also 
providing them with a more powerful voice throughout the EU while there 
would be full respect for the economic interests of consumers. 
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Along the same lines, the Consumer Policy Strategy for the period 2002-
2006, had highlighted that there was a need to make consumers feel more 
confident within the internal market so as to take full advantage of it.  For this 
reason, the objectives that the Commission had set were to achieve a high 
common level of consumer protection across the Community and the 
involvement of consumer organizations in the EU policies as well as to 
ensure the effective enforcement of those rules dealing with consumer 
protection.  What was thus aimed to be achieved was the maximization of 
the benefits flowing from the internal market.162  
What could be accordingly argued from an examination of the different policy 
documents brought forward by the European Commission is that the internal 
market was from an early point connected to the European consumer policy.  
In addition to that, consumer confidence has more or less been at the heart 
of consumer policy from an early stage as well.  Nevertheless, there was an 
effort to increase consumer confidence by, amongst others, providing for the 
safety of consumers and for their access to justice while the provision of 
information and the respect for their interests both in the internal market and 
in financial transactions were also seen as means to increase consumer 
confidence.  However, the concerns that are posed in this study question the 
Commission’s shift towards adopting measures that contribute to the 
completion of the internal market rather than really increasing the confidence 
of consumers and those concerns have intensified with the emergence of 
the Consumer Rights Directive. 
Subsidiarity 
The preceding part referred to the process by which the European 
Community had managed to gain competence within the area of Consumer 
Law as well as to a historical overview of how European Consumer Law 
gradually developed through the various consumer policies.  Nevertheless, a 
question that arises at this point is how the European Member States 
reacted to such an expansion of the European competences and which the 
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area of consumer protection forms part.  As it has earlier been referred to, 
there were Member States such as the United Kingdom which expressed 
their concerns towards this expansion particularly when the Single European 
Act was adopted.  It was perhaps as a response to those concerns that the 
principle of subsidiarity as a general principle was introduced some years 
later within the Maastricht Treaty.163  The principle of subsidiarity as 
contained in Article 3(b) of the Maastricht Treaty provides, in those areas 
which do not fall with its competence, the Community, in taking any action, 
shall pay regard to the principle of subsidiarity and only take action when the 
objectives are not sufficiently met by the Member States which accordingly 
makes action at the Community level more appropriate.164  While the 
principle of subsidiarity which had as its aim was to provide a clear 
separation of the responsibilities of the Community on the one hand and the 
Member States on the other hand, it was at the same time regarded as 
having being proposed to justify the expansion in the Community’s 
competences as well as to settle, as it will be seen below, the diverging 
interests of the various political actors involved. 
The Council of Ministers had soon after the adoption of the Single European 
Act, started considering ways in which they could limit the expansion of the 
European Commission’s power without of course hindering the spirit that the 
Community had by then acquired, the purpose of which was to achieve the 
completion of the internal market.165  As a concept, subsidiarity made its 
appearance during the mid-1970s in a number of Reports in which the 
European Parliament was making an effort to stop the pessimistic feelings 
that had been then made evident about Europe.166  The common feature of 
all the Committees that had prepared the relevant reports was the existence 
of Christian democratic politicians from the countries of Belgium, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, the prominent presence of 
Christian democrats in those efforts to achieve optimism towards Europe 
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may not be regarded as surprising as it was Christian Democrats that 
developed the vision of European integration after the Second World War.167 
Most reports in relation to subsidiarity had initially presented it as a way in 
which the problems that the European Member States were facing during 
the mid- 1970s and early 1980s could be resolved. With the principle of 
subsidiarity, Member States would transfer their sovereignty in certain areas 
to the Community which would step in and help them in resolving the 
problems that the Member States then encountered.  Accordingly, 
subsidiarity soon became a way in which the expansion of the Community 
competences was promoted.  The adoption of the principle of subsidiarity 
was both welcomed by Member States such as France and Germany which 
were defendants of the Community acquiring more authority as well as by 
Member States such as the United Kingdom who was opposing to such a 
development.  Subsidiarity was a principle which all gave it the meaning they 
want and this is also an indication of the fact that its adoption was a solution 
to the conflicts of interests and the disagreements among the different actors 
involved and upon whom the common market would have an effect.168   
While the United Kingdom was concerned with the issue that the completion 
of the common market would gradually diminish the national sovereignty of 
Member States, the European Commission was primarily concerned with 
minimizing the impression that the programme that the Community had set 
and by which it would be able to legislate in a number of policy areas would 
lead to an increased power in the hands of the Community.169   Despite the 
adoption of the subsidiarity principle and the prominent importance that was 
attached to it, it has nevertheless been rarely used to strike down measures 
on the basis that they violate the particular principle.  Despite the 
expectation that subsidiarity would constrain the scope of the EC rule 
making, the Community has without interferences carried on legislating 
within the area of consumer protection.170 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has showed the early stages of formation of European 
Consumer Law and how the European Commission, while not initially having 
competence to regulate in the particular area, eventually became a key 
player.  This historical reference additionally acknowledges how the internal 
market considerations are unavoidable as consumer policy has from its early 
formation been connected to the internal market.  Of course this more or 
less had implications for its subsequent development.  Therefore the shift of 
focus on benefiting the internal market and which has put consumer 
protection considerations in the second place should perhaps not surprise 
us.   Having set the scene, this Chapter paves the way for subsequent 
Chapters which attempt to show how the concerns voiced in relation to the 
uneven balance between the objectives that European Consumer Law seeks 
to achieve are indeed valid.  The question at this point turns as to whether 
the integration of the internal market, as opposed to providing consumers 
with a high level of protection which the relevant Treaty provisions stipulate, 
is the actual driving force behind European Consumer Law.  And if this is the 
case, how European actors achieve it remains to be seen in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 - The Moral Panic Theory 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 of this study deals with the Moral Panic Theory, a social sciences 
theory which is concerned with the process in which increased concern is 
created over a given issue which leads to the exaggeration of a social 
problem as well as a calling need for greater social regulation or control in 
order to address the problem arising.171  It could accordingly be argued that 
the creation of moral panics serves as a diversionary tactic which seeks to 
make a given solution seem more valid or convincing.  Although the 
competency of the Commission to legislate in the area of Consumer Law 
has been tied to the internal market project, there are concerns that the 
focus has in reality shifted on the internal market by thus putting consumers 
on the second place.  The question posed is whether the consumer 
confidence justification employed by the European Commission has simply 
served as a smoke screen behind which the European Commission has 
primarily sought to achieve objectives beyond simply providing consumer 
protection.  The moral panic theory is therefore applied in the case of 
European Consumer Law in an effort to examine the process in which the 
increased concern around the low levels of consumer confidence in the 
internal market has been created and subsequently to determine whether 
this constitutes another example of a moral panic. 
 
 The Moral Panic Theory and the case of European 
Consumer Law 
The moral panic theory portrays a condition, an episode, a person or a group 
of persons which becomes defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests while the actors involved present it in a stylized and stereotypical 
way so as to in this way take the opportunity to provide a solution to the 
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problem which is favourable to them and their interests.172  The solution to a 
given problem accordingly creates the condition for the emergence of a 
moral panic.  The panic created around a particular issue may thus lead to 
changes in legal or social policy or in the way the society ultimately 
conceives a certain issue or even itself.  According to Critcher, moral panics 
acquire more strength when politicians, or we could even speak of influential 
people more generally, such as in our case the various European actors 
involved, make an effort to define and combat a given “threat”, or to better 
say it a major obstacle, by adopting relevant legislation or by adopting public 
policies which will help them to deal with it.173  Equally in the current case, 
the consumer confidence justification has constituted the reason used by the 
European Commission to achieve their desired outcome that is to achieve a 
shift towards maximum harmonisation which as this thesis will make an 
attempt to show better serves the interests of the internal market. 
While moral panic theory constitutes a theory which in most cases has 
focused on an alleged danger caused by the behaviour of a certain group of 
people, it is the element of misrepresentation of the actual goals of a public 
policy that has in other situations fuelled a moral panic.174  The latter 
constitutes the main reason for choosing to apply this theory to the area of 
European Consumer Law and particularly to the use of the consumer 
confidence justification.  With this theory forming the ground of this Chapter, 
there will be an attempt to examine whether the concern around consumer 
confidence that the European Commission could be seen as another 
emerging moral panic as well as to examine what lies behind, as Cohen puts 
it, the discrete social process that is involved in a moral panic.175   
We live in an era where the contemporary world has resulted in being loaded 
with institutions that constantly make attempts to protect people from certain 
risks, whether those are social, political or economic, and they do so in an 
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effort to ensure that the discipline required by capitalism is achieved.176  For 
this to be achieved, a social problem needs to be first created.  However, it 
should be born in mind that this does not imply that a condition or an issue is 
non-existent and that the reaction caused around it is totally based on 
fantasy and illusion.177  What the moral panic theory rather denotes is that 
the extent and significance of an issue is largely exaggerated.178  At any 
given time, there are advocates who seek to construct social problems and 
in doing so their purpose is to attract the attention of policymakers, the 
media or even the public.179  Every now and then, claims about a given 
situation suggesting that something is wrong and should be addressed are 
made. This constitutes the most common way in which social movements 
begin180  as well as the first steps towards preparing the ground for the 
subsequent concern created around a given issue.   
From an early point, the idea created around such social movements was 
that they are engaged in “the politics of reality” as Erich Goode has put it.181  
What this denotes is that those involved in claim making, use evidence or to 
better say presumed evidence, in an effort to determine and present to the 
public and generally to others the nature of a situation.182  This enables the 
actors involved in such social movements to subsequently make 
suggestions as to how a situation ought to be.183  Attempts to define a 
perceived reality for others does not only constitute a first step towards, as it 
has earlier been stated, the creation of a moral panic but it is at the same 
time a serious achievement of claim makers along the wider journey of 
attaining their goals.184   
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It should not be of course disregarded that the power and the ability to define 
reality for others and more importantly to construct reality in a convincing 
way, is generally connected to the power one has in the society.185  The way 
in which those actors define reality is often the subject of debates and long 
discussions.  The most difficult part in this process is in essence the effort to 
make a claim seem more convincing and legitimate and this primarily 
constitutes the subject of the debates and discussions among the different 
actors occupied with a given claim.186  In such situations, bringing a certain 
condition that was earlier ignored to the forefront is in itself an important 
achievement for movements aiming to attract the attention of others to such 
a condition187 and accordingly to unconsciously create a moral panic. 
Accordingly, the aim of this Chapter is thus to throw light on how the 
European actors, and primarily the European Commission, have gradually 
created a moral panic around consumer confidence in an effort to divert 
attention towards a misconceived social threat, a social problem in this case, 
which is a key characteristic of moral panics.  Those participating in moral 
panics are most of the time able, and purport, to exert influence on the 
content as well as the enforcement of law.188  Moral panics are based on the 
premise that “There ought to be a law” and legislation and law enforcement 
constitute the most apparent and often resorted to ways in which the 
concerns of moral panics are said to be addressed.189  In the case of the 
European Consumer Law, the moral panic that has been created around 
consumer confidence is indispensably connected with legislation and for this 
reason the consideration of legislation cannot be absent.190   
As relevant legislation and law enforcement are an indispensable part of 
examining a moral panic situation, the Consumer Rights Directive which is in 
this study regarded as being the most recent and manifest materialisation of 
                                            
185 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (n 19) 
120. 
186 Krinsky, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics (n 20) 144. 
187 ibid. 
188 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (n 19) 
121. 
189 ibid 122. 
190 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (n 19) 
119. 
54 
 
the moral panic that has been created around consumer confidence and for 
this reason the basis upon which European actors have based its adoption 
will be examined.  The process preceding the Consumer Rights Directive will 
be to some extent considered here, however there will be greater 
examination of the issue in a later chapter in this thesis.  In addition, the 
smoothening of the path throughout the Consumer Acquis will also be 
investigated at this point as this can help in tracking the development of the 
concern that was gradually created around consumer confidence.   
Ultimately, the theory of moral panics, once employed, can provide answers 
to questions relating to the process involved in passing laws as well as in 
even determining such as why certain laws are adopted. 191  
 
Key Attributes of Moral Panics: 
From an early point of the development of the moral panic theory, Goode 
and Ben Yehuda have provided five characteristics that moral panics bear.  
Those include the element of concern, hostility, consensus, 
disproportionality and volatility.192  The question posed is whether, given the 
peculiarities of the area in question, in the absence of one of the 
characteristics of a moral panic in the current situation, it could still be 
argued that the concern created around consumer confidence constitutes 
another instance of a moral panic.  The moral panic theory will for the first 
time be applied in an analogous situation where the increased concern in 
question has not been created around a given condition, event or behaviour 
but rather around a particular argument serving to conceal the actual driving 
force behind legislative activity in the area of European Consumer Law. 
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Concern 
Moral panic theory has rested on the conception that an increased concern 
in relation to the behaviour of certain individuals viewed a threat for the 
society is created.193  Concern is in essence a considerably significant as 
well as indispensable part of a moral panic.  Through the concern created, it 
could be said that moral panics have resulted in a way in which certain 
issues are brought to the forefront.194  The heightened concern created does 
not need to relate to the actual behaviour of a group of individuals; a concern 
over a supposed behaviour or over presumed consequences may suffice as 
well.195  
 However, in our case, the concern created around the behaviour of 
consumers does not involve a threat in the sense that the moral panic theory 
has traditionally provided.  While in other instances people whose behaviour 
was being attacked, were actually doing something, in our case it is the 
reluctance of consumers and the fact that they are abstaining from doing 
something that is at stake.  Namely, the fact that consumers are not 
considerably keen on purchasing online and cross border puts their 
behaviour under the focus of the Commission’s legislative activity.  In this 
way, the European Commission has managed over the years to create a 
concern around the lack of consumer confidence by constantly stressing the 
need to harmonize the national Consumer protection regimes of the various 
Member States and thus achieving an increase in consumer confidence.196  
The disparities that exist among the different national provisions have been 
presented as the cause of concern in the case of European Consumer law 
and at the same time as a major “threat” – obstacle to better state it – which 
deters consumers from entering into generally online and online cross 
border transactions. 
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In developing the characteristics of moral panics, what Goode and Ben-
Yehuda have stipulated in relation to the element of concern is that this 
concern should be over the actual or presumed behaviour of a group of 
individuals.  However the question posed at this point is whether in absence 
of a particular behaviour posing a threat to the society, the particular element 
could still be satisfied. Although the theory was originally developed to 
question sociological events where the antisocial behaviour of certain 
individuals was involved, it is for the first time applied in the area of 
European Consumer Law which greatly differs from the areas that the theory 
was initially applied to.  With those differences in mind and the absence, due 
to the peculiarity of the area, of a group’s behaviour posing a threat for the 
society, the element of concern could still be satisfied.  What one rather 
witnesses in the current case is reluctance on the part of consumers to 
actually act in the way that the European Commission desires. 
The concern involved in a moral panic situation becomes visible and its 
magnitude can be measured in concrete ways which include among others 
public opinions, proposed legislation as well as the speeches of political 
actors.  Political activity constitutes one of those sphere in which moral 
panics are most of the times expressed while lawmakers and politicians are 
amongst the characters that Cohen has in developing his theory determined 
as those who seem to be most worried about a perceived threat.197  Equally, 
in our case, at different points of time reference to the consumer confidence 
argument was made by various European Actors.  Politicians either give 
speeches or propose legislation regarding a certain perceived threat with the 
purpose being to make their view more convincing and consequently to 
make it shared by others.  Nevertheless, what is interesting in our case is 
that the law makers themselves have caused the moral panic in question to 
be created.  The fact that those involved in the efforts to create such concern 
around the lack of consumer confidence are at the same time those involved 
in the legislative process of the European Consumer Law could provide an 
affirmation that their efforts were directed at justifying – or even “legitimizing” 
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their legislative efforts and particularly the shift towards maximum 
harmonisation.  
Viviane Reding, who was the then Vice-Present of the European 
Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
has in 2010 delivered a speech for the purposes of the European Consumer 
Day conference, made an effort to emphasize that the lack of consumer 
confidence acts as a discouraging factor for consumers’ online shopping 
activity.198  Even if a claim is to a certain extent true, constant reference to it 
may create an exaggerated level of concern.  For example, reference to the 
argument that the level of consumer confidence is connected with the level 
of online and cross border trading may, to a certain extent, be accurate.  
However, the fact that it has been again and again put forward as well as the 
way in which different European actors, such as members of the 
Commission and of relevant to the consumer committees, talk about it has 
led to its conceptualization as a more serious issue than really is.  Reding, 
has in the same speech, stressed that only 7% of European consumers take 
the opportunity that the Single Market provides them to buy online from 
another country and blamed the lack of consumer confidence for it199 for 
which full harmonization was presented as the cure.  The fact that Reding 
attributed the low levels of cross border trading to consumer confidence 
seems to disregard wider issues involved as well as factors that obviously 
affect consumer’s confidence and of course go beyond the extent to which 
legislation is harmonised.  Those wider issues and factors affecting 
consumer confidence are analysed in great detail in a later part of this 
thesis.   
Nonetheless, this was not the only time that claims to convince for the 
validity of the consumer confidence justification were put forward.  Staffan 
Nilsson, who has been the President of the European Economic and Social 
Committee for the period of 2010-2013, was amongst those who made 
analogous efforts and what he argued was that there exists a dangerous 
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crisis of consumer confidence.200  In a speech of 2012 presented by him at 
the European Consumer Day conference he stressed out that the our 
century faces apart from a financial, economic and social crisis, a crisis of 
consumer confidence which he characterized as being far more 
dangerous.201  It is interesting that Staffan Nilsson used the word 
“dangerous” to characterize the crisis of consumer confidence.  Language is 
an important factor in such instances and it contributes towards changing the 
gravity and seriousness of an argument.  Such bold statements not only 
attract greater attention but can also lead to the gradual creation of concern 
enabling the presentation of a given situation as being more important than it 
is in reality. In addition when referring to the fact that European consumers 
must be at the heart of any initiative202 constitutes a way in which his 
argument can attract more trust and can thus be more convincing. 
 
Hostility 
In moral panic situations, the alleged social threat must be viewed with a 
bitter feeling of resentment in the sense that it is the behaviour of those 
responsible that is threatening for the society.203  The behaviour of such a 
group was envisaged by Goode and Ben-Yehuda as being damaging to 
certain values and interests.204  In our case, there exists no threat in its 
ordinary meaning that poses a danger to the society and this is attributed to 
the very nature of the situation.  What rather exists in the current situation is 
a wider state of affairs that pose a threat to the society as consumers will be 
deprived of the opportunity to improve their situation unless they engage in 
online and cross border trading.  A feeling of missing out has accordingly 
been created and unless the national consumer laws of the various Member 
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States are fully harmonized, it is presumed that consumer confidence is at 
threat in the sense that consumers will be deprived of the benefits that flow 
from the internal market.   
In our case, a ‘bitter feeling’, seems to have been created around consumer 
confidence and more accurately around the disparities that exist among the 
different national provisions which are blamed for the low levels of online 
cross border trading.  The creation of this ‘bitter feeling’ has been based on 
the view that this state of affairs had as a result depriving consumers from 
the EU’s crown jewel as Viviane Reding characterized the Single Market205.  
The fact that the moral panic theory constitutes a social theory involves a 
need of adaptation in the case of the European Consumer Law.  In the 
current case, the element of hostility differs from what already exists and, it 
is, in its literal meaning, entirely absent.  While in other situations where a 
moral panic existed, there was a heightened level of hostility towards the 
people whose behaviour posed a threat to the society206, in the current case 
as it has already been put forward, there exists no behaviour that can be 
recognized as a threat to the society.  Although hostility per se is absent in 
the current case, the feeling of dissatisfaction that European actors tried to 
create around minimum harmonization, which is blamed for the lack of 
consumer confidence, should not be disregarded.  This forms part of their 
efforts to convince about the presumed need to move away from minimum to 
maximum harmonization and of their wider efforts, whether conscious or not, 
of creating a moral panic around consumer confidence.   
Consensus 
Consensus constitutes another key feature of a moral panic and according 
to it there must be at least some minimal agreement that the societal threat 
is real and indeed serious.207  Goode and Ben-Yehuda in developing the 
characteristics of moral panics, have made clear that a given societal threat 
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does not need to resonate across the whole society, a threat must rather be 
achieved with a large or powerful segment of the public capable of 
counteracting the given threat with policies that are preferable to them.208  
This element is perhaps the most straightforward that needs no further 
analysis both in general as well as in the current case.  A satisfactory 
number of European politicians and the European Commission itself share 
common views both in relation to the issue of consumer confidence as well 
as to the ways in which they can address it.  
In addition to the view expressed by Viviane Reding in her speech where 
she emphasized that full harmonization constituted the way in which the lack 
of consumer confidence could be addressed, there have in addition been 
more instances where full harmonization was presented as the solution to 
the lack of consumer confidence.209  The European Commission has, as it 
has earlier been stated, in its various consumer policy strategies stressed 
the importance of having common rules for increasing consumer confidence 
as well as for protecting consumers effectively.210 
However, apart from Members of the Commission, there have been 
members of the European Parliament such as the French Liberal Robert 
Rochefort who supported that it was time to harmonize the different national 
rules across the EU so as to in this way increase trust in regulation and fuel 
the common market.211  To add to that, Andreas Schwab, a German centre-
right member of the European Parliament stated that online cross border 
shopping would be, once the Consumer Rights Directive was adopted, 
easier and safer for consumers.  By putting emphasis on cancellation rules, 
what he once again put forward was that only if rules were common, 
consumers would feel confident to shop across borders.212 
                                            
208 Krinsky, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics (n 20)  7. 
209 Commission, ‘Review of the Consumer Acquis’ (Green Paper) COM (2006) 744 final 7. 
210 Commission, ‘Consumer Policy Strategy 2000-2006’ (Communication) COM (2002) 208 
final; Commission, ‘EC Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 – Empowering consumers, 
enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them’ (n 16) 16. 
211 <www.euractiv.com/consumers/battle-eu-consumer-rights-linksdossier-
504087?display=normal>  accessed 15 January 2014. 
212 ibid. 
61 
 
Disproportionality 
Yet another important key characteristic of a moral panic is the element of 
disproportionality.213  Disproportionality which equates to exaggeration is 
widespread in moral panics and it constitutes the most common element 
present in most situations where claims giving rise to a social problem are 
being made.214  The level of concern caused in moral panic situations is 
unrealistic and does not accord to the relative importance of seriousness as 
well as the nature of the threat itself.215  The concern created by the 
advocates involved is accordingly much greater than the actual threat which 
a sober and a sensible assessment of it would bring forward.216 
It is, according to Hilgartner and Bosk, unlikely for the advocates of a moral 
panic to understate the importance of the issue that they are making an 
effort to present as a problem.217  It should not be disregarded that in such 
instances, the arguments that are put forward are only scarcely occupied 
with the consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the both 
sides of an issue in question.  What one can rather witness in these 
situations is evidence being put forward in a one-sided fashion, as opposed 
to a scholarly reasoned fashion.218  It is in addition unlikely for those 
advocates to critically consider the statistical numbers presenting the size of 
the problem.  The numbers are presented as right and seek to make the 
problem look more convincing.219 
The act of generating and disseminating numbers is an important aspect of 
moral panics that should not be disregarded.  The figures provided as 
empirical evidence by claim makers to support a particular claim are in most 
situations considerably exaggerated.220  In the case of European Consumer 
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Law, Eurobarometer surveys have been used by the European Commission 
to make the consumer confidence seem convincing.  What is interesting in 
this regard is the fact that Eurobarometer constitute surveys for which the 
European Commission has the role of the principal investigator and this 
raises questions as to their validity.221   
Differences in the national regimes have been blamed for the low levels of 
consumer confidence and subsequently the lack of consumer confidence 
has been seen as the reason for the low levels of cross border, and 
particularly online, shopping.  With questions that were too focused and 
directed towards receiving the desired answers, a disproportionate concern 
for the low consumer confidence accruing from minimum harmonisation 
standards began to emerge.  Nonetheless from other parts of the same 
Eurobarometer surveys that are adduced below, it can be seen that from 
consumers’ answers, legislation and maximum harmonisation can in reality 
be an irrelevant consideration when consumers have to consider legislation 
as a factor among others.   
In the Eurobarometer survey of 2002, the respondents’ answers have 
showed that the fear that there may be lower standards in other EU 
countries was cited as being last in the list of the very important reasons 
which inhibit consumer confidence in cross border purchases.222  
Consumers were more concerned with issues such as their ability to return a 
good and receive refund and how to deal with a problem that may arise as 
well as with issues such as delivery problems.  In the same survey, when 
respondents were asked as to what would increase their confidence in cross 
border trading, the least important factor was to be informed about the 
different specific consumer rights and protection measures that exist in each 
EU country.223  However, more interesting it is the fact that although it 
seemed that consumers considered the fear for lower standards in other EU 
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countries as the least important reason for the low confidence in cross 
border trading, the survey at a subsequent point contained a question 
exclusively focused on consumer rights and protection.  Consumers were 
asked a question in relation to six factors from which three of them related to 
consumer protection laws and rights and to information regarding them.   
More particularly, consumers were asked as to how important maximum 
harmonisation is for making them feel more confident in cross border 
shopping.  Consumers had to answer whether they would feel more 
confident if consumer protection laws were strengthened in all EU countries, 
if they enjoyed the same consumer rights and protection as for purchases in 
their country or if they were given information about the different specific 
consumer rights and protection measures that exist in each EU country.224  
Consumers to their majority regarded those factors as very important and 
fairly important when shopping across border, but this constitutes an 
example of a loaded question.  It could nonetheless be suggested that the 
question was directed towards a desired answer that could be used to back 
up the shift to maximum harmonisation.  Nevertheless, as this thesis will 
later argue, doubts as to whether the level of consumer protection offered in 
a foreign Member State is a relevant consideration in consumer’s decision 
making process.  What should rather raise concerns here is perhaps an 
effort made through the particular survey to direct the attention of consumers 
towards factors relating to consumer rights and consumer protection.225  
Those could well be regarded as early attempts to justify the intervention of 
the European Community in the particular area. 
A subsequent Eurobarometer survey of 2003 has interestingly showed that 
Europeans who were more confident in internet cross border trade, were 
neither particularly confident nor particularly sceptical with respect to their 
own countries.226  This raises some initial doubts as to whether the different 
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national laws is really what keeps consumers back from cross border trade 
which will be solved through the shift to maximum harmonisation.  In 
addition, the particular survey has showed that consumers are not even 
aware of their rights in their own countries, how are they then expected to 
being paying considerable regard to the laws of other countries is a question 
that remains unaddressed.  Contrary to that, the European Commission 
places considerable weight upon the differences in the various national 
regimes while in essence consumer confidence unavoidably depends, 
among others, upon wider issues and various factors that will be expanded 
in greater detail in a later part of this thesis.227   
While great emphasis is paid upon the fact that the Internet constitutes a 
recently developed medium with which not all consumers are familiar with, 
the fact that cross border trading is generally low, including purchases made 
by phone and post and not merely Internet228, signifies that it is the idea of a 
cross border transaction where the seller is physically out of the reach of the 
consumer that actually estranges European consumers.  This was also 
made evident from the fact that the majority of consumers have in the same 
survey expressed the view that they are less interested in cross border 
shopping because they prefer to shop in person.229 
However, with a slight increase being highlighted in cross border trade in the 
Special Eurobarometer Survey of 2008230, three years before the adoption of 
the Consumer Rights Directive whose purpose was to boost consumer 
confidence and thus increase cross border trade231, what could be argued is 
that trends change and as time passes people gradually become more 
familiar with new methods of transacting such as for example distance 
shopping.  The same could of course be argued for domestic distance 
shopping.  The slight increase noted perhaps constitutes an unconscious 
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change which in essence depends on a personal willingness on the part of 
consumers.  To add to that argument, it is worth mentioning that when 
consumers were asked questions in relation to their levels of confidence in 
2008, the survey has showed that consumer confidence has increased since 
2006.232  While the slight increase noted seems not to be enough for the 
European Commission, it nevertheless points towards the fact that it takes 
time for consumers as ordinary people to familiarize themselves with 
distance shopping in more particular and with the fact that the seller is out of 
their reach.  This can also be made evident from the reluctance on the part 
of consumers to enter into a transaction even while they are on a trip.233  As 
regards their view in relation to the level of protection they are provided, over 
half of Europeans have in 2008 expressed their satisfaction with the existing 
protective standards.234  This is not just an additional indication of the fact 
that the level of legislative protection offered is indeed not the primary 
concern for consumers but it also shows how the concern created around 
consumer confidence and the reliance on maximum harmonisation to 
address this is not consonant with what happens in reality. 
Volatility 
The last key feature of a moral panic is volatility.  Moral panics have been 
regarded as volatile phenomena which break out suddenly, although as 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda have stated “they may lie dormant or latent for long 
period of times”.235  This means moral panics may exist long before they 
erupt but in an undeveloped and more hidden state.  By saying that moral 
panics are volatile does not equate to say that moral panics do not have 
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structural or historical development.236  In the current case, the moral panic 
began to emerge, a long time before the Consumer Rights Directive took 
place.  For a number of years, both the European Commission and various 
European actors have with their words and actions led to the conception of 
the low levels of consumer confidence as a social problem which ought to be 
solved.  The moral panic was made explicit with the efforts of the European 
Commission to achieve a shift towards maximum harmonisation.   
There are according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda two types of moral panics; 
firstly there are moral panics which become routinized or institutionalized 
which means that they remain in place in the form of a social movement, 
legislation or even enforcement practices.  On the other hand, there are 
moral panics that disappear without leaving traces behind and by leaving the 
legal, cultural, moral and social structure more or less intact.  In the current 
case the moral panic against consumer confidence was gradually 
institutionalized and led to a change in law, that is the shift towards 
maximum harmonisation.  At the moment, the indications available show 
how the emerging moral panic has in the current case began to cause a 
change in legal structure and leaving its impact on legislation, however it 
cannot be determined yet whether the moral panic will evaporate easily or 
not. 
Pattern of Development 
Undoubtedly, moral panics differ from one another and undoubtedly their 
causation varies from case to case.  Three different patterns of development 
for moral panics were put forward by Goode and Ben-Yehuda and those 
include the grassroots model, the elite-engineered model and the interest 
group theory.237  Interestingly, the pattern of development of the concern 
caused in moral panics can shed light upon the causes and consequences 
of such a moral panic. Before determining the pattern of development of the 
concern around consumer confidence in this case, a brief reference to all 
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three models could aid in a better understanding as to which model best 
applies.   
The grassroots model 
What the grassroots model suggests is that a given concern originates within 
the public and its roots lie in wider public concerns that pre-existed and have 
been widespread amongst the populace.238  According to this theory, it is the 
public itself that both forms and maintains a moral panic.239  In such 
situations, neither interest groups nor the elites are involved in presenting 
issues aimed at spreading concern around an issue.  From the analysis that 
has been made of the current situation, it is evident that the grassroots 
model does not apply in the case of the European Consumer Law as there is 
no indication of a pre-existing public concern.  Rather the concern that has 
been created around consumer confidence constitutes a creation of the 
various European actors involved in the legislative process of the relevant 
policy. 
The elite-engineered model 
The choice between the two remaining models for the pattern of 
development of the current moral panic is more difficult to be made and a 
further analysis of the two models is required.  The elite-engineered model 
on the one hand provides that those who are the richest and most powerful 
in the society, including members of the political and economic area, 
“orchestrate” moral panics.240  They do so through the control of major 
institutions of the society.  The elite-engineered model involves campaigns 
which contribute in not only creating but also in upholding a concern around 
an issue by thus causing fear and panic to the public.241  However, the 
purpose behind such moral panics is to draw the attention of the public and 
drive it away from other problems that may exist in the society.242  Of course, 
the motive behind such moves is to protect the political and economic 
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interests of the elites by directing concern towards a condition that the elites 
do not consider as being considerably threatening to the society.  The 
supposed threat that is posed to the society can be either a considerably 
less serious problem that is amplified or it can even be totally made up.   
The interest-group model 
On the other hand, according to the interest-group model, legislators as well 
as moral entrepreneurs seek to influence the society and thus persuade 
them that a certain condition constitutes a societal threat.  This constitutes 
the most common approach to moral panics.243  This will provide them the 
opportunity to enact new rules however it is firstly required to achieve the 
recognition of an issue or a problem around which a moral panic attracting 
the concerns of the society is created.  The interest-group model considers 
moral panics as emerging from the acts of the media or other groups that 
construct a problem which may bear little or no connection to public 
concerns that are dominant in the society.  For Goode and Ben-Yehuda the 
interest-group model constitutes the most common approach into which 
legislators and moral entrepreneurs engage and initiate a series of actions 
directed towards achieving a particular end which is often to ensure that 
certain desired rules are passed.244   
The pattern of development in the current case 
Having referred to what each model suggests and having dismissed the 
grassroots model which does not resemble the pattern of development of the 
current moral panic, the question posed is which of the two remaining 
models, the elite-engineered and the interest-group model, applies to the 
current situation.  With consideration to the characteristics of each model, it 
could at this point be argued that it is the interest-group model that seems to 
apply according to the way in which the moral panic around consumer 
confidence was actually created.  As the interest-group model provides, 
legislators often with their actions manage to create a concern around a 
given issue so as to in this way grab the opportunity to pass certain rules 
                                            
243 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (n 24) 67. 
244 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, ‘Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction’ (n 
195) 165; Krinsky, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics (n 20) 8. 
69 
 
directed towards a particular, and even a less obvious, end.  In the current 
case, the constant reference that was being made to the lack of consumer 
confidence aimed at turning their argument into a convincing one and thus 
achieving recognition of it as a social problem that needs to be addressed 
through the shift to maximum harmonisation. 
The interest-group model seeks to provide answers to questions such as 
“…For whose benefits it is? Who profits? Who wins out if a given issue is 
recognized as threatening to the society? To whose advantage is a 
widespread panic about a given behaviour or institution? Who stands to 
gain?”245  From an early point, ideological moral gains have been 
distinguished from material moral gains as the motivation and driving force 
behind each of them differs.  Interest-groups politics which aim at material 
moral gains have been regarded as “cynical, self-serving, devoid of sincere 
conviction”.246   
 
The validity of the Moral Panic theory in the case of the 
European Consumer Law 
Moral panic constitutes a sociological theory which once employed can aid 
in explaining overreaction to a perceived social problem.247  Being a theory 
that has been developed during the late 1960s in a time where there was 
considerable political and intellectual turbulence, its main aim was to throw 
light at the process by which a concern about a given social problem is 
created, and although such concern is not proportionate to the actual 
problem, it has nonetheless provided the basis for change in the social or 
legal codes.248  However, one may question the validity of the particular 
theory in the case of European Consumer Law and in more particular in 
relation to the consumer confidence justification.  However, it would be 
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helpful at this point to compare the current case with another instance where 
the moral panic theory has been applied to. 
When the concept first appeared in Cohen’s work entitled Folk Devils and 
Moral Panics, the phenomenon being at stake was the Mods and Rockers 
traced back in 1960s in Britain which was a form of adolescent deviance by 
British young people belonging to the working-class and which involved 
seaside fights between two groups of young people.249  Their activities were 
presented as being immoral and as threatening the then established way of 
life.250  What was then noticed was an escalation of measures to address the 
problem which became manifested in calls to “tighten up” and “take strong 
measures”.251  Stronger propositions such as “don’t let it get out of hand” 
were in addition evoked with the image of innocent holidaymakers, parents,  
children playing with the sand, tradesmen, as the groups of people who had 
to be safeguarded against the problem at stake was put forward in an 
attempt to make those efforts seem legitimate.252  What is also important to 
mention in relation to the current case is that the degree as well as kind of 
control were both extended with new methods of control being proposed.  An 
example of that in the case of Mods and Rockers was to introduce new 
methods of control, by making new powers and new penalties available in 
the hands of the police. 253   
As if this was not enough, further control in the form of legislation was 
additionally proposed and this constitutes the most important way in which 
the government can exert control.254  “The most important interface”, as 
Thompson Kenneth puts it, in this control culture is in those instances where 
legislation proposed as a means of state control as well as legislators have 
to face the pressure that claim-makers and moral entrepreneurs inflict upon 
them.  However it should not be disregarded that this issue acquires even 
more significance where the claim-makers and moral entrepreneurs involved 
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are themselves politicians. 255  In the case of Mods and Rockers, the threat 
was perceived as going contrary to commercial interests.  Spokespersons 
made efforts to form increased reaction against the issue as its resonance 
had to reach the national level256 in order to ensure that a more powerful 
government response that would safeguard the commercial interests of local 
tradesmen or seaside resorts owners.   
An anxiety around the issue as well as a general feeling that the existing 
control was not adequate was created.  The issue ended occupying the 
House of Commons where MPs spoke with bold language about the “young 
hooligans” for which there was a need of “urgent and serious consideration” 
of punishments that would act as deterrents.257  Legislation to address the 
problem was without delay put forward while the then responsible Minister 
honestly admitted that there was a great degree of exaggeration in relation 
to the issue.258  Although, the young hooligans, as they have been 
characterized, symbolized more than one may think of, the degree of 
exaggeration as well as the fact that the problem was exploited for achieving 
hidden purposes, which in that case were to safeguard commercial interests, 
are both elements resembling the case examined in this thesis.  In the case 
of Mods and Rockers, the concern created served to justify an increase in 
social control and thus broadening the scope of law enforcement. 259  
Equally, what we witness in the case of the European Consumer Law is a 
further step towards maximum harmonisation260 with a new legislation being 
proposed, that is the Consumer Rights Directive.  Reactive law solutions 
have from an early point been regarded as a fundamental element of 
modern moral panics.261  
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The consumer confidence justification throughout the 
development Consumer Acquis 
The consumer confidence argument has comprised the justification that the 
European Commission has occasionally used throughout a period that led to 
the development of the Consumer Acquis.  At that stage the particular 
justification was employed more sparingly and in certain instances it could 
be argued more legitimately.  Although the Consumer Acquis is comprised of 
eight different Directives, only four of them, that is the Directives that were 
contained in the Consumer Rights Directive as it was initially proposed, will 
be examined.  Part of this analysis connects back to Chapter 2 which deals 
with development of the European Consumer Law and for this reason 
reference to issues that have already been discussed will unavoidably be 
made throughout this part.  The Doorstep Selling Directive adopted in 1985 
was the first directive of the Consumer Acquis.  However, as it has already 
been pointed out, the consumer confidence justification had not until that 
point made its appearance and this may be attributed to the fact that the 
particular type of contracting, that is contracts negotiated at the doorstep, 
was not perhaps greatly connected to the internal market. 
The first references to the term consumer confidence made their 
appearance a couple of years later with the first Action Plan of 1990-1992.  
With considerable emphasis being put on consumers, what was put forward 
in the Action Plan for the period of 1990-1992 was that the internal market, 
once successfully constructed, would be greatly to the advantage of the 
consumer.262   This constitutes an early indication of presenting the internal 
market as particularly advantageous for consumers.  However, this perhaps 
diverted attention away from the fact that it is in essence a rather greater 
advantage for businesses.  For businesses, the internal market constitutes 
the channel by which they can expand their trading across the Community 
and thus increase their sales by attracting consumers from Member States 
beyond their own country.  It is from that point that the Commission, whether 
consciously or not, began to construct its argument which would contribute 
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in convincing the society that the internal market was primarily for the 
advantage of consumers perhaps driving attention away from the fact 
legislating in the name of consumers would at the same time contribute in 
coming a step closer to complete the internal market project.   
What this thesis supports is that the purpose of the Commission has not 
been as pure as presented.  It could not be denied that there are provisions 
providing valuable rights and protection to consumers, nevertheless the 
suspicion that this study puts forward is that the primary purpose or to better 
say the driving force in European Consumer Law has been the desire to 
complete the internal market.  Providing consumers with adequate rights and 
protection have not been the concern per se for the Commission but it is 
rather the power of consumers in completing the internal market that seems 
to count the most.  Consumer confidence was presented by the Commission 
as a necessary ingredient of the internal market and to a certain extent this 
is true.  The position of consumers is vital for the smooth functioning of the 
internal market as all depend on consumer activity and namely their 
willingness to transact.  However, the overemphasis that is being put on 
consumers and their confidence does not seems as the real and only 
concern of the Commission but it has on the contrary been repeatedly used 
in its desire to achieve further market integration with the shift to maximum 
harmonisation.263   
The Commission had from an early point singled out areas which it regarded 
as important for building consumer confidence and among others those 
included consumer information and consumer transactions264.  The provision 
of adequate information was from that point recognized as having effect on 
consumer confidence and at the same time on the extent to which it would 
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help consumers enjoy the full benefits flowing from the internal market.  
Cross border trading was as early as 1990 acknowledged as a possible 
method of selling however up to that point, cross border trading could be 
effectuated by using means such as telephone, mail order as well as other 
communication technology.  Undoubtedly, cross border trading through the 
use of Internet was not envisaged and did not even exist.  However, the 
concern over the different national provisions in relation to sale contracts 
began to emerge by stressing out that the differences among the various 
Member States in the conditions of sale in contracts being further 
complicated by the existence of different languages across the Community 
and by the fact that each Member State used to have its different legal 
system.  The view formed was that the inability of consumers to deal with 
those complexities with confidence would act as a discouraging factor for 
entering into cross border transactions.  The new state of affairs needed to 
be addressed and the Unfair Contract Terms and the Distance Selling 
Directive were then proposed by the Commission to address complexities 
arising. 
Neither the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms and the Distance Selling nor 
their Preambles contained any explicit reference to the term consumer 
confidence per se.  However, it should not be disregarded that both 
legislative measures were results of the emphasis that the Commission had 
previously put on consumer confidence as those expressed in the Action 
Plan 1990-1992 and the Action Plan 1993-1995 accompanied by a 
willingness to adopt further legislative measures in those areas which were 
regarded as important for consumer confidence and could aid in boosting 
consumer confidence.  Consumer confidence has accordingly been an old 
argument that the Commission has rested upon in numerous occasions, and 
the fact that it was not explicitly contained in the two directives does not 
seem to undermine the fact that an emerging concern began to be formed 
from that point.  To add to the number of areas which were regarded as 
affecting consumer confidence, the Commission had some years later 
proposed the Directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods 
and associated guarantees, known as the Consumer Sales Directive which 
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was adopted in 1999 which would contribute in strengthening consumer 
confidence through the minimum harmonisation of the area.   
 
The consumer confidence justification and the Directive on 
Consumer Rights 
The Consumer Rights Directive which was eventually adopted in 2011, after 
a three year process full of obstacles which will be examined with greater 
detail at a later part of this study, has repealed the Distance Selling and 
Doorstep Selling Directive and made some slight amendments to the 
Directive on Unfair Contract Terms and to the Consumer Sales and 
Associated Guarantees Directive.  In a press release that preceded the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive, the Commission had 
emphasized that the adoption of the new directive will strengthen consumer 
rights and that it will help ensure that the provisions of it would be 
implemented promptly in all Member States so as to make consumers feel 
more confident whether they shop online or offline.265  The Commission in its 
attempt to be more convincing about the adoption of the Consumer Rights 
Directive has in a considerably ambitious way employed the consumer 
confidence justification.  By putting forward a rather bold argument, the 
Commission tried to persuade that the prompt implementation of the 
particular directive would have the power to put consumers who shop online 
in the same position with those who shop offline. 266  The question is 
nonetheless to what extent this can be achieved give the perplexities 
involved in online shopping, not to mention online cross border shopping 
which is even more burdensome due to the fact that the trader is out of the 
reach of the consumer and delivery and return issues may arise.  Is that 
really attainable?  The answer to this might be a statement put forward by 
Cohen years ago when developing the moral panic theory, legislation is in 
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moral panic situations regarded as being in line with the interests or even the 
views that the members of a given group have.267   
The more power that a group possesses, the greater the possibility that they 
will be successful in exerting their influence on the legislation adopted.268 In 
the case of European Consumer Law, if the internal market has constituted 
the actual driving force, the questions remains: which Member States may 
exert influence and what are the reasons behind this?  This issue is 
examined in Chapter 4 which analyses the trends and preferences involved 
in the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive.  However it suffices to say 
at his point that perfecting the internal market can be particularly beneficial 
for businesses found in Member States with the most powerful industries 
who can expand their trading across the Community. 
The argument that is put forward in this thesis is based on an assumption 
that a more harmonized legislation will diminish costs for businesses that 
under the previous law, they should spend a considerable amount of money 
in order to be in compliance with the different national regimes of the 
countries they wished to trade in.  On the contrary, the harmonized 
consumer protection regime will involve one time compliance costs which 
will not be considerably onerous and burdensome for big businesses.  
However, for small businesses the situation is much more different.  What 
could be insinuated at this point is that the willingness on the part of the 
Commission to create a harmonized consumer protection regime which will 
at the same time provide an opportunity to business to reap the advantages 
of the internal market are rather favourable for the biggest businesses which 
come from the most powerful and industrialized countries in the Community.  
It nonetheless remains to be seen which Member States have indeed 
favoured further integration and maximum harmonisation. 
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Limitations and Concerns 
The concept of moral panic has over the years acquired great dynamic and it 
has had an impact not only on sociology where a separate field of study in 
relation to moral panics was developed, but also as David Garland had put it 
“on the language of cultural debate and on the practice of journalists and 
politicians”.269  Allegations made at various points that certain social 
reactions are in reality moral panics have become more and more frequent 
in discussions about social problems.270  In an era where exaggeration is 
widespread, where either the media or politicians converge on creating 
concern around an issue with the purpose of exploiting it, it is not surprising 
that the concept of moral panic has become part of the armoury used in 
public debate as a means of showing one’s disapproval towards hyperbole 
that manipulates sectors of our lives.  Despite the fact that moral panic was 
initially developed as a strictly defined concept by Cohen in its earlier 
mentioned work, Folk Devils and Moral Panics271, it has with the passing of 
time, become a rhetorical move in cultural politics.  Nevertheless, its 
extensive use is not free from conceptual problems and limitations and this 
part of the chapter will be devoted on some of the majors concerns and 
criticisms in relation to the concept of moral panic.  
Despite the existence of criticisms that have repeatedly attacked moral 
panics, the value of the concept has nevertheless not been undermined.  As 
Cohen’s suggest, those problems and limitations in relation to moral panics 
should be kept in mind when applying the particular theory.  The issue of 
proportionality has been the subject of concerns and David Garland, in a 
paper commenting about the problems and limitations of the moral panic 
concept, has stated that the assumption of disproportionality involves 
empirical disputes as to the actual nature and extent of a given problem and 
the question posed is whether the reaction to such a problem is indeed out 
of proportion or whether the problem is in fact greater than one may think.272  
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The issue of disproportionality requires careful evaluation of the data 
available and careful consideration of it in relation to the given problem.  
Empirical disputes in the case of disproportionality are difficult to be 
managed and the reason for that is because there is a need to consider the 
relativeness of the actual problem to the perceived threat that is posed to 
society whose nature is always more difficult to be measured.273  For this 
reason this thesis, will make an attempt to show that despite Eurobarometer 
surveys adduced by the European Commission to support its argumentation, 
there are issues and factors, as it will be seen in Chapter 5, which are far 
more significant for affecting consumer’s decision making and consumer 
confidence.  This can further prove the disproportionate level of concern that 
has been created around the consumer confidence justification and its 
misplaced character.   
Another criticism in relation to moral panics is temporality.  Moral panics 
have been characterized as temporary, short-lived episodes.  However, 
there are criticisms that most of the studies that were engaged with the 
moral panic theory have put much emphasis on the present of a panic by 
failing to take its historical process into consideration.  According to Amanda 
Rohloff and Sarah Wright, it is perhaps the desire on the part of the writer to 
expose the reaction to the perceived threat and prove that such a reaction is 
indeed “misplaced, displaced and tendentious”, which have caused the 
tendency to ignore what preceded a certain event.  This is rather ironic since 
when considering the different elements of a moral panic, a historical 
consideration is unavoidably required.274  The criticism that most moral 
panics are “present-centred” does not constitute a concern for the current 
case as it is overcome by the fact that adequate consideration has been paid 
to the historical process of the consumer confidence argument which has 
provided a comprehensive picture of its development going beyond the 
present. 
The moral panic theory as it was initially developed by Cohen in 1972 was 
criticized for presenting a moral panic as a development that has been 
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neither intended nor anticipated.  However, this concern seems to have 
been addressed as Goode and Ben-Yehuda had in 1994 made a distinction 
between actions that were intended as opposed to developments that took 
place unintentionally.   Goode and Ben-Yehuda have by distinguishing the 
three different types of moral panics, the grassroots, the interest group and 
the elite-engineered model, paid emphasis on the elements of motive and 
responsibility.275  The three different types of panics have been examined in 
an earlier part of this study and a conclusion as to which of the three models 
applies has been drawn.  Accordingly, as the motive behind the moral panic 
that has been formed around consumer confidence has been considered, 
the concern in relation to unintentionality does not seem to constitute a 
problem for the current study. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided the underlying theory of the moral panic concept 
which constitutes the basis for the analysis of the consumer confidence 
argument.  Moral panics aid our understanding of the society and changes 
that take place within it276 and the adoption of certain laws as well as the 
shift of focus of legislation form part of such changes.  The efforts of the 
European Commission have been accordingly aimed at presenting the 
argument in relation to the lack of consumer confidence as convincing as 
possible and which has thus enabled the Commission to use the argument 
as a smokescreen for benefitting the internal market.  The purpose of this 
Chapter has accordingly been to set a hypothesis that the consumer 
confidence argument constitutes a moral panic behind which the European 
Commission has hidden the actual goals of the European Consumer Law, 
which this thesis is called upon to prove.   
The analysis of the different key attributes of moral panics and the 
application of each of them in the current case further complete the picture 
for the analysis of the consumer confidence justification.  Although the 
nature of the European Consumer Law greatly differs from the areas where 
                                            
275 Rohloff and Wright, ‘Moral Panic and Social Theory: Beyond the Heuristic’ (n 23) 407. 
276 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (n 24) 28. 
80 
 
the theory has been previously applied, most of the key characteristics 
applied in our case with the exception being the element of hostility which 
was adapted as what rather exists in our case is a bitter feeling and not 
hostility in its ordinary sense.  The concern that has been created around 
consumer confidence constitutes another moral panic, of which the 
Consumer Rights Directive is the most evident and recent manifestation, a 
moral panic that started leaving its traces behind by leading to adoption of 
legislation.  Minimum harmonisation and national legal disparities resulting 
from it have been presented as harming consumer confidence.  But, in 
reality the goal behind the current moral panic has been to achieve 
maximum harmonisation which further supports the internal market and the 
interests of businesses and therefore maximum harmonisation.  However, it 
remains to be seen in this thesis whether the moral panic has eventually 
been successful with the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive. 
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Chapter 4 – The Road to the Consumer Rights Directive 
 
Introduction 
After acknowledging the root of the problem, namely the lack of consumer 
confidence in the internal market, the European Commission had in 2004 
initiated the revision of the Consumer Acquis.  The aim was to put in place a 
common high level of protection to enhance consumer confidence in the 
internal market and at the same time create a more predictable regulatory 
regime that would decrease compliance costs for businesses who by 
expanding their trading across their national borders would contribute to the 
smooth functioning of the internal market.277  Those efforts led to the 
proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive in 2008278 which has constituted a 
highly debatable Directive due to the maximum harmonisation principle it 
provided and the reduction of consumer protection in many regards.  With 
consideration to the fact that the Commission has repeatedly stressed out 
the need to increase consumer confidence by providing a higher level of 
consumer protection, one may wonder about the true purpose of the 
proposed Directive which would lead to a diminishing of consumer 
protection.   
The three years that passed from the proposed Directive as initially 
proposed in 2008 until its adoption in 2011, of course led to considerable 
improvement being made, this does not allow one to argue that the Directive 
is a milestone.  As subsequent parts of this thesis will show, the approach 
taken in the final version as adopted is but a manifestation of its 
instrumentalist nature and the fact that the primary consideration is still the 
internal market.  Nonetheless, the initial proposal for the Commission allow 
the argument that this thesis supports to be made again, consumer 
protection considerations have been overridden by the increased desire to 
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expand cross border trade which is particularly beneficial for the internal 
market.   The purpose of this Chapter is to throw light upon the process that 
preceded the Directive and examine whether the fact that the worst 
consequences have perhaps been prevented may be attributed to the 
differences in approach between the main European Union institutions 
involved.  For this this reason, this Chapter will examine the process that 
preceded the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive, the disagreements 
that emerged throughout this process, and more importantly, the possible 
role that the position of the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union have played in this regard .   
 
Legislative Procedure 
Before examining the road to the Consumer Rights Directive, it is useful to 
provide some basic information as to the legislative process in which it was 
adopted.  The Consumer Rights Directive has been adopted using the 
ordinary legislative procedure279 as provided by Article 289 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU280 in which the European Commission, the Council 
of the European Union and the European Parliament are all involved.  The 
ordinary legislative procedure constitutes the method used for the adoption 
of the vast majority of European legislative instruments.281  The role of all 
three bodies could be considered as decisive as they directly affect the 
outcome that will eventually be achieved.  Under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, legislation is in all circumstances initiated by the European 
Commission which comes up with proposals resulting from long consultation 
process.   
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission’s proposal is 
forwarded to the European Parliament and the Council which enjoy an equal 
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footing in this process and together act as co-legislators and can adopt 
legislation, provided that agreement has been reached, either at the first or 
second reading.  The European Parliament is asked to consider the proposal 
and deliver a position on it which is usually developed by a Rapporteur and 
considered by the relevant Parliamentary committee.  The proposal is 
forwarded to the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee who are in this way called to provide their opinions as well as to 
the various National Parliaments.282  Under the ordinary legislative 
procedure the European Parliament is on equal footing along with the 
Council and their influence in the stages of adopting a piece of legislation 
should in no case be considered insignificant.  The majority of the work is 
being carried out behind the scenes in Committees and Working Groups 
which eventually formulate their positions.  However, the fact that under the 
ordinary legislative procedure there are hoops that a piece of legislation 
needs to pass through before it is finally adopted, raises questions regarding 
any influences that may led to some change during the legislative process 
and which this Chapter is called to examine. 
Structure of the Chapter 
In the first part of this Chapter, there will be an examination of the position of 
the European Parliament by drawing upon the debate that was held in the 
plenary of the European Parliament on the 23rd of March 2011283 regarding 
the proposed Consumer Rights Directive in an effort to determine the main 
areas of disagreement both within the institution itself as well as with the 
European Commission’s approach.  As the part examining the position of the 
European Parliament will show, there have been Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) who exhibited a more balanced approach between 
consumer protection and internal market consideration while there have on 
the other hand been MEPs who exhibited a rather pro-integrationist 
approach by supporting maximum harmonisation for the benefit of the 
internal market.  This provides an opportunity to check whether any 
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particular trends from those belonging to the same political grouping or the 
same Member State could be drawn.  There will additionally be an 
examination of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament in its 
final report regarding the originally proposed Directive.  The purpose behind 
the consideration of both the debate and the amendments remains to show 
the differences in the approach between the European Parliament on the 
one hand and the European Commission on the other hand.  A relevant 
question in this regard of course remains as to the influence of the 
rapporteurs and the Committees involved and whether those affect the 
position that the European Parliament as a body adopts.  The last part of this 
Chapter will be devoted on statements put forward by the Council of the 
European Union at various points throughout the legislative process of the 
Consumer Rights Directive and on the outcomes of the Policy Debates held 
by thus providing an insight into their position and further complement the 
picture regarding the position of all actors involved in the process. 
 
The Position of the European Parliament 
The Debate in the European Parliament 
The debate that was held in the European Parliament on the 23rd of March 
2011 in relation to the proposed version of the Directive brought the most 
controversial issues of the Directive to the forefront, with the level of 
harmonization being the main one.  This part will examine individual opinions 
expressed by the different MEPs by separating them based on their political 
affiliation.  The political groups in which the MEPs sit in the European 
Parliament are 7 in number and those include: the Group of the European 
Parliament People’s Party (PPE Group), the Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D 
Group), the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE Group), the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA Group), the European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR Group), the Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL Group) and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
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Group (EFD Group).  Of course, the fact that MEPs are organized according 
to their political affiliation does not prevent conclusions regarding their 
nationalities to be drawn where that is possible. 
PPE Group 
Two trends cam be highlighted from the opinions expressed by the Members 
of the European People’s Party (PPE Group).  The majority of the members 
coming from the PPE group have been particularly sympathetic to maximum 
harmonisation who viewed it as important for the benefit of the internal 
market but also exhibited an interest in e-commerce and in increasing cross-
border trade in the Union.  The Italian MEP Raffaele Baldassarre expressly 
stated that “this fundamental harmonisation action is an essential condition 
for the development of the internal market.”284  To his view, the full 
harmonisation of the right of withdrawal and the rules on information 
requirements are improvements which will increase consumer confidence 
particularly in cross-border trading as they provide the essential legal 
certainties required for the further development of electronic commerce.  The 
Swedish MEP Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, did not hesitate to express that her 
vision “has been and remains full harmonisation” as minimum harmonization 
supported by the Social Democrats prevents consumers from enjoying the 
full advantages that flow from the common market.  To her view, 
harmonisation should go further in the areas of consumer remedies and 
unfair contract terms too.285  As she more importantly stated, the resulting 
approach in the Consumer Rights Directive, which she characterised as a 
milestone, can contribute in relaunching the internal market, injecting 
confidence required to boost growth and increase competitiveness.286  The 
Polish MEP Malgorzata Handzlik287 stressed out that the Directive is 
important for consumers, trade and particularly electronic commerce and 
cross border trade.  To her view, maximum harmonisation is beneficial for 
consumers and at the same time will make life easier for companies 
operating in the field of electronic commerce.   
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For the German MEP, Kurt Lechner288, the resulting approach, with 
maximum harmonisation being more limited contrary to the initial proposal, 
will not be greatly beneficial to allow the desired progress in the internal 
market in Europe conceived as a convenient business location.  The French 
MEP Damien Abad had referred to the fact that there has been an attempt to 
strengthen the framework conditions for increasing cross-border trade which 
is particularly beneficial for the economy at a time of recession but at the 
same time ensure that the level of consumer protection is not lowered.289  
He gave emphasis on the need to create new sources of growth in order to 
exit from recession and that the simplification of European law will provide 
business the opportunity to benefit from the single market.290  In the same 
line of argument, the Portuguese PPE Group member Regina Bastos had 
showed her optimism in relation to the new Directive which according to her 
view will lead to progress in the internal market, help in boosting the 
economy and making the European Union more competitive and dynamic in 
the global economy.291  The speech of the Estonian MEP Tunne Kelam 
pointed to the same direction who additionally referred to the need to boost 
the economy through harmonizing the rules across the EU.292  Lastly, the 
Irish MEP, Seán Kelly expressed that this is about the internal market with 
harmonisation adding value to it293 while the Finish MEP, Ville Itälä, 
expressed, how hopefully the resulting approach will increase cross border 
distance sales.294 
What can be concluded from the consideration of the PPE Group’s approach 
is that the adoption of the Directive has been driven by internal market 
considerations.  The PPE Group has more or less favoured the maximum 
harmonisation approach as a way to increase cross border trade which can 
help in the economy of the Union as a whole.  They exhibited increased 
concern in putting in place a legislation that accords not only with the 
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interests of consumers but more importantly with the interests of traders and 
consequently the internal market.  Although none of the MEPs of PPE Group 
would be happy to see a reduction of consumer protection, their opinions are 
but indications of the fact that consumer policy at the European level is not 
solely focused on protecting consumers but in essence has another function, 
reducing costs which although is in the end beneficial for consumers, it 
should not nevertheless constitute the driving force behind the European 
Commission legislative efforts.  Their position seems to be more consistent 
with the approach followed under the proposed Consumer Rights Directive 
which unevenly shifted the focus on what is in the best interests of the 
internal market as opposed to providing real consumer protection.  However, 
it is perhaps fortunate that, as it will be seen below, the rest of the political 
groups in the European Parliament followed a rather balanced approach and 
have perhaps contributed in some improvements to the Directive to be 
achieved. 
S&D Group 
As the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D Group) is 
concerned, most of its members have showed their sympathy towards 
keeping in place minimum harmonization.  The German Evelyne Gebhardt 
(S&D) have acknowledged the fact that indeed there have been a number of 
improvements and she more importantly stressed the fact that the 
fundamental principle in the Consumer Rights Directive is once again 
minimum harmonization295, albeit with the exception of certain areas that are 
to be fully harmonized.296  The fact that Evelyne Gebhardt characterised 
minimum harmonisation as a fundamental principle could perhaps been 
taken as an indication that the maximum harmonization approach under the 
proposed Directive and which the European Commission has presented as 
the optimal solution has not been the preferred option by all.  Members of 
the S&D have in more particular been particularly concerned with the 
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maximum harmonisation of the list of unfair contract terms and particularly 
categorical against the fact that the list would be exhaustive.  The Spanish 
MEP Antonio Masip Hidalgo expressed how “establishing the maximum 
possible harmonisation across the Member States would reduce the 
protection of many consumers, since in many countries there is a greater 
tradition of protecting consumer rights.”297  In addition, the French MEP, 
Bernadette Vergnaud, stated that the maximum harmonisation of unfair 
terms is unacceptable as it would mean that fraudulent practices that may 
change over time and require responsiveness at times, would in this way be 
ignored.298 To her view, the  Commission’s proposal was absurd and 
maximum harmonisation would only be justifiable so long as it increases and 
not reduces consumer protection s as it was the case with the proposed 
Consumer Rights Directive.299  the French Liem Hoang Ngoc also referred to 
the fact that maximum harmonization would take away Member States’ 
ability of reacting to commercial practices that make their appearance every 
now and then and which indeed involve important risks for consumers.300   
 
Analogous views which expressed their disapproval to full harmonization 
and their preference to the minimum harmonization were those expressed 
by S&D members such as the Greek Sylvana Rapti and by the Estonian 
Antolín Sánchez Presedo, the Spanish María Irigoyen Pérez and the 
Romanian Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă.  To the latter’s view,  the better 
harmonization of the internal market  which will at the same time ensure a 
high level of consumer protection can be achieved by increasing the current 
minimum level of harmonization to the degree provided by the best existing 
national practices.  Although Antolín Sánchez Presedo stated that an 
internal market with a high protection in place is key for growth, the opinions 
expressed by the members of the S&D Group can hardly be regarded as 
driven by internal market considerations.  As the Polish member of the S&D 
Group Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg rightly acknowledged, the level 
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of harmonisation has been the most controversial issue in the proposal.  The 
Polish MEP felt pleased that the rapporteur from the Committee on the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection agreed with the arguments that 
the S&D Group put forward in which they have been highly critical with the 
Commission’s initial proposal with the rather sweeping effect that maximum 
harmonisation would have.  Not only Lidia Joanna Geringer de 
Oedenberg301 but most members coming from S&D Group expressed the 
view that Member States need to have the opportunity to maintain higher 
standards if they wish.  The fact that some improvement was made in the 
Consumer Rights Directive as eventually adopted is not due to the 
Commission’s decision to reduce the scope of the Directive but rather 
because the actors involved in the process have not been satisfied with its 
proposal.  An evident example is the S&D Group which constitutes the 
second largest grouping in the European Parliament.   
ALDE Group 
As regards the ALDE Group, they also referred to the economic growth that 
cross-border trade can bring for the Community with Robert Rochefort 
referring to the usefulness of electronic commerce which widens the choices 
available to consumers, provides them an opportunity to find the lowest 
prices while at the same time enables small and medium-sized enterprises 
and craftspeople to find new markets for their products and services.302  To 
his view, in order to move forward in the particular area, there are specific 
points that require the complete harmonization of everyone’s rights and 
duties.  He acknowledged the fact that this will obviously upset existing 
habits within each Member State’s legal culture but living together in Europe 
involves for him slightly changing our habits for the benefit of the Community 
and the general interest.303  An analogous opinion was also expressed by 
the Irish Liam Aylward who also paid emphasis on the need to facilitate 
cross-border trade.304  To his view, transparency as well as better 
information for businesses and consumers would contribute at increasing 
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consumer confidence in the market and consequently promote economic 
growth accruing from consumers’ increased activity.  Cristian Silviu Buşoi, 
while first speaking about the improvements that have been achieved in the 
Directive, he then expressly referred to the initial intention of promoting 
cross-border business by characterising it as important and very good.305  
 
ECR Group 
The Polish Adam Bielan expressed how despite the fact that the directive 
constitutes a compromise, hopefully it will bring legal certainty and increase 
consumer confidence in cross border trade and online purchases as a 
result.306  He also referred to the hope that the Directive will prove to be a 
favourable stimulus for the popularisation of online selling which will 
encourage a great number of traders to enter new markets in the European 
Union and which will in turn improve the performance of the market.307  He 
nonetheless referred to the need to strike a right balance and while trying to 
bring advantages to consumers it should at the same time be ensured that 
this does not result on adverse effects for traders.308  Malcolm Harbour and 
Edvard Kožušník also expressed their support for more harmonization.309  
To the latter’s view, full harmonization will not only eliminate cross border 
barriers but it will at same time bring greater competition in the internal 
market which means that the focus shifts from protection to providing 
consumers with choices.310 
EFD, GUE/NGL, Verts/ALE Groups 
The position of the three smaller groupings in the European Parliament are 
all considered under one part due to the fact that only one MEP of each 
grouping expressed their opinion.  As regards the EFD Group, the Italian 
MEP Oreste Rossi expressed how the proposal for the Consumer Rights 
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Directive has been bad from the outset and if the general level of 
harmonisation in the Directive is raised they will vote against it.311  For them, 
being Eurosceptics as he expressly stated, a high degree of harmonisation 
is acceptable only when it coincides with common sense and the public 
interest, which has not been perhaps the case with the European 
Commission’s attempts.312  The Cypriot Kyriacos Triantaphyllides on behalf 
of the GUE/NGL Group referred to the fact that the reduction in consumer 
rights which the proposal would have brought was avoided.  To him, the 
initial proposal put forward by the Commission was unable to meet the 
needs of consumers and it would more importantly lower the level of 
protection.313  Lastly as regards the Verts/ALE Group, the Danish MEP 
Emilie Turunen acknowledged that the Directive is not a perfect piece of 
legislation and there is a need to ensure that the result will benefits 
consumers in Europe.  She cited what the European Commission expressly 
wrote in its draft of the Single Market Act that Europeans need to be at the 
centre of the work to develop the single market.314  To her view, Member 
States should accordingly retain freedom to produce additional legislation 
when that is needed. 
 
Conclusions as to the Position of the European Parliament 
The fact that maximum harmonisation which was a major reduction in the 
areas of consumer remedies and unfair contract terms was eventually 
removed is from a consumer protection perspective an improvement.  This 
could partly be attributed to the role of the European Parliament whose 
opinion was not consonant with the Commission’s proposal.  Accordingly, 
the breaks that were put on the Commission prevented the worst results that 
the Directive could have brought.  Of course the role that the rapporteurs 
have played in this and to which a great number of MEPs referred to in their 
speeches in the particular debate should not be disregarded as they 
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contributed towards achieving some improvement to the original proposal.  
Nevertheless, the debate in the European Parliament has provided an 
opportunity to see beyond the overall approach of the European Parliament 
and have regard to what the different political groupings and the MEPs 
aligning with those political affiliations have actually expressed and for this 
reason there is an attempt at this point to draw some conclusions accruing 
from the current debate.  When issues relating to the single market are at 
stake, two opposing camps are unavoidably formed, although the two 
considerations are inextricably linked, there are Member States that are 
more consumer-oriented on the one hand and more business-oriented on 
the other hand315  and this has also been the case for the Consumer Rights 
Directive.   
There have been MEPS expressly referring to the fact that the purpose has 
been to increase cross border trade and thus contribute in the development 
of the internal market while there have at the same time been members 
expressing their concerns for keeping in place a high level of consumer 
protection.  As the debate in the European Parliament has showed, not all 
actors involved have favoured maximum harmonisation especially given the 
wide ambit of the proposed Consumer Rights Directive which would result in 
adverse consequences in the areas of consumer remedies and unfair 
contract terms.  What has been highlighted from the analysis of the debate 
held in the European Parliament is that MEPs coming from the same 
Member States had in some instances exhibited common approaches, a fact 
which is difficult to be considered as random.  When either the majority or a 
considerable number of a Member States’ MEPs align with a particular 
political group, to a certain extent the political positions of the group are not 
expected to greatly stand apart from those generally supported by the 
Member State.  There will be at this point a brief reference to the 
composition of the two largest political groups, the PPE and the S&D Group, 
as this can more or less contribute in reaching some conclusions regarding 
the wider political stance of certain Member States.  
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To begin with, the PPE Group which constitutes the largest political group in 
the European Parliament in terms of representation, brings together the 
centre and centre-right pro-European political forces of the EU.  It is 
interesting in promoting growth in Europe through closer economic 
integration.316  In this group in which almost one third of the European 
Parliament total MEPs sit, Germany is the most represented Member State 
with more than the one third of its MEPs, 42 out 99, sitting in it.  Italy and 
France comprise the second and third most represented Member States in 
the PPE group with a number almost reaching the one half of their MEPs 
sitting in this group, 34 out of 78 and 30 out of 78 respectively.  Member 
States such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Portugal are also well 
represented in the PPE Group with over half of Poland’s and Hungary’s 
MEPs sitting in it.  With consideration to the fact that the PPE Group is 
primarily focused on promoting growth in Europe through economic 
integration317, it is perhaps not surprising that the majority of Germany’s, 
France’s and Italy’s MEPs sit within the particular group.  The three Member 
States, and especially the former which is perhaps the largest and most 
industrialized country in the EU318 and for which economic integration may 
prove particularly beneficial.  The fact that the MEPs of all three Member 
States have in their speeches express their support for further harmonisation 
which, following their arguments, can help to expand cross border and 
therefore the development of the internal market, should not accordingly be 
regarded as random.   
On the other hand, as regards the UK, with consideration to the statements 
expressed by Malcolm Harbour and Diana Wallis, a desire to achieve further 
integration can hardly be inferred in that case.  On the contrary, Malcolm 
Harbour was particularly concerned with taking rights away for consumers 
which for him has constituted the biggest problem in the whole process.  For 
him, the Directive does not constitute a milestone but it is at least a 
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compromise which, as he had expressed, has prevented a downgrade to 
consumer protection. 
Protecting traders’ interests and at the same time increasing their confidence 
to trade across the EU is at the heart of ensuring the smooth functioning of 
the internal market which is actually in line with achieving an integrated 
market.  As it has already been seen in the preceding part, for the Italian 
MEPs Raffaele Baldassarre and Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, the position of 
traders has formed an important consideration which seems to have 
outeweighted consumer protection considerations.   The opinion of the 
Italian MEP Oreste Rossi, although a member of the EFD Group, also 
pointed to the same direction.  He was particularly concerned with the 
position of traders and feared about the consequences that the level of 
harmonization will have on small and medium-sized enterprises.  
Safeguarding the interests of traders as well as promoting their confidence in 
cross border trade has accordingly been a common consideration in the 
Italian approach, an approach which greatly abstains from being regarded as 
a pro-consumer approach.   
In addition, as it has been seen in the preceding part, the German MEPs 
have also in their majority expressed their concern about the position of 
traders and the need to have a practicable directive, as opposed to an over-
complex one.  The opinions of Andreas Schwab and Kurt Lechner are sound 
examples of this.  As regards the French Position, particular regard to 
distance selling was again paid by the French MEPs Robert Rochefort and 
Damien Abad in their speeches.  Concerns in relation to the position of 
traders were expressed, as it has already been stated, by the Portuguese 
Regina Basto, by the Polish Malgorzata Handzlik, as well as by the 
Hungarian MEPs Alajos Mészáros and Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz.  It is important to 
say at this point that all three Member States, Poland, Portugal and Hungary 
are well represented, according to their size, in the PPE Group with the two 
latter countries constituting the strongest manufacturing forces in Central 
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and Eastern Europe.319   Accordingly, their sympathy towards traders could 
be presumably ‘justified’ to some degree. 
 
As far as the S&D is concerned, the second largest group in the European 
Parliament, it is important to state that those Member States whose 
presence is noteworthy in the PPE Group and in more particular Germany, 
France, Poland, Hungary, have far less MEPs sitting in the S&D Group as 
well as in the rest of the political groups.  The approaches of the two Groups 
seem to be found on the two edges of the spectrum.  The mission of the 
S&D Group is to achieve social justice, to ensure that everyone receives the 
benefits of growth while citizens’ rights both as humans and consumers are 
protected and overall to ensure that not only societies and markets are fairer 
but also that Europe is generally democratic for all.320  For this to be 
achieved they acknowledge the importance of making people trust the 
European Union as a whole.  From their main position, one may expect that 
their stance in relation to European Consumer Law will be more in line with a 
more pro-consumer approach which is not primarily driven by a desire to 
benefit the internal market through common principles across the EU.  This 
is what has indeed been highlighted from the views of the MEPs that align 
with the S&D as those were expressed in the Parliament’s debate regarding 
the Consumer Rights Directive.  Amongst the examples to be cited here is 
the opinion of the Czech S&D Member Olga Sehnalová and the Estonian 
MEPs Antolín Sánchez Presedo and María Irigoyen Pérez who all spoke 
about the need to enhance consumer protection and thus avoid deterioration 
in consumer rights.  In addition, MEPs such as the Estonian Antonio Masip 
Hidalgo, the Greek Sylvana Rapti have also expressed their concerns in 
relation to maximum harmonization and to the adverse effects this will have 
on consumer protection.  
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What could be thus argued is that the political positions of the group to which 
an MEP belongs as well as the Member State which an MEP comes from 
are both influential factors in this regard. Although one may consider such 
observations as obvious, it should be disregarded that there may be motive 
behind the stances that MEPs take.   
Concerns as to whether there was a group of Member States, “a core 
Europe” to better state, which actually led the integration process and guided 
change in the EU have nonetheless been formed from an early point.321  It 
cannot be denied that certain Member States have favoured integration 
more than others.  France and Germany were regarded as forming that core 
group which managed to steer the integration process.322  Their decisive role 
in the integration project of the European Community was acknowledged by 
scholars who characterized them as the driving force of Europe323, as the 
“engine”, “heart”, “vanguard” of integration.324  For this reason, it should not 
be surprising that MEPs coming from the particular Member States have, as 
it has been seen from the debate held in the European Parliament, followed 
a rather pro trader approach and have supported greater harmonization.  As 
the integration of the European Community has always constituted one of 
those Member States’ objectives, their desire to increase the confidence of 
traders in the internal market should also not be surprising and this this 
could only be achieved by ensuring that a piece of consumer protection 
legislation is not onerous for traders as well as by safeguarding certain 
provisions which have the potential to improve traders’ position.  Maximum 
harmonization is but an example of this.   
While the agreement of both is necessary to achieve an end result, it is 
nonetheless not sufficient as their views need to be shared by other Member 
States but through the use of pretext this is not difficult to be achieved.  
Although a relationship of followers and leaders was acknowledged to exist 
between EU Member States, it should not be disregarded that the desired 
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outcome which in the current case is to promote cross border trading, may at 
the same time be beneficial to other Member States as well.  This may be 
the reason why Member States such as Poland, Italy and Hungary and 
Portugal have been particularly concerned with improving the position of 
traders and developing electronic commerce which they regarded as a vital 
component for the smooth functioning of the internal market.  There is 
nothing to prevent smaller countries from improving their position and 
benefiting their economies through the expansion of cross border trade in 
EU but it may not constitute the driving force for them.   
The motives that Member States may have are always important as they can 
justify certain approaches and this is the case for the European Consumer 
Law.  The degree of industrialization of a Member State has been regarded 
as a factor affecting the emphasis that the Member State’s politicians may 
place on economic interests325 when discussing an issue at stake.  This may 
provide an initial justification as to why greater emphasis has been placed on 
finding ways to promote cross border trading and thus the ensuring the 
smooth functioning of the internal market as opposed to tackling the real 
consumer problems which should be the primary aim of European 
Consumer Law.  The greater the harmonization the more firms will take the 
advantage of the common rules to expand their trading activities to other EU 
Member States as it has already happened, to a certain extent, within 
Western Europe.  In line with Neil Fligstein’s views, a sociologist at the 
University of California, common rules have constituted one of the reasons 
that the interlocking of the economies of Western Europe was achieved by 
thus making economic integration an economic reality and not just a political 
project.326  Nonetheless, this does not suggest that the approach taken and 
the increased integration will harm consumers.  It is the fact that the efforts 
to provide firms the opportunity to expand on a European basis are actually 
taking place behind the smokescreen of providing consumer protection and 
increasing consumer confidence in the cross border trading.  France and 
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Germany have been amongst those Member States that have pushed this 
integration as they from an early point acknowledged the advantages that 
this would have for them.327  The ‘Europeanization’ of their economies was 
without doubts a way to ensure economic growth.328   
 
The Report of the European Parliament 
Committees and Rapporteurs 
Whenever a Commission puts forward a legislative proposal, a 
Parliamentary Committee is responsible to provide an opinion.329  The 
Committee appoints a rapporteur whose task is to produce a document 
containing proposed amendments which the Parliamentary committee has to 
vote upon before those are submitted to the plenary of the European 
Parliament.330  Rapporteurs are accordingly Members of the European 
Parliament and they are those who in essence develop the position that the 
Parliament finally delivers when asked to consider a particular legislative 
proposal.  At the same time, the various political groups in the committee 
have the opportunity to appoint a shadow-rapporteur whose role is to 
observe the work of the rapporteur on the report.  This has as a 
consequence the report being a result of discussions of political groups 
involving the rapporteur and the shadow-rapporteurs.331  This provides 
shadow-rapporteurs the opportunity to promote the preference of their 
political groups which subsequently guarantees that the political points of 
view of all groups will be taken into consideration. 
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The role of rapporteurs has been considered as being vital in the European 
Parliament due to the fact that their opinion carries a lot of weight.  The wide 
powers that are given to rapporteurs, which include apart from producing the 
first draft, the ability to lead debates, exert influence on the timetable as well 
as on the agenda and also to organize conferences makes their post 
considerably decisive.332  The fact that they generally receive great attention 
from the media provides a great opportunity for them to be convincing and 
thus get their views across.333  For this reason if a Member of the European 
Parliament wishes to influence a particular proposal, it is important for them 
to make sure that their concerns are known to the rapporteurs334 as they are 
those who give shape to the position of the European Parliament regarding a 
legislative proposal.335  However, the internal leadership of committees and 
the post of main rapporteur gives rise to concerns regarding their actual role 
in the process as they have all relevant information concentrated in their 
hands.336 There have been made arguments suggesting that the influence 
that the rapporteur may have in the legislative process may be sometimes 
driven by national interests as well as by the interests of the European 
Parliament group they belong to.   
 
The responsible committee throughout the legislative process of the 
Consumer Rights Directive had been the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection Committee (IMCO) while the responsible rapporteur was the 
German Andreas Schwab belonging to the PPE Group working together with 
six other MEPs coming from the rest of the political groupings who acted as 
shadow-rapporteurs in this process.  The shadow-rapporteurs had in this 
case been the German Evelyne Gebhardt coming from the S&D Group, the 
French Robert Rochefort belonging to the ALDE Group, the Danish Emilie 
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Turunen a member of the Greens/EFA Group, the Polish Adam Bielan, a 
member of the ECR Group, the Cypriot Kyriacos Triantaphyllides of 
GUE/NGL Group and the Italian Matteo Salvini belonging to the EFD Group.  
Although the amendments that were eventually contained in the Final Text 
adopted on 24 March 2011 presented in plenary provided considerable 
improvements in terms of consumer protection, the draft report initially 
provided n the Report of 22 February 2011 had initially failed to address 
certain important issues. Perhaps, the more conservative approach that was 
followed at the beginning with an evident reluctance to actually depart from 
the Commission’s proposal may be attributed to the rapporteur of the 
Committee itself.  As it has been seen in the preceding chapter, the German 
MEPs and the PPE Group in general, including the rapporteur Andreas 
Schwab, exhibited a more pro-integration approach which showed the 
additional, perhaps primary aim, of the Directive which goes beyond simply 
providing consumer protection.  This provides ground to suspect that this 
would be reflected in IMCO’s draft report for which Andreas Schwab was 
responsible to produce.  However, as it will be seen from the examination of 
the amendments put forward by the European Parliament,  the fact that 
some improvement was achieved in the Final Report may be attributed to 
the presence of the shadow-rapporteurs whose post ensures that that the 
views of all political groups are heard throughout the process.   
 
The amendments proposed by the European Parliament 
The amendments that the European Parliament put forward in relation to 
proposed Consumer Rights Directive are included in its Report of 22 
February 2011 and in the Text adopted on 24 March 2011.  Those 
amendments constituted the result of the work carried by the IMCO 
Committee of which the rapporteur was Andreas Schwab.  The purpose of 
this analysis is to present the different approaches between the European 
Commission and the European Parliament.  In certain instances, the 
Parliament has managed, with either certain insertions or slight changes to 
the Commission’s proposed text, to clarify a number of issues for consumers 
as well as to increase the level consumer protection.  The amendments that 
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the European Parliament has put forward are numerous, however, reference 
will only be made to those which are of greater significance in terms of 
consumer protection and which at the same constitute examples for the 
differences in approach between the two institutions.  There will be, where 
this is feasible, reference to the amendments that, although contained in the 
final Parliament’s report, were initially absent from the draft report prepared 
by IMCO in an effort to insinuate that this may have been a result of the 
involvement of the shadow rapporteurs in the process whose existence 
perhaps contributed in ensuring a more balanced approach.   
 
The purpose of the Directive and the level of harmonisation 
The amendment made by the European Parliament to the wording of Article 
1 which may seem totally insignificant, simply reflects upon the difference in 
approaches between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission.  While the Commission had in Article 1 of the Directive 
provided that “The purpose of this Directive is to contribute to the proper 
functioning of the internal market and achieve a high level of consumer 
protection…” the European Parliament has shifted the sequence of the two 
terms by stating that “The purpose of this Directive is to achieve a high level 
of consumer protection and contribute to the proper functioning of the 
internal market…”.  Although this constitutes a slight amendment which 
merely rephrases Article 1, it at the same time constitutes an indication of 
the importance that each body attaches to the two particular terms and the 
tension between consumer protection and the internal market.  This slight 
change was initially not included in the draft report prepared by IMCO. 
 
The European Commission has evidently been keen on full harmonisation 
by presenting it in Recital 8 of the Proposed Directive as the only way to 
ensure legal certainty in the internal market through the creation of uniform 
rules.  The particular Recital accordingly stipulated that the existence of a 
single regulatory framework will have the effect of eliminating barriers that 
result from the fragmentation of rules as well as completing the internal 
market in the area.  On the other hand, the European Parliament had been 
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willing to leave some space for discretion to Member State which would 
provide them the opportunity to adopt or maintain more stringent provisions 
in their national laws which will improve consumer protection. The 
amendment that the European Parliament secured was the full 
harmonisation of some key regulatory aspects of the Directive, which 
following their argumentation, can be justified ‘in order to secure a single 
regulatory framework for consumer protection’ and in order to increase legal 
certainty for consumers and traders in cross-border trading.  In addition, the 
rephrasing of the part of the Commission’s Recital 8 stating that ‘These 
barriers can only be eliminated by establishing uniform rules at Community 
level’ to ‘by establishing uniform rules at Union level, this should eliminate 
the barriers stemming from the disproportionate fragmentation of the rules 
and complete the internal market in this area’ is but a manifestation of the 
different opinion that the European Parliament has in relation to full 
harmonization.  The fact that the Parliament states that uniform rules at 
Union level ‘should’ eliminate barriers leaves scope for some doubt as to the 
effectiveness of this approach as opposed to the Commission’s approach 
which tries to convince that the advantages of full harmonization should be 
taken for granted.  These amendments were initially not included in the 
IMCO’s draft report. 
The initial Commission’s desire to fully harmonize the level of consumer 
protection was as it has already been made clear the main area of 
disagreement in relation to the proposed Consumer Rights Directive.  Article 
4 of the proposed Directive which provided for full harmonization approach 
was amended by the European Parliament by thus enabling Member States 
to maintain or introduce in their national laws more stringent provisions in 
those instances that are not covered in paragraphs 1a and 1b so as to 
ensure a higher level of consumer protection.   Although the concerns as to 
level of harmonization became evident from an early point in the proposal’s 
legislative process, the amendment of Article 4 and to the level of 
harmonization was probably still emerging at the point where the report of 
IMCO began to be prepared as no amendment was initially made to it in the 
draft version.  
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The ambit of the Directive 
A significant change brought has been the inclusion of digital content under 
the ambit of the Directive which was not initially contained in the European 
Commission’s original proposal.  The European Parliament had rectified this 
gap by inserting Recital 11e which provides that digital content which is 
transmitted to the consumer in a digital format and there is the possibility of 
the consumer using it on a permanent basis or in a way which is similar to 
possessing a good, should be regarded as a good for the purposes of the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  This has as a result the provisions of the 
directive to be applied to digital content with the exception that the right of 
withdrawal is lost at the time when the consumer chooses to proceed with 
download the digital content.  The European Parliament by expanding 
protection to digital content made a great step towards safeguarding the 
rights of a great number of people who nowadays enter into contracts for the 
purchase of digital content.   
In addition, by amending Article 2(1), the European Parliament expanded the 
scope of the protection that the Consumer Rights Directive would provide by 
providing Member States the opportunity to either maintain existing 
legislation or extend the application of the Consumer Rights Directive to 
either legal or natural persons which do not fall within the definition of 
consumer as provided in the same Article.  This will ensure that the Directive 
will also apply to any legal or natural person who might due to a peculiarity 
involved lose the protection offered by the Directive.  While a wider array of 
instances where protection will be provided is in this way ensured, this 
amendment was not initially included in the IMCO’s draft report.  This was 
equally the case with the further amendment brought by Article 3(1) which 
expanded the ambit of the Directive and was at the first place not addressed 
by IMCO.  Nonetheless, the improvement made extended the protection 
offered by the Consumer Rights Directive to dual-purpose contracts by thus 
ensuring that contracts concluded for purposes partly within and partly 
outside the person’s trade are covered, provided that the trade purpose is so 
limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract. 
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Information Requirements 
Although the amendment made to Recital 17 was absent from the initial draft 
report of IMCO, is of great importance owing to the insertion of a new 
requirement by which the trader, in providing comprehensive information to 
the consumer prior to the consumer being bound by the contract, is under a 
duty to take into account any specific needs that a vulnerable consumer may 
have.  According to the stipulation inserted those specific needs may be a 
result of their mental, physical, or psychological infirmity, age or credulity.  
This addition made by the European Parliament at least acknowledges the 
existence of vulnerable consumers, an issue which the European 
Commission failed to refer to altogether.  The fact that the special position of 
vulnerable consumers was not mentioned anywhere in the directive as that 
proposed by the Commission is amongst the issues that raise questions as 
to whether the Directive was indeed put forward to increase consumer 
confidence. 
Article 9 dealing with the pre-contractual information requirements simply 
constitutes another example of the improvements that were made to the 
proposed directive by the European Parliament.  The European Parliament 
attempted to provide more clarity in relation to the pre-contractual 
information that the trader is under an obligation to provide to the consumer 
in distance and off-premises contracts by creating a separate list 
independent of that contained in Article 5 which merged the general 
information requirements for on premises, off premises and distance 
contracts.  Creating a separate part dealing more specifically with off 
premises and distance contracts whose nature greatly differs from on 
premises contracts signifies that the European Parliament paid some regard 
to the peculiarities involved due to the surprise element on the one hand and 
on the fact that the trader is out of the consumer’s reach as well as the fact 
that the consumer does not have the opportunity to examine the products 
before entering into the contract on the other hand.   
Article 9 as amended by the European Parliament in a way clarifies the point 
at which the information requirements need to be provided, an important 
issue that was not at all determined in the proposed version of the directive.  
The amended Article 9 changes not only the title from “Information 
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requirements for distance and off-premises contracts” to “Pre-contractual 
information requirements for distance and off-premises contracts” but it more 
importantly stipulates under section (1) that the trader shall provide the 
information included in the Article in good time before the consumer is bound 
by the contract and in a clear and intelligible manner.  The insertion of the 
requirement “in good time” has the potentials for increasing protection of 
consumers as they can in this way be provided the opportunity to carefully 
consider the information available to them before they enter an off premises 
or distance contract.  Nonetheless, the actual meaning of the requirement “in 
good time” is left unclear which raises questions as to whether it will indeed 
improve the position of consumers.  The fact that a gap in relation to its 
actual meaning has been left open leaves the possibility to traders to make 
use of it.  At the same time it constitutes a term whose meaning may differ 
from Member State to Member State.  The introduction of this requirement 
has the potential, once its meaning is made clear, to provide consumers the 
opportunity to make an informed choice and thus avoid situation where 
certain issues become known to the consumer at the last point.  Although 
this amendment has the potential to increase consumer protection it was not 
at first contained in the IMCO’s draft report. 
In addition to that, the insertion by the European Parliament of the statement 
requiring information to be written in a clear and intelligible manner will avoid 
instances where traders might use complicated and difficult for the consumer 
to understand language which is in essence deterring for consumers.  
However, apart from diminishing consumers’ confidence, it should not be 
disregarded that consumers may be layman people, people with poor 
education, poor cognitive skills or even vulnerable consumers.  For this 
reason, although minor this amendment might look, it could be said that it is 
greatly to the advantage of consumers since requiring traders to use clear 
and intelligible language when providing the pre-contractual information to 
consumers can place consumers in a better position to comprehend the pre-
contractual information before them. 
What Article 11(1) merely provided was the information requirements 
contained in Article 9 to “be given or made available to the consumer” before 
the conclusion of the contract “in a way appropriate to the means of distance 
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communication used”.  However, the European Parliament added to this 
rather general clause and Article 11(1) now additionally stipulates that such 
information “shall be given or made available to the consumer on a durable 
medium” by thus avoiding situations where a disagreement between the 
parties, over to whether such information was indeed provided by the trader 
or not, might arise. 
 
The Right to withdraw 
As regards the withdrawal period, an important step towards greater 
consumer protection was made by extending the withdrawal period, in those 
cases where the trader has failed to inform the consumer about his right of 
withdrawal, from three months to one year.  This provides greater legal 
certainty by setting in place an adequate period in which consumers can 
withdraw from a contract they entered ignorant of their right to withdraw.   In 
addition, the originally proposed Recital 28 which dealt with the mode in 
which the right of withdrawal is exercised required the standard withdrawal 
form as the method which the consumer could use to exercise his right.  
However, a slight change made by the European Parliament to the wording 
stating that the consumer “may use” the form signifies that the wish of the 
Parliament is to provide the withdrawal form as one of the possible ways in 
which the consumer can exercise his right of withdrawal and not the only 
way he can do so.  More freedom and flexibility is also provided to 
consumers who owing to the addition that the European Parliament has 
made by which the consumer will also be free to withdraw by using their own 
wording, “provided that his statement to the trader is clearly worded”. 
Sending the goods back, sending a letter or even making a telephone call 
are actions which meet the requirement and in which the consumer can 
freely communicate his decision.  The significance of these amendments lies 
in the fact that consumers who might be uneducated or unfamiliar with 
technology will have in their disposal alternative ways for withdrawing and 
thus avoid the situation where consumers wishing to withdraw from a 
contract are kept from enjoying their right because of technicalities. 
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In the main body of the Directive, the European Parliament amended Article 
14(2) and expressly extended the options for consumers by thus giving them 
the opportunity to fill in and submit the model withdrawal form electronically 
or to submit any other clearly worded statement on the trader’s website.  An 
additional option was provided to consumers, consumers would be able to 
withdraw from the contract by telephone.   While the original Article 14(2) as 
proposed required the acknowledgement of receipt of the withdrawal to be 
sent by email, the Parliament’s amendment provided this to be 
communicated in any durable medium.  Accordingly, what could be argued 
is that the latter option as proposed by the European Parliament had the 
potential of simplifying the withdrawal process for consumers to a 
considerable degree and could increase the confidence of those who would 
feel that completing the model withdrawal form would be a burdensome and 
difficult task and would accordingly refrain from exercising their right.  
Although those may seem minor, slight changes to a single provision 
contained in the Consumer Rights Directive, it should not be disregarded 
that their possibilities of increasing consumers’ overall confidence in the 
withdrawal right are great.  
The European Parliament has reduced the reimbursement period in which 
the trader is required to return any payment he had received from the 
consumer.  While the proposed period provided reimbursement to be made 
within thirty days from the day which the trader receives the communication 
of withdrawal, the European Parliament’s amendment provided that trader 
shall reimburse the consumer any payment received, and where applicable 
the delivery costs as well, without delay in a period of no later than fourteen 
days which is a considerably shorter period than that originally proposed and 
undoubtedly more favourable to consumers who will receive their money 
without delay. 
As far as the right of withdrawal is additionally concerned Article 9(b) of the 
proposal merely provided that the conditions and procedures for exercising 
that right should form an integral part of the contract while the amended 
Article 9(1)(e) contains an additional statement which requires the trader to 
inform the consumer regarding any eventual costs that may be involved 
when the consumer decides to return the goods.  Also, Article 9(1)(ea) 
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imposes a further obligation on the trader to inform the consumer, in those 
cases where the right of withdrawal does not apply, of the fact that he cannot 
exercise it.  Both amendments constitute important clarifications which can 
enable consumers to make more informed choices. 
Although the consumer is the party who bears the direct cost of returning the 
goods, the European Parliament introduced a considerably advantageous 
provision for consumers in Article 17(1).  Consumers shall only bear the cost 
for returning goods whose price is below the limit of EUR 40 while when the 
price of the goods being returned exceeds the limit of EUR 40 the trader is 
who shall bear the cost.  The introduction of this provision aimed to 
safeguard the interests of consumers who might be reluctant to return 
expensive and valuable goods for which they are not satisfied with due to 
the fact that they would have to bear the direct cost of returning the goods 
back to the trader. 
The Commission had in the Proposed Directive provided that in the case the 
trader has not provided the consumer with the information on the right of 
withdrawal, the withdrawal should expire three months after the trader has 
fully performed his other contractual obligations.  However, the European 
Parliament has extended this period to one year from the end of the initial 
withdrawal period, a change which is undoubtedly advantageous for 
consumers and can thus ensure that there is sufficient chance for 
consumers to exercise their withdrawal right when such a situation arises. 
As regards the mode of withdrawal, the European Commission’s proposal 
and Article 14 in particular required withdrawal on a durable mean, by which 
the consumer could either inform the trader of his decision by using the 
standard withdrawal brought forward in the proposed version of the Directive 
or by addressing the statement which has been drafted in his own words to 
the trader.  Nevertheless, the European Parliament involves a more relaxed 
approach by providing for a model withdrawal form.   The standard 
withdrawal form that the European Commission had initially desired could 
save time and money for traders as no further action would be required in 
order to adapt it as required by the model withdrawal form which needs to 
form the basis of the forms that traders will provide for their consumers.  In 
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addition to that, the European Parliament, has in section 1(b) introduced a 
provision which gives an additional choice to consumers who can simply 
return the goods to the trader accompanied by a clearly worded statement 
by the consumer himself which sets outs his decision to withdraw.  The 
introduction of this new method constitutes the most straightforward and 
easy method for consumers in general and most importantly for consumers 
who are not educated enough and are accordingly reluctant to make use of 
the withdrawal form provided or they might even face difficulties in 
completing it. 
Recital 34 of the Proposed Directive dealt with the instances in which the 
consumer loses his right to withdraw from a distance contract for the 
provision of services, particularly where performance begins, with the 
consumer’s prior express agreement, during the withdrawal period and the 
consumer has enjoyed the service full or in part.  The European Parliament 
provided further clarification to the particular recital by providing that the 
express agreement on the part of the consumer needs to be an informed 
consent given by the consumer after he has been informed of the 
consequences of his decision which result in losing his right of withdrawal.  
This improvement, which was initially absent from the IMCO’s draft report, 
can be advantageous for consumers as it not only safeguards them from 
such surprises but it also provides them the opportunity to make more 
informed decisions. 
 
Non-conforming goods 
The addition by the European Parliament of Recital 39 stipulating that where 
goods are other than those ordered or where an insufficient quantity of 
goods have been delivered, then they should be presumed not to be in 
conformity with the contract is also capable of providing extra protection to 
consumers where such a situation arises.  The changes made by the 
Parliament to Recital 40 are also considerably important as the freedom that 
the original text had left to the trader to choose, in case of non-conformity, 
between repairing and replacing the goods has been removed.  Owing to 
those changes, the option is left to the consumer to choose by thus avoiding 
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the situation in which traders could act in their own motives and choose the 
option that would better serve their interests.  As far as non-conformity is 
concerned, the addition of Recital 42a by the Parliament will render the 
trader liable for lack of conformity that existed at the time the risk was 
transferred to the consumer although the lack of conformity becomes 
apparent only at a subsequent point by thus protecting consumers from 
surprising consequences.  Despite the amendments proposed by the 
European Parliament, the changes in the particular area were eventually 
removed entirely from the Consumer Rights Directive. 
Article 26(2) deals with the consequences in those cases where the goods 
do not conform to the contract.  In those cases where the trader shall 
remedy the lack of conformity to the consumer, the European Commission 
has in its proposal left the choice between repair and replacement to the 
trader himself.  However, the European Parliament has transferred this 
choice to the consumer who has the right to first require the trader to repair 
the goods or to replace them when this remedy is either not possible or 
disproportionate. 
Contractual Terms 
Recital 47 also contains an important addition by the European Parliament 
requiring all contracts to be expressed in a clear and comprehensible 
manner, an issue which was left untouched by the Commission in the 
proposal as well as in the initial draft report of IMCO and it is undoubtedly 
considerably important if one pays regard to the fact that consumers are 
most of the times ordinary people with no special legal knowledge or people 
to whom complex clauses and statements are difficult to understand.  
Moreover, while the Commission had in Recital 50 suggested that the 
Directive should contain two lists of unfair terms which should in all 
circumstances be considered unfair, the European Parliament had in the 
final Report gone a step forward by providing that the two lists should be 
non-exhaustive by thus providing a greater opportunity for consumer 
protection as the list is in this way expanded to situations beyond those 
strictly included in the list.  Although, the chapter on Unfair Contract terms 
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was eventually dropped, the requirement by which the list would be non-
exhaustive was absent from the draft report of IMCO as well. 
In Article 31(1) dealing with contract terms in more general, the European 
Parliament added the requirement for the contract terms to be expressed in 
a clear and comprehensible manner by thus making an effort to avoid the 
creation of lengthy and puzzling contract terms that ordinary consumers 
might struggle with to understand.  Additionally, while paragraph 4 of the 
same Article provided that Member States shall refrain from imposing any 
presentational requirements as to the way in which contract terms are 
expressed or made available to the consumer, the European Parliament 
made a step further once again and provided for an exception to this 
provision in cases where there persons with disabilities or where the goods 
or services may present a risk to the health and safety of the consumer or a 
third person or where there is evidence that they may lead to consumer 
detriment. 
Assessment of amendments proposed 
Amendments proposed by the European Parliament touch upon individual 
issues that are important for a consumer protection perspective 
The position of shadow-rapporteurs in a Directive’s legislative process can 
ensure that the work of the Committee rapporteur is monitored throughout it 
and as Costello and Thompson argue this is a solution to which political 
groups resort to when they are not provided with the rapporteurship on a 
legislative proposal.337  The representation of other political groups in this 
process possibly may have contributed to avoiding the situation where the 
PPE Group would have the only saying through Andreas Schwab’s 
rapporteurship.  The PPE Group constitutes a group supporting the 
promotion of a European model which they consider as vital in order to 
adapt the European Union in the changing world of the 21st century.  A 
European Political Union and further enlargement is what they aspire to and 
EU policies can contribute towards achieving economic development across 
the whole Europe.  It briefly constitutes a group favouring integration and 
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paying considerable regard to the idea of a Single Market.  Accordingly, 
consideration of the general position of the PPE Group, which had generally 
been in favour more maximum harmonisation, raises questions as to 
whether the same result would have been achieved in the final version of the 
IMCO’s opinion presented in the plenary unless the representation of the 
other political groups was guaranteed in this process.   
Accordingly, it could at this point be argued that certain amendments that 
included in the European Parliament’s final opinion which considerably 
improve consumer’s position in the Consumer Rights Directive may be 
attributed to the existence of shadow-rapporteurs which aims at ensuring 
that a wide array of opinions are represented and all taken into 
consideration.  This led to the Consumer Rights Directive being at least 
improved in and preventing the reduction of consumer protection which the 
PPE Group was, due to its interest in the internal market, promoting through 
retaining the changes to consumer remedies and unfair contract terms.  The 
general ideology of the majority of the European Parliament groupings 
coincides with a more balanced approach if one compares it to the 
Commission’s approach in the proposal which was strictly focused on the 
integration of the internal market.   
At the same time, the various political groups in the committee have the 
opportunity to appoint a shadow-rapporteur whose role is to observe the 
work of the rapporteur on the report.  This is primarily done by the bigger 
party groups.338  This has as a consequence the report being a result of 
discussions of political groups involving the rapporteur and the shadow-
rapporteurs.339  Shadow-rapporteurs enjoy considerable power over the 
report which in this way guarantees that all the political points of view of all 
groups are taken into consideration.  However, it should not be disregarded 
that this also leaves scope for manipulation as shadow rapporteurs in 
essence carry the weight of the political group they belong to behind them340 
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and the various groups involved in this way provided with the opportunity to 
promote their preferences. 
 
The Position of the Council of the European Union 
The Council held a policy debate on the draft Consumer Rights Directive 
during its Meetings held on 3-4 of December 2009.  The general view was 
that there was still a need for more work to be done in relation to the 
directive and for which the outcomes of the Council’s debate would provide 
guidance.  The Council has emphasized that there is a need to consider the 
situation of consumers and citizens in the internal market as well as to 
achieve a balance between the rights of consumers and the obligation that 
are placed on traders.  Interventions should also according to the Council 
focus on important challenges ahead such as technical developments, the e-
Commerce and the cross-border dimension of the internal market.  To the 
Council’s view and as expressly stated in the Press Release summarizing its 
meeting’s outcomes, there is a “need for more common rules to achieve a 
modern, clear European consumer policy providing legal certainty”.341  The 
Council has in more particular expressed their support for broadening of the 
definitions of distance and off premises contracts so as to guarantee that 
consumers are provided with specific information and with the right of 
withdrawal in wider array of instances which pushes towards greater 
consumer protection.  The Council expressed that a large majority of 
delegations agreed with common rules for a 14-day right of withdrawal in 
distance and off premises contracts while there were evident concerns in 
relation to the provisions dealing with faulty goods.  However, the Council’s 
view was that the text of the Commission proposal was in need of further 
clarifications in terms of its scope.   
Along with the outcome of the first debate of 3 December 2009, the outcome 
of the second ministerial debate held on 25 May 2010 provided further 
guidance and would constitute a solid basis for the subsequent work on the 
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Directive.342  In its particular debate, the Council expressed how the 
objectives of improving the functioning of the internal market and ensuring a 
high level of consumer protection cannot be realised with the Commission’s 
proposal.  They expressly acknowledged how maximum harmonisation in all 
aspects contained in the draft Directive led to concerns being developed 
among Member States, consumer organisation as well as among Members 
of the European Parliament.  The Council had remained categorical against 
full harmonisation and acknowledged that such approach would reduce the 
level of protection that consumers enjoy by the national regimes of certain 
Member States.  The Council referred to the fact that there have been 
Member States who did not agree with the maximum harmonisation of 
information requirements as this would remove them the opportunity to add 
to the list of information requirements and thus be able to react promptly 
once new types of contracts requiring specific information requirements 
arise.  To the Council’s view, a solution involving “a new reflection” and 
which will strike a balance is necessary so as to secure the agreement of all 
Member States.343  For that reason, the Council expressed its support for a 
mixed approach which would combine both levels of harmonization.  In 
addition, as far as other more specific issues are concerned, the Council 
once again emphasized the need to come up with an updated legislation that 
would be both clearer and more consistent so as to in this way achieve the 
stated objectives of the legislation, to contribute to the proper functioning of 
the internal market and at the same to achieve a high level of consumer 
protection.344   
The minutes of the ministerial debates are not available and for this reason 
only a partial conclusion can be reached in relation to the Council’s position 
through the two press releases commenting upon their meeting’s outcomes.  
Although both Press Releases are particularly short and only provide a 
summary of key points raised in the Council debates, they nonetheless allow 
an initial conclusion to be drawn.  The Council, unlike the European 
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Commission, follows a rather balanced approach and does acknowledge the 
evident flaws in the Commission’s proposal as well as the very fact that 
maximum harmonisation would lead to adverse effects for national 
consumer protection regimes.  The position of the Council in no case seems 
to be primarily driven by internal market concerns and neither by a 
passionate desire to incite an increase in cross-border trade through 
maximum harmonisation.  The Council is evidently concerned with individual 
issues arising from the Commission’s proposal and do not seem ready to 
accept a deterioration of consumer rights across the Union. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this Chapter dealing with the process that preceded the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive was not only to provide an insight 
into the differences between the approaches of the bodies involved but also 
to uncover deeper issues involved.  The main areas of disagreements and 
the different opinions regarding individual issues of the Directive which were 
the reasons for its delayed adoption have in this way helped to throw light 
upon what the different actors involved actually pursue.  A consideration of 
the Parliamentary debate in relation to the Consumer Rights Directive has 
showed that both the political group and the nationality of an MEP might in 
certain instances be a factor affecting the stance that MEPs take in the 
European Parliament.  In the debate held in the European Parliament 
plenary, there were instances where MEPs expressed views which were 
evidently more concerned with the position of traders and the desire to 
increase cross border trade which is beneficial for the internal market rather 
than for consumer protection per se.   
The European Commission has shifted its efforts towards promoting cross 
border trade by putting a legislative proposal in place that would be 
particularly attractive for traders but not protective enough for consumers.  
However, the disagreement of the European Parliament towards the 
Commission’s approach and the considerable improvements that were 
achieved to the Commission’s original text through the Parliament’s 
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amendments prevented a major reduction of consumer protection and thus 
the success of the European Commission in passing the Directive in its 
proposed form.  However, as it has been seen in the current Chapter some 
of those amendments – improvements – were not initially contained in the 
draft Report produced by the IMCO Committee.  Nonetheless the fact that 
those amendments were eventually safeguarded may be attributed to the 
presence of shadow-rapporteurs whose role is to promote the views of all 
political groups.  With consideration to the fact that the Members of the PPE 
Group and most German MEPs had followed an approach which was more 
consistent with the Commission’s proposal, it is fortunate that the concerns 
expressed by all political groups in the end safeguarded some changes.  In 
addition, the Council of the European Union by again following an approach 
which evidently stands apart from the European Commission’s preferences 
is a further contributing factor that has prevented a downgrade to consumer 
protection.   
The two subsequent Chapters of this thesis will show how despite the fact 
that the Consumer Rights Directive as eventually adopted greatly differs 
from the initial proposal it still constitutes evidence of the focus of the 
European Commission.  The European Commission, by hiding its primary 
objectives, has proved ready to sacrifice consumer protection in an effort to 
promote cross border trading which is vital for the smooth functioning of the 
internal market.  Despite the improvements made, the Directive can hardly 
be regarded as a milestone, but in reality it still constitutes indication of the 
function, and manipulation, of European Consumer Law. 
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Chapter 5 – The level of Harmonisation 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to question the very fact that maximum harmonisation 
was, according to the Commission’s argumentation, put forward to increase 
consumer confidence in cross border trade.  The chapter initially provides an 
account of the differences between minimum and maximum harmonisation 
as well as criticisms that have been made in relation to the latter level of 
harmonisation. In addition, Chapter 5 makes an attempt to prove the 
weakness of maximum harmonisation to increase consumer confidence, an 
argument that has been repeatedly put forward by academics, however 
relevant evidence from Eurobarometer surveys as well as factors affecting 
consumers’ attitude from the perspective of consumer behaviour literature 
are adduced to add to this argument.  Despite the fact that there is a 
possibility for some partial improvement to consumer confidence, there are 
factors beyond legislation that do influence consumer confidence.  As this 
chapter attempts to show the consumer confidence argument seems to be 
rather misplaced because of the limited ability of maximum harmonisation to 
really contribute towards increasing consumer confidence as the European 
Commission suggests. On the contrary the ultimate driving force behind the 
Commission’s shift to maximum harmonisation rather seems to be the 
internal market integration.  The arguments that are put forward accordingly 
seek to further prove that the European Commission’s actual aims when 
legislating within the area of the European Consumer Law actually go 
beyond consumer protection.   
Despite the fact that the proposed Directive which provided for the maximum 
harmonisation of four areas was not eventually adopted, the approach 
followed in the final Consumer Rights Directive still provides for maximum 
harmonisation while it leaves some limited areas for Member States to 
expand.345  The Consumer Rights Directive harmonises among others the 
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information requirements and the withdrawal period across the Union and it 
still provides evidence of the actual focus of the European Commission.   
The debate in relation to the level of harmonisation is the subject of this 
Chapter and central to this is an important question that has attracted the 
attention of scholars such as Wilhelmsson.  The question is whether there is 
a connection between maximum harmonisation and consumer confidence 
that is whether the maximum harmonisation of European Consumer Law can 
positively affect consumer confidence as the European Commission 
argues.346  The purpose of this Chapter is to dispute the Commission’s 
argumentation according to which maximum harmonisation was put forward 
to increase consumer confidence in cross border trading and to suggest that 
rather maximum harmonisation is particularly beneficial for the internal 
market.   The examination goes beyond a simple consideration of arguments 
that have already been made in relation to the level of harmonisation as the 
purpose of this Chapter is to uncover the weak connection between 
consumer confidence and maximum harmonisation.  The analysis of this 
chapter will make a step further by enumerating factors, beyond legislation, 
such as consumer’s perceptions, attitudes and the wider culture in which a 
consumer lives, which do affect consumer’s decision making. 
With the underlying purpose being to reveal the misplaced character of the 
consumer confidence argument and the actual focus of the European 
Commission, this chapter also analyses the underlying basis of the entity of 
consumer.  The shift to maximum harmonisation has brought to the forefront 
the use of a standard consumer by the European Commission.  European 
Consumer Law seems to envisage a consumer who, once all rules in 
relation to consumer protection are harmonised across the Union, will 
automatically be ready and confident to engage into cross border trading.  
Accordingly, the shift to maximum harmonisation seems to be focused on a 
single standard consumer which can hardly be the case in reality and this 
will be supported by a number of examples drawn from relevant surveys.  
Relevant evidence from Eurobarometer surveys that have been carried out 
                                            
346 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) 318. 
119 
 
as well as consideration of factors that affect consumers’ attitudes from the 
perspective of consumer behaviour literature will be also considered. 
The two levels of harmonisation 
With minimum harmonisation being the default position, the European 
legislators set the floor of protection that Member States need to provide in 
their national regimes.  With minimum harmonisation national legislators are 
prevented from adopting any legislation that is below the standard provided 
by European legislation in the future.347  Minimum harmonisation directives 
can be absorbed easily into national legislation due to the fact that only the 
minimum requirements provided have to be met.348  As far as pre-existing 
national standards are concerned, the advantage of minimum harmonisation 
lies in the fact that only those standards that are lower than the harmonised 
standard are displaced.  Higher standards and further consumer protection 
remain unaffected. 349  At the same time, the particular approach accordingly 
provides an opportunity for Member States not only to maintain but also to 
introduce more exacting standards of consumer protection in their national 
regimes.350  Consumers’ rights can at the same time be considerably 
improved as national legislators can choose to go beyond the minimum 
standard and develop their national legislation in accordance with the best 
practice from the rest of Member States.351  This, for example, was the case 
for the Doorstep Selling and Distance Selling Directive.  Member States had 
taken advantage of the minimum harmonisation and provided additional 
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rights for consumers under their relevant national provisions.352  An obvious 
example is the extension of the withdrawal period by some Member States 
from 7 days that was provided under the two Directives to 14 days.353 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the effect of minimum harmonisation 
is limited and emerging differences between the national laws are but an 
unavoidable consequence of the minimum harmonisation approach.  As 
Marco Loos has noted even if only one Member State chooses to transpose 
a directive into its national regime by providing extra protection than that 
provided in the directive, a process known as ‘gold-plating’, differences 
automatically emerge.354  From the consumer’s interest perspective, doubts 
exist as to whether such differences are indeed problematic as well as 
whether they constitute the reason for the low levels of consumer 
confidence.  Minimum harmonisation, by setting the floor of protection, 
provides a safety net for consumers and there is no reason why further 
protection offered in a foreign regime may discourage consumers from 
engaging in cross border shopping.  While, the adverse consequences of 
minimum harmonisation for consumers has constituted a longstanding 
argument put forward by European policy makers and as Chapter 3 have 
shown doubts exists as to whether  this indeed the case, it should not be 
disregarded that minimum harmonisation has a rather limited potential to aid 
in the functioning of the internal market.355  Minimum harmonisation 
increases the risk for traders who are particularly willing to trade across 
border as they may be surprised by the differing national rules of Member 
States.  Differences in national laws may discourage traders from trading 
beyond their borders and thus prevent the full potential of the internal market 
from becoming a reality and hindering further economic integration.  The 
goal of European integration was from an early point to reduce heterogeneity 
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amongst Member States which would no longer follow unilateral and 
diverging policies356 and achieve as much convergence as possible.  It could 
be in this way argued that the more harmonised standards the closer to the 
political ideology of integration they are.  Harmonised standards have the 
potential to facilitate trade and they can in this way be regarded as important 
in terms of the European political ideology to achieve integration.    
On the contrary, with the shift to maximum harmonisation, EC rules become 
the ceiling of protection.357  Pre-existing national standards, irrespective of 
whether they are higher or lower, are completely displaced by the 
harmonised standard as provided by European legislation.  The pre-emptive 
effect of maximum harmonisation thus limits the legislative power of Member 
States in the areas to which a directive applies and this would also be the 
case for the Consumer Rights Directive had the proposal been adopted with 
the maximum harmonisation provision.358   Maximum harmonisation leaves 
less scope to national legislators’ for manoeuvring while at the same time it 
deprives them the opportunity to take additional legislative measures.359  
Particular regard should be paid to the fact that maximum harmonisation 
brings the onerous consequence of wiping out even more protective pre-
existing national legislation that consumers in certain countries would 
otherwise enjoy.360  The latter shows the considerably radical character of 
maximum harmonisation which exceeds that of minimum harmonisation to a 
great extent.361 
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The shift to maximum harmonisation 
Low consumer confidence has been regarded as the reason why cross 
border trading across the Union has not greatly expanded.  The existence of 
different national regimes have been regarded as affecting consumer 
confidence, a concern which rose to the level of the European Commission 
which has from an early point used the consumer confidence as the 
justification for legislating within the area of European consumer law.  The 
vision of the European Commission has accordingly been to make 
consumers feel confident within the internal market and thus engage into 
cross border trading, an opportunity that the internal market provides.  While 
the consumer confidence argument initially served the justification for the 
minimum harmonisation directives that were put forward within the particular 
area, by using the same justification362, the European Commission shifted its 
focus on the maximum harmonisation of European Consumer Law363 
through the proposed Consumer Rights Directive although this was not the 
first maximum harmonisation directive that was proposed.  The Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive had in 2005 been adopted as the first 
directive based on the principle of maximum harmonisation.  The 
consequences of maximum harmonisation are unavoidably far-reaching and 
while this may not be particularly problematic with regard to the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive which has been limited to the harmonisation 
of merely one area, maximum harmonisation acquired a more radical 
character in the proposed Consumer Rights Directive as it expanded in a 
wide array of issues. 
 
Concerns in relation to the use of the consumer confidence are nevertheless 
not new as similar arguments have already been put forward by authors 
such as Christian Twigg-Flesner364, Cristina Poncibo365, Geraint Howells and 
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Reiner Schulze366.  Twigg-Flesner doubted the persuasiveness of the 
consumer confidence argument due to the existence of practical factors 
which will be examined at a later point in this chapter and which cannot be 
addressed through legislative amendments.367  Doubts as to the effect that 
maximum harmonisation may have on consumer confidence were 
expressed by Poncibo who questioned whether this is the best approach.368  
Evidently, the relationship between maximum harmonisation and consumer 
confidence has been an issue with which a significant number of authors 
have been concerned.  The only view which departed from those expressed 
by most authors is that of Vanessa Mak who has not been strongly 
categorical about the relationship between maximum harmonisation and its 
effect on consumer confidence.  To her view, maximum harmonisation will 
benefit consumers’ confidence as consumers will in this way feel secure by 
knowing that the same rules apply in all Member States.369  On the other 
hand, Wilhelmsson has spoken about the misleading nature of the argument 
which has been employed perhaps purposively by the European 
Commission despite the weak connection between maximum harmonisation 
and consumer confidence.  
Maximum harmonisation and the consumer confidence 
argument 
The consumer confidence argument, as it has already been stated, has 
constituted the leading justification that the European Commission has put 
forward both in relation to the various minimum harmonisation directives as 
well as for shift to maximum harmonisation.  The purpose of this part is to 
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show the weak connection between the maximum harmonisation of 
European consumer legislation and consumer confidence.  This argument 
has already attracted considerable criticisms by authors such as Cristina 
Poncibo, Erin O’Hara O’Connor and Thomas Wilhelmsson.  Poncibo was 
sceptical about the relationship between maximum harmonisation and 
consumer confidence.370  The fact that consumers’ decision making is 
affected by factors that go beyond legislation suffices to dispute the 
persuasiveness of the consumer confidence argument371 and as Erin O’Hara 
O’Connor has rightly cited “Harmonisation alone is unlikely to do the trick”.372  
Although, a slight change in consumer’s trust and confidence may be 
achieved through legislative amendments, law is nevertheless not the only 
and definite means in which such trust can be created.  In fact, consumers 
rarely take differences of law into consideration.373   
As it has already been stated, Thomas Wilhelmsson has been amongst 
those who have exhibited particular opposition to the use of the consumer 
confidence justification which has been overused and possibly abused by 
the European Commission in its legislative efforts. 374  To his view, 
substantive harmonisation measures that have been justified by reference to 
it relate minimally to the actual creation of consumer confidence375 and it is 
upon this premise that this part seeks to expand.  Expecting that maximum 
harmonisation will automatically bring an increase in consumer confidence, 
equates to disregarding wider complexities involved and actual factors 
affecting consumer’s decision and the very fact that consumer is a much 
more complex entity than one may think.  A more thorough consideration of 
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how consumers really behave in the marketplace provides evidence for this.  
At the same time, with the resulting approach, European Consumer Law 
seems to be focusing on a single standard consumer and consumers, as 
human beings, bear various peculiarities.  Consumers do react in various 
ways within the marketplace, whether this is due to their age, vulnerability or 
simply perhaps due to reasons in relation to their national markets.  
Examples drawn from various surveys will provide an insight into this with 
the purpose of attacking the presumed single standard of consumer that 
European Consumer Law seems to be focused on. 
Factors affecting consumer’s decisions 
Consumers base their decisions on a number of factors that go beyond 
issues in relation to legislation and therefore not associated with the level of 
harmonisation.376  Those factors which Jan Smits called as “natural barriers” 
involve among others language and distance.377  Eurobarometer surveys 
have showed that language constitutes a factor that inhibits consumers from 
buying across border with the majority of consumers expressing, in a 
Eurobarometer survey published in 2008 when the proposal for the 
Consumer Rights Directive was proposed, that they were unprepared to 
enter into a cross border transaction in another language.378  Not only two 
years before, consumers had expressed the same view with 62% of 
consumers regarding the use of a foreign language as a barrier to cross 
border shopping379 but also the same pattern prevailed in the Eurobarometer 
of 2011 on “Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer 
protection”.380   
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The fact that European consumers choose to enter into a cross border 
transaction with a US business than with a business located in another 
European Member State also points to this direction.381 The difference 
between a European Member State’s law and US law is evidently far more 
striking than the difference between two European Member States’ national 
regimes.382  However, consumers seem not to worry about legal differences 
in this instance.  An important factor to this is possibly the linguistic element.  
The main languages in the United States are English and Spanish and most 
consumers residing in European Member States may be able to understand 
one or the other of these two languages as opposed to for example 
languages such as German and French.  This accordingly seems obvious 
with regard to transactions made by UK Consumers who choose to transact 
with US traders due to the fact that the language between the two is the 
same.  The same argument could be maintained for the issue of currency as 
the exchange rates involved where a cross border transaction is concluded 
with a currency other than Euro may equally affect consumer’s willingness 
and confidence to shop from a seller in a Member State where the Euro is 
not applicable.   
The mere geographical distance that exists between the trader and the 
consumer is also a factor that may in certain circumstances dissuade 
consumers from engaging into cross border shopping.   This can be 
supported from the 2008 Eurobarometer survey in which it was made 
evident that European citizens are more confident to make a cross border 
purchase when that involves face-to-face contact with the seller as for 
example a purchase made in another Member State whilst on holiday, 
shopping trip or a business trip.383 More particularly, two thirds of European 
citizens were less interested in cross-border shopping because they prefer 
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to shop in person.384   However, the fact that distance constitutes an 
indispensable characteristic of an online and more particularly a cross 
border transaction means that the only way this can be dealt with is with a 
change in consumers’ mentality towards it.  The wider culture of a Member 
State and the general attitude of a country’s consumers towards cross 
border shopping are central to this and may affect consumers’ choice.385  
There are for example Member States where distance shopping may not be 
well embedded within the country’s culture and not well developed at all.  In 
Member States where cross-border shopping has begun becoming more 
popular, it is likely that more and more consumers may change their 
attitudes towards it and thus engage into cross border shopping more easily.  
As the Eurobarometer Survey of 2008 has showed, respondents in Member 
States where there is higher incidence of cross-border shopping are likely to 
express that they intend to make a cross-border purchase in the coming 
year.386 
Convenience issues that are connected to distance also exist and they are 
actually concerns in relation to delivery itself. 387  The fear of late delivery, 
non-delivery, or even the costs involved are all factors that affect consumers’ 
willingness to shop from a seller that is located in another Member State.388 
However, concerns in relation to delivery are according to surveys not 
limited to distance cross border transactions.  Consumers may also be 
reluctant in distance domestic transactions due to delivery problems.389  This 
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throws light upon the fact that distance shopping still alienates consumers.  
Concerns of consumers are based on a presumed risk attributed to the 
rather impersonal character of distance, more particularly online, shopping 
which not all consumers are ready to accept yet.  The impersonal character 
involved is also perhaps the reason why consumers fear of falling victim to 
scams, a factor that does affect their confidence to a considerable extent.390  
However, concerns in relation to delivery as well as the possibility of falling 
victim to scam are in the root of distance selling and whatever legislation 
amendments are made, perhaps such concerns are likely to persist as 
factors inhibiting consumers’ confidence unless consumers either acquire 
experience personally or decide to disregard them.  As the 2011 
Eurobarometer has showed, respondents who had already made at least 
one cross-border distance purchase seem less worried about delivery than 
those respondents who had not made any cross-border distance 
purchase.391 
Consumers may also be reluctant to shop from other Member States 
because of difficulties involved once the need to exchange or repair the 
products ordered emerges as well as once the need to solve a conflict with 
the seller arises.392  It is the possibility of having to resolve a problem, 
whether this is the need to make a complaint or return the goods ordered393, 
that discourages a consumer from entering into a cross border transaction 
as the trader is out of their reach.  The majority of consumers in 2006, 
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reaching the percentage of 71%, agreed that it is harder to resolve problems 
such as complaints and returns when entering into a cross border 
transaction.394  Apart from complaining, access to justice is also an important 
factor that affects consumers’ decision making.395  Uncertainties as to 
whether their rights can be enforced once such a need arises or 
uncertainties in relation to the process they have to follow to solve a conflict 
or to seek redress equally suffice to discourage consumers from shopping 
across border.  However, prior experience is once again important.  In the 
Eurobarometer Survey of 2011396, consumers who had made at least one 
cross-border distance purchase seemed less worried about difficulties 
involved when the need to resolve problems such as complaints and returns 
would arise.397   
Whatever legislative amendments are made, consumers’ concerns in 
relation to delivery, scams or returns and complaints will continue to exist 
due to the nature of distance selling and due to the fact that they are rooted 
in the consumers’ beliefs and perceptions.  The nature of those factors 
renders it infeasible to be addressed through legislative amendments.398  
Since it is unlikely that legislation alone can do the trick, doubts exist as to 
whether maximum harmonisation presented as the optimal solution for will in 
the end prove successful and have an effect on consumer confidence.  In 
addition, the debate between the two levels of harmonization in the process 
of adopting the Consumer Rights Directive has largely been based upon 
legal arguments while a wider approach embracing arguments from an 
economic and behavioural science is absent.  Although, the European 
Commission has acknowledged the importance of taking behavioural 
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economics into consideration when adopting its various policies399, this has 
not been the case with the Consumer Rights Directive.  Consideration of 
behavioural economics in the context of the Consumer Rights Directive was 
limited to the removal of pre-ticked boxes in relation to additional charges 
that are imposed on consumers, with an example of this being the priority 
boarding in flights, as well as in relation to increasing the cooling off 
period.400 
Consumer Behaviour Perspective 
Behavioural economics also throw light upon the complexity involved in 
consumer decision making process.  Evidence from the perspective of 
consumer behaviour shows how consumers’ decision can be affected by a 
wider array of issues401 with consumer’s perceptions, attitudes and the wider 
culture in which a consumer lives being some examples.  A consumer’s 
confidence constitutes an internal process which can be influenced by the 
consumers’ own views as well as by external factors accruing from his wider 
environment.  An important observation that has been made supports that 
consumers’ decision may depend on context and there may be instances 
where a consumer does not feel confident on a particular day402, without this 
meaning that he overall lacks confidence.  Also consumers may in certain 
circumstances be overconfident and put much weight on their own power of 
judgement while in others the fear of appearing less competent or less 
prudent keeps them back from entering into a transaction.  Accordingly, the 
extent to which legal standards are harmonised across the Union seem a 
minor consideration within the pool of factors that seem to affect consumers’ 
confidence and decision to proceed with a particular transaction.   
Consumers’ preferences are contingent upon behavioural biases and 
consumers are often hesitant to step out their comfort zone.  Consumers’ 
own perceptions constitute a reason why consumers stick to their habits and 
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at the same time a reason why online cross border shopping has not been 
embraced by EU consumers.403  Consumer behaviour literature 
acknowledges that consumers have the tendency of depending on 
heuristics.  The availability heuristic in more particular constitutes a mental 
shortcut by which consumers base their decisions on issues that 
immediately spring to their mind.404  Examples of this are prior first-hand 
experience or consumers’ existing knowledge about a product or service that 
affects their choice and decisions.405  Consumers hesitate to buy a product 
that they do not have direct experience due to a degree of insecurity 
accruing from the fact that consumers put much emphasis on direct 
experience406 or to better state it, in the current case, lack of experience.  At 
the same time, consumers form their own attitudes within the marketplace 
which is the reason why consumers exhibit, in most of the times, an extent of 
predisposition.407  Consumers may either be predisposed to certain products 
or perhaps to certain methods of purchasing as for example online cross 
border shopping.  Central to this is the high level of perceived risk which may 
discourage consumers from entering into a transaction.  This could be 
argued for online cross border shopping as well.  The perceived risk involved 
accordingly affect consumers’ behaviour and their confidence in cross 
border shopping is likely to increase after first-hand, positive, experience 
which can create positive attitudes towards it, a process which takes time. 
The skills of consumers, both the technical expertise of consumers as well 
as the extent of their familiarity with online shopping are equally important 
factors which tend to be ignored.  Undoubtedly, skills relate to the ease of 
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use as well as to the need for the consumer to be in control and they are a 
precondition, among other factors of course, for a consumer to proceed with 
an online purchase.408  However, the list does not end there and to add to 
what has earlier been put forward in this part, the age, education and of 
course the income of consumer are all factors that influence consumers’ 
behaviour.409  When a consumer has a rather limited income, he will 
probably hesitate to spend it on online shopping, and especially cross border 
shopping where a greater degree of risk is involved. 
Not only risk but also loss aversion is an important element within 
consumer’s decision making process.  Through the choices they made, 
consumers try to minimise or if possible to avoid losses.410  This is again 
associated with the fact that consumers tend to overvalue those products 
that they have direct experience of. 411 It could be said that online shopping 
and perhaps cross border online shopping have proved the complex nature 
of consumer’s decision making process as consumers’ behaviour is indeed 
affected by multiple factors.  It would accordingly be unreal to expect that a 
mere harmonisation of consumer protection legislation could increase 
consumer’s confidence in cross border trading.  Consumer is not only a far 
more complex entity, but also online shopping is from its nature a peculiar 
means of purchasing that not every single person is ready to accept and 
make use of.   
Some further observations 
Additionally, from research studies that have been carried out, it could be 
said that the Member State in which a consumer lives in is also a factor that 
has an impact on consumers’ choice to shop online cross-border.  
Consumers coming from Member States such as Malta, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, Austria, Ireland and Belgium have already been particularly familiar 
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with online cross border shopping and are likely to do so in the future.412  In 
certain respects, surrounding circumstances do play an important role; the 
market size and the geographic location of a Member States are factors that 
have a direct impact on the likelihood of consumers engaging into online 
cross border shopping.413  It could in this way be stated that consumers from 
smaller Member States seem to be more attracted by cross border.  This 
may be attributed to the small size of their markets where choices for 
consumers are rather limited.  In countries where there is enough choice for 
consumers, it is perhaps less likely for consumers to enter into a cross 
border transaction as they are satisfied with their country’s market.414  Just 
at the same time, cross border shopping provides far more choices for 
consumers.  Consumers’ behaviour is thus affected by various factors and 
evidently differs from one Member State to another.  However from the 
continuing reference of the European Commission to the consumer 
confidence arguments, it seems that this fact is more or less disregarded. 
Consumers pay regard to beliefs as opposed to actual knowledge.  
Although, they may be totally unaware of details found under their own 
national regimes, they may nevertheless have a false impression that the 
level of protection offered in their own system is higher than that provided 
under any other Member State.415  Empirical evidence from Consumers 
Survey, such as Eurobarometer surveys, has thrown light on the fact that 
consumers do not always pay regard to law and legal differences, a fact 
which the European Commission perhaps disregards with the desire to shift 
to maximum harmonisation. This is of course not the case in all 
circumstances.  There are consumers from certain Member States, such as 
countries situating in the Southern Europe, who constitute an exception to 
this.  Consumers coming from Member States such as Italy, Greece and 
Portugal as opposed to consumers coming from Member States such as 
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Germany, Sweden and Denmark trust foreign systems more than their own 
Member State.416 This may be attributed either to the fact that some 
countries have developed more protective rules in their consumer protection 
regimes, or to the fact that in certain countries legislation is more respected 
and better applied which increases the trust of consumers.  Consideration of 
those examples shows that consumers do not always have more trust in 
their own system and this also contradicts the nationalist consumer beliefs 
which are rooted in the consumer confidence argument as put forward by 
the European Commission.417   
Consumers’ confidence in foreign legal systems may additionally depend 
upon issues such as age.418  Younger consumers exhibit more trust to 
foreign systems than older people.  This may be attributed to the fact that 
younger people are not conservative to the extent that older people are.  
Younger consumers are less fearful, they travel more and come in touch 
with foreign cultures but what is more they through the use of internet 
familiarise themselves to new customs and trends such as online and cross 
border shopping.  However, this is not to say that harmonisation is not 
important for all consumers but it is despite anything to the contrary dubious 
as to whether harmonisation alone will achieve a change in consumer’s 
attitudes and willingness to enter into transactions beyond their national 
borders with firms and traders of other Member States. 
With regard to those arguments, one can support that those who have 
questioned the consumer confidence justification as having a weak and 
unreliable basis in European Consumer Law are indeed right.419  It cannot 
be denied that the level of consumer confidence is decisive for the fate of 
cross border trading across the Union, however the particular justification 
has been used by the European Commission in a rather misleading manner 
as its real aim is to encourage businesses to start trading cross border while 
the actual effects for consumers are in essence a second place 
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consideration.  Had the real aim of the European Commission been to 
increase consumer confidence, a different approach aiming at educating 
consumers could perhaps have been followed.   
Not only factors that in essence affect consumer confidence should be taken 
into consideration, but in addition other measures such as education 
campaigns could have taken to promote consumer confidence.420  The 
European Commission runs various campaigns to make consumers aware 
of their rights as well as exercise them421, however consumer education 
should go beyond this and help consumers realise how the market really 
works.  Of course the importance of education in terms of their rights should 
not be disregarded as with education, consumers will no longer be hesitant 
to seek remedies and redress.  However, in an era with various 
technological developments such as online shopping, perhaps further 
education in relation to the peculiarities of distance shopping may contribute 
in spreading trust among consumers.  Although, as it has already been seen 
trust can eventually be achieved through experience, appropriate consumer 
education can boost consumer confidence.  Not only in terms of knowing 
and enforcing their rights as they have done so far but also to help 
consumers to better understand the opportunities that the marketplace offers 
them.  
Consideration of factors that affect consumers’ choices has showed that 
consumers are not primarily concerned with legislation issue.  This is 
actually an irrelevant factor when a consumer is considering to shop online 
either from a local trader or a trader outside their Member State.  It is 
inferred that it is perhaps distance shopping as a means of purchasing that 
still alienates consumers and education can help familiarise consumers with 
it.  Consumers may in this way see distance shopping from a different, less 
sceptical, perspective.  Education is important for consumers to acquire 
confidence within the unique market of the 21st century where products or 
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services are just a click away from the consumer.  Consumer’s age, culture 
and more importantly level of understanding differs from individual to 
individual and there are instances where things should not be taken for 
granted and consumer education has an important role to play.  Education 
can help in achieving long run changes with consumers developing critical 
thinking and awareness and ultimately can bring an increase in consumer 
confidence in the market. 
Definition of consumer 
Connecting maximum harmonisation with a definite increase of consumer 
confidence in cross border shopping implies that cross-border trading is a 
way of purchasing that all consumers are interested in and once all rules are 
harmonised, they will happily engage in cross border shopping.  In reality, for 
a large number of consumers cross border shopping and generally online 
shopping may be totally uninteresting and not even a possibility.  Connected 
to this are arguments made which maintain that policy measures are to their 
entirety directed at the average consumer to whom policy-makers as well as 
legislators have put a considerably high expectation.  In most instances, the 
average consumer is viewed as reasonably well-informed, observant and 
circumspect.422  The fact that the European Commission has focused on 
consumer as a cross-border shopper423 whose activity was vital for the 
functioning of the internal market may be a direct consequence of the fact 
that consumer protection measures should from the very beginning be 
adopted in the context of completing the internal market.424 
The consumer is mistakenly perceived as omniscient who once he considers 
all the alternatives facing him he makes the best choice, the one that brings 
maximum satisfaction to him.425  However, this is not the case as much more 
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complexity is involved in reality.  Consumers even make compromises and 
as consumer behaviour literature portrays consumers, they are in reality 
individuals who seek to satisfy their needs through the purchases they 
make.  It is not unlikely once consumers are satisfied with a product to stop 
looking for alternatives although there may be superior alternatives to the 
one they have become accustomed with.  This is perhaps the case with 
online cross border trading.  The fact that consumers stick to their habits 
may be one of the reasons that cross border trading within the internal 
market has not prospered to the extent desired by the European 
Commission.  This is explained not only by the fact consumers seem loyal to 
brands they are familiar with426 but it can also be explained in terms of the 
need to feel competent in an environment.  Consumers show fear for the 
unknown and prefer to master the environment rather than being dominated 
by it.427  
As the internal market constitutes the driving force, it is not surprising that 
the European Commission focuses on a standard consumer who is not only 
above the average but it can hardly be the case in practice.  Well-informed, 
observant and circumspect consumers can of course through their increase 
shopping activity contribute in boosting the internal market.  The emerging 
approach in the Consumer Rights Directive which is discussed in Chapter 6 
of this thesis also gives an idea as to how the consumer is portrayed at the 
EU level.   Less than the standard consumer cannot help to the same 
degree in the internal market project.  Whatever the reasons are for the 
consumer being portrayed as such, consideration of categories of 
consumers who might be vulnerable due to their age, education, skills, leads 
to the conclusion that a single standard of consumer is difficult to exist.  It is 
vital to understand that consumers do not all fall in one category and if there 
is one group that may feel disadvantaged by the new state of affairs with 
online shopping being given prominence, it is the old.   Old people are not 
only unfamiliar, albeit not all, with technology but their income considerably 
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falls as they get older428 and it is unlikely that they will risk their limited 
income to try new methods of purchasing such as online, and particularly 
cross border, shopping as well as new, unfamiliar to them, products through 
a means of distance sale.   
The Commission’s argumentation 
The Commission’s argumentation itself is not free from criticism and 
concerns as well.  An interesting observation is the fact that the European 
Commission has claimed to be acting in accordance with the views 
expressed in the responses to the Green Paper on the Review of the 
Consumer Acquis.  The Commission used questionnaires to which all the 
interested persons, including governments of both Member States and non-
Member States, the academic community as well as the business 
community and other stakeholders, European Consumer Centres, consumer 
organization,429 all were called to provide their answers as to whether they 
would see an advantage to maximum harmonisation.  The Commission has 
contended that the majority of respondents, reaching the percentage of 62% 
and comprising of both Member States and the business sector, have been 
in favour of maximum harmonisation.  What has more paradoxically been 
maintained by the European Commission is that minimum harmonisation 
has been supported by only four Member States430, but it did not refer to 
which particular Member States.431  Nonetheless, an analysis of the 
responses provided by Member States, as those published in the European 
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Commission’s website432 does not point to the same direction.  While nine 
Member States, with Cyprus being one of them433, were in favour of 
maximum harmonisation, five Member States, as opposed to four that the 
Commission had put forward, were on the other hand in favour of minimum 
harmonisation, with UK being one of them.434  Also, no less than eight 
Member States regarded maximum harmonisation as being justified for 
measures of technical nature only as for example the length of the right of 
withdrawal.  It is nonetheless too simplistic as Rutgers and Sefton-Green 
have put forward to say that the majority of respondents have been in favour 
of full targeted harmonisation as the various respondents can be 
distinguished from one another.435  In essence, the responses of Member 
States differ from those given by consumer organisations and those of 
consumer organisations can be discerned from those given by actors 
coming from the business sector.436  The Commission made in this way an 
effort to present maximum harmonisation, albeit in certain areas, as the most 
favourable option so as to safeguard its adoption.   Full targeted 
harmonisation eventually prevailed with maximum harmonisation provided 
only for certain aspects and not for the Directive as a whole. 
At the same time, there are flaws within the Commission’s argumentation if 
one considers the fact that although the European Commission has 
presented the shift to maximum harmonisation as the optimal solution, it has 
nonetheless failed to consider some further consequences accruing from the 
shift to maximum harmonisation.  Lawyers across the Union would have to 
undergo training in order to familiarise themselves with the new harmonised 
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legislation while maximum harmonisation would lead to an increase in 
preliminary references to the European Courts for interpretation of the new 
concepts and rules in a desire to achieve a uniform interpretation of the 
harmonised rules.437.  The latter consequence would be considerably time 
consuming and expensive as national courts will need time as well as 
guidance in order to become cognizant with the harmonised rules.   
However, differences in the application of the directive are nevertheless 
likely to persist and this contradicts the power of maximum harmonisation.  
Even maximum harmonisation, presented by the Commission as what 
consumers really need, will not achieve full uniformity owing to the day-by-
day role of national courts.438  National courts enjoy much more freedom 
when interpreting a directive as opposed to regulation, an alternative 
legislative measure at the EU level.  This is due to the fact that since 
directives do not need to be implemented verbatim, Member States can 
employ national legal terminology when transposing a directive in their 
national regimes and which national courts are then called to interpret as 
opposed to the actual wording of the Directives.  Accordingly, particular 
regard should be paid to the fact that national courts interpret the relevant 
national law that implements a directive and not the actual directive.439  
Although interpretation of more practical issues such as the length of the 
cooling period may not be problematic, there may be provisions as 
implemented in the national legal order that may require further 
interpretation by national courts.  Accordingly, the possibility of national 
courts interpreting EU provisions in the context of their national laws440 may 
be regarded as an additional indication of the fact that the European 
Commission’s argument in relation to maximum harmonisation is 
unconvincing. 
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Questioning maximum harmonisation does not stop here.  Not only empirical 
evidence that maximum harmonisation is the optimal solution is missing from 
the Commission’s argumentation but in addition the methodological 
approach employed which as it has already been said included 
questionnaires, renders its argumentation even more problematic.  The 
responses given to the Commission’s Green paper neither constitute 
evidence for the effect of maximum harmonisation nor do they constitute a 
serious scientific research as Faure argues.441  This method of “leading 
questions” employed by the European Commission in the consultation 
process was not free from criticisms and many authors have been 
concerned with the choice of the Commission.  One should not be surprised 
by the fact that there have been positive reactions to the creation of uniform 
rules.  Although, uniform legal rules were attractive to most respondents, it is 
important to say that the actual content of such rules was at that time not 
known.  As Rutgers and Sefton-Green in their article “Revising the 
Consumer Acquis: (Half) Opening the Doors of the Trojan Horse” rightly 
argue, the questions contained in the Green Paper were rather focused on 
form than on the actual content It is accordingly unlikely to give a correct 
answer to such questions due to the fact that the respondents were not 
aware of the content of the substantive provisions and this raises concerns 
as to whether their reactions would still be the same.442   
Questions were hypothetically asked which raises questions as to whether 
the responses given by the various respondents would accord to their actual 
behaviour once maximum harmonisation was adopted.  Respondents, who 
have provided a rather positive response for a hypothetic shift to maximum 
harmonisation, would have perhaps changed their mind once maximum 
harmonisation would become the norm.  More importantly, no question 
regarding the negative aspects of maximum harmonisation or regarding the 
costs involved in the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive was 
made.  This means not only that the questionnaires were not all-embracing 
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in order to provide a spherical picture about harmonisation but also 
questions were skewed to get particular responses in relation to maximum 
harmonisation.  By taking all those factors into consideration, one could 
argue that the validity and the weight of this research is rather limited443 and 
should not be greatly dependent upon.  
The flaws highlighted in the Commission’s argumentation complete the 
doubts in relation to the shift to maximum harmonisation.  While a 
connection between minimum harmonisation and consumer confidence 
could be more easily be discerned, the same does not seem to apply for 
maximum harmonisation.  Minimum harmonisation provides a safety net for 
consumers and prevents instances where consumers may be surprised as 
well as disadvantaged by the justices of a foreign system however there are 
doubts as to whether this is the case for the maximum harmonisation 
argument.  An important question provoked is why then maximum 
harmonisation was so passionately sought to be achieved and an 
examination from a politics point of view could provide some answers to this. 
 
From a politics point of view 
In the current case there are indeed differing attitudes towards 
harmonization depending on the perspectives of the actors involved, 
whether those are state actors, consumers or commercial parties.444  Not 
only academics have been largely occupied with the idea of harmonisation 
but it at the same time constitutes an indispensable part of the political 
discussions of the European institutions and amongst the politicians coming 
from the  various Member States as it has been seen in the preceding 
chapter.  The different views of State officials in relation to harmonization as 
Jan Smits puts it is largely connected with their status.  Their attitude 
towards achieving further harmonisation largely depends on whether they 
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have strong incentives to change the current status quo.445  State officials 
are often reluctant to accept a change unless they have interests or any 
other countervailing factors that prompt change.446  In other words, of 
greatest importance is not whether there exists strong resistance to further 
harmonisation but whether there interest groups with strong incentives to 
strive for such a change.447   
This provides an explanation for the difference that is noted between the 
approaches followed by Germany on the one hand and that followed by the 
United Kingdom on the other hand.  With a high production of consumer 
goods for export in Germany and with 45% of German exports in 2013 
comprising exports to European Union countries equating to €401.9 
billions448, Germany constitutes the largest and most important market in the 
European Union449 and will considerably benefit from harmonization.  On the 
contrary, the United Kingdom is a net importer of commercial legal 
businesses.   According to The CityUK, a private association that promotes 
the financial and professional services of UK,  2014 report on legal services, 
UK is the world’s leading centre for international legal services and accounts 
for the 7% of global law firms’ fee revenue by thus rendering it the largest 
market in Europe.450  With £20,4 billion output, the legal services sector 
accounted for the 1,5% of the UK’s gross domestic product in 2012.451 With 
consideration of the fact that maximum harmonisation will have the biggest 
impact on cross border shopping and based on the above facts, it could be 
argued that the UK will not to gain, to the same degree as Member States 
such as Germany from the harmonisation of European Consumer Law.  For 
Member States such as Germany which focus on industrially produced 
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goods, their traders will, as it will subsequently be shown,  considerably 
benefit from a harmonised piece of legislation as the Consumer Rights 
Directive is.  While it is consequently not surprising that Member States such 
as the UK have been less interested in harmonisation452, this wider picture 
provides an explanation as to why Member States such as for example 
Germany have been more enthusiastic towards further harmonisation.453   
The former chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schrӧder was amongst those 
who argued that the legal diversity that exists in the EU constitutes one of 
the impediments that hinder the smooth functioning of the single market and 
the same time the European economic growth.454  Schrӧder ‘s view 
contradicts the statements made by Lord Falconer who has served as the 
Constitutional Affairs Secretary of UK until 2007 and who advocated against 
harmonisation.  Lord Falconer supported that the diversity of laws provides 
businesses the opportunity to base their decision as to which country they 
want to trade in based on the legal regime of a country.455  In the same vein, 
he cited the importance of London as a competitive centre which attracts 
both European and international businesses due to the competitive 
advantage UK law offers.456  Although their statements and views relate in 
more particular with the wider harmonisation of contract law, they can be 
equally considered in the effort of finding an explanation for the different 
approaches of Member States towards the harmonisation of European 
Consumer Law as well which relates to business to consumer contracts 
only.  Competitive economic considerations take the lead in the differences 
in approach between the various Member States. 
The European Commission’s seems to be primarily concerned with enabling 
businesses to enter foreign markets whose entry is impeded by the 
existence of different consumer protection regimes across the Union.457  The 
                                            
452 O’Hara O’Connor, ‘The limits of contract law harmonisation’ (n 372) 508. 
453 Smits, ‘Introduction to special issue: Harmonisation of contract law: an economic and 
behavioural perspective’ (n 373) 478. 
454 O’Hara O’Connor, ‘The limits of contract law harmonisation’ (n 372) 506. 
455 ibid. 
456 ibid 508. 
457 Micklitz and Reich, ‘Cronica De Una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission Proposal for 
a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (n 358) 474. 
145 
 
harmonisation of laws can bring considerable benefits for firms and traders 
that are willing to engage in cross border trading.  Providing a harmonised 
regime will accordingly reduce the risk of traders who otherwise have to 
encounter the various national rules and languages as well as the differing 
practices and customs which are in essence an unavoidable part of both the 
common market458 and the cross border trade itself.  Accordingly, 
businesses will feel the benefit of maximum harmonisation to a greater 
extent than individual consumers.459  
 The interests of the businesses seem to be greater in this regard and with 
maximum harmonisation businesses will merely have to rely and adapt to a 
single legal standard which makes it cheaper for them to trade across the 
whole Union.  The fact that the level of protection will be the same in all 
Member States will save costs for businesses which were previously spent 
on either negotiations when a disagreement in relation to the transaction 
arose460 or on obtaining foreign legal advice in individual cases.461   One 
single standard will reduce interpretation costs and legal advice that were 
before needed to comply with the 28 different national regimes in case they 
were willing to sell beyond their borders as well as compliance costs that 
were otherwise spent by businesses trading online in order to adapt their 
websites to the different regimes.  This was also the view of Poncibo who 
has from an early point justifiably argued the adoption of the Consumer 
Rights Directive as proposed with the maximum harmonisation approach, 
would be a valuable tool for businesses as it would reduce compliance costs 
on the one hand while on the other hand it would turn the previous 
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legislation into a simpler one462 which would make their trading activity 
easier.   
From a survey carried out by Vogeneaur and Weatherill in 2005, just three 
years before the shift to maximum harmonisation was put forward, regarding 
the perceptions of businesses463, it has been made evident that divergence 
between the various national laws was the major obstacle for businesses to 
trade cross border.464  Businesses had to change their trading patterns and 
restructure their standard business model due to the differing 
implementation of the Directives in an effort to comply with the various 
acquired consumer rights that Member States had in various instances 
provided in their national regimes.465  To the majority of businesses that 
participated in the survey, 59% of them expressed the view that the various 
European Directives, in relation to business to consumer transactions, have 
indeed reduced obstacles to cross border trade.466  Nonetheless, out of ten 
respondents had experienced problems with differences that accrued from 
the implementation of the directives467 which may be attributed to the 
minimum harmonisation approach which allowed Member States to go 
beyond what the Directives provided. 
The obstacles that businesses have experienced in trading cross border 
were actually costs resulting from legislative disparities between the different 
national regimes. 468  This involved the costs to obtain legal advice as to the 
regime of a Member State they would like to trade in as well as to update 
their websites in the case of online distance shopping and thus comply with 
the relevant regime of a Member State.  Those accrued from the variations 
between legal systems as well as the differences involved in the 
                                            
462 Poncibo, ‘Some Thoughts on the Methodological Approach to EC Consumer Law 
Reform’ (n 72) 362. 
463 Vogenauer and Weatherill, ‘The European Community’s Competence to pursue the 
Harmonisation of Contract Law – an Empirical Contribution to the Debate’ in Vogenaur and 
Weatherill (eds), The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European 
Private Laws, Business and the Legal Practice (n 461) 117. 
464 ibid 125. 
465 ibid 129. 
466 ibid 127. 
467 ibid 128. 
468 ibid 126. 
147 
 
implementation of the European directives.469  Undoubtedly, further 
harmonization will benefit Member States producing consumer goods for 
export to other European Member States as this will enable their businesses 
to merely rely on single set of policy for their transactions.470  Avoidance of 
another jurisdiction’s law by businesses which was a direct consequence of 
divergence in domestic laws will no longer be the case.471  Maximum 
harmonisation has been particularly sought to avoid instances where 
businesses were reluctant to engage into cross border trading due to issues 
in the domestic laws of other Member States that are ignorant of and may 
have to, unavoidably, anticipate.472   The overall uncertainty involved as well 
as high compliance costs have been regarded as deterrence for businesses 
who wished to engage into cross border trading and this was primarily a 
problem resulting from the fragmentation and regulatory barriers that the 
different consumer protection rules gave rise to.473  The complex, costly, as 
well as unpredictable business environment caused by the differing 
implementation of the various consumer protection directives would 
accordingly be considerably simplified with the shift towards maximum 
harmonisation.   
As the effort to achieve harmonisation has been promoted by such 
incentives it is not surprising that it has taken the form of legislation where 
the interests of trader were given primal importance although in the name of 
consumer protection.  It could be argued that the directive constitutes a 
“market access instrument” 474 as the single standard across the Union 
strives to incite more traders to engage into cross border trading and 
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ultimately this is to the advantage of the internal market and its smooth 
functioning.  This may be to the advantage of consumers in terms of 
competition but not necessarily in terms of protection as it has been made 
evident from the preceding part in relation to the substantive provisions of 
the Consumer Rights Directive.  An increased level of harmonisation seems 
to accord with the internal market needs475 as harmonised standards can 
facilitate trade.  Harmonisation has been at the heart of achieving European 
integration which can be better achieved with more harmonised standards 
as the level-playing field ensured and the reduction in cross-border 
transaction costs provide greater incentives for businesses to expand their 
trading beyond their national markets.  There should be no doubts that the 
greater convergence the greater the more advantageous it is in terms of the 
internal market objectives and it seems that consumer protection policy has 
in fact turned into an internal market policy in order for that purpose to be 
achieved.   
Technological changes have changed the nature of the single market and as 
Sarah Edgar has noted, over the last years the development of the Digital 
Single Market and generally of the electronic commerce have taken the lead 
in the European Commission’s considerations and have attracted particular 
recognition within the EU.476  As Viviane Reding, the Vice-President of the 
European Commission, had in 2012 stated, ‘As a new digital economy 
emerges, so does the need to break down new barriers.  This is why our 
Single Market must increasingly become also a digital Single Market.’477  To 
add to that, Malcolm Harbour, the Chairman of the Committee for the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) has emphasized that in 
order for the Single Market to work, the functioning of the digital Single 
Market is a prerequisite.  The shift of the European Commission towards 
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maximum harmonisation and the choices that were made in the Consumer 
Rights Directive, which will be examined in the subsequent chapter of this 
thesis, focusing on aspects that are evidently related to electronic commerce 
point towards this direction.  It could be argued that they more or less 
constitute changes that were required for the internal market to be efficient. 
The European Commission, instead of paying regard to aspects that are 
within the primary considerations of consumers, has focused on harmonising 
aspects of distance selling that will primarily simplify the previous regime for 
traders who will be able after the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive 
to rely on a single standard for their cross border trading.  At the same time, 
it should not be disregarded that the Digital Single Market, being as it has 
already been stated an important component of the whole Single Market, 
can considerably increase the Union’s GDP.478  Studies have showed that 
such an increase is estimated to provide an increase of 4% to the Union’s 
GDP by 2020 which is equivalent to €500 billion.479 However, it is peculiar 
that there are there still digital issues that need to be resolved and have not 
been covered by the Directive.  The focus has accordingly been to simplify 
legal standards with regard to cross border trading and thus provide the 
opportunity and an incitement for traders to expand their trading by thus 
leaving important issues behind. 
The shift to Full Targeted Harmonisation 
Concerns in relation to the maximum harmonisation provision led the 
European Commission to reduce the level of harmonisation to targeted full 
harmonisation which as its name reveals has a more limited scope.480  With 
full targeted harmonisation being the resulting approach, there is a 
combination of maximum and minimum harmonisation approach under the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  Maximum harmonisation is limited to only 
certain aspects of the Directive which are in more particular consumer 
information and the right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises 
                                            
478 Edgar, ‘Cross-border B2C e-commerce in the EU and the introduction of the Consumer 
Rights Directive: A cure for fragmentation?’ (n 31) 11. 
479 ibid 5. 
480 Mak, ‘Review of the Consumer Acquis – Towards Maximum Harmonisation?’ (n 369) 6. 
150 
 
contracts.  At the same time, with the full targeted harmonisation approach, 
the European Commission has included “flexibility clauses” within the 
Consumer Rights Directive which provide the opportunity to Member States 
to go beyond the level of protection offered by certain provisions in the 
directive.481   
Targeted full harmonisation has been seen as a compromise between the 
two approaches and as a way out of the lengthy process involved in the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive,482 with the Commission not 
making great efforts to justify its decision.   Equally, no justification was 
provided informing and making clear why full harmonisation should be 
accepted in those particular instances so as to achieve the aims of the 
Directive.483  It is also remarkable that there has been no effort on the part of 
the Commission to provide further details as to what this new harmonisation 
approach entails.  As Howells and Schulze have rightly argued, “It is 
paradigmatic that neither the explanatory memorandum nor the recitals 
make any effort to give shape to what targeted harmonisation means and 
how it could be concretised”.484  However, for such an approach, it is 
important for the scope of those issues that the particular approach 
harmonises to be clearly elucidated485 so as to avoid uncertainties, this is 
what targeted full harmonisation actually means.486   
What has rightly been argued there exists a possibility for the directive to be 
incorrectly transposed into domestic regimes but in addition, the mixing of 
maximum and minimum harmonisation into the full targeted harmonisation 
approach will not increase consumer confidence which the European 
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Commission has so passionately defended.487  Full targeted harmonisation 
may also give rise to confusion as to which issues have been fully 
harmonised and which have remained under the Member States’ 
jurisdiction.488  Uncertainty will on the contrary be caused as a result of 
partial harmonisation.489  On that account, it seems that considering full 
targeted harmonisation as the optimal solution may be regarded as too 
optimistic as commentators such as Vanessa Mak490 have put forward.   
However, it should not be disregarded the shift to full targeted harmonisation 
constitutes perhaps an additional indication of what the Commission actually 
strives to achieve.  Had the real aim been to increase consumer confidence, 
full targeted harmonisation and maximum harmonisation would from that 
point of view never be the right approaches to provide.  Even if consumers’ 
real concerns cannot be addressed through legislation and will to their 
entirety remain unsolved, the level of uniformity achieved still leaves 
untouched important issues as redress which ensures that the rights of 
consumers can be enforced.491  The Commission’s increased desire for 
maximum harmonisation led to a compromise being adopted with maximum 
harmonisation remaining, as it has been seen, the default position with 
regard to information requirements and the right of withdrawal.  The 
European Commission has from the beginning targeted at full harmonisation 
rather than targeted harmonisation492 which was the eventual approach.  
The European Commission was accordingly particularly willing to achieve 
maximum harmonisation although it was not eventually successful in all 
aspects of the Directive. 
The benefit that the eventual choice may have on businesses should not be 
underestimated for the reasons that have already been referred to earlier in 
                                            
487 Edgar, ‘Cross-border B2C e-commerce in the EU and the introduction of the Consumer 
Rights Directive: A cure for fragmentation?’ (n 31) 36. 
488 ibid 35. 
489 Amato, ‘The Europeanisation of Contract Law and the Role of Comparative Law: The 
Case of the Directive on Consumer Rights’ (n 482) 17 
490 Mak, ‘Review of the Consumer Acquis – Towards Maximum Harmonisation?’ (n 369) 
14. 
491 ibid 16. 
492 Micklitz, ‘The Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach: Looking Behind the Curtain’ in 
Howells and Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, (n 483) 
53. 
152 
 
this Chapter.  Businesses wishing to engage into cross border trade will not 
have to incur costs for adapting their websites in order to comply with the 
different information requirements and modalities in relation to the right of 
withdrawal as contained in the various national regimes.  Greater certainty 
and confidence is in this way ensured for businesses.  While the maximum 
harmonisation of the two particular aspects under the Consumer Rights 
Directive can bring certain advantages that to businesses by thus enhancing 
arguments such as that put forward by Geraint Howells suggesting that 
European Consumer Law will not be in favour of European consumers 
anymore but will become the guardian of traders’ interests.493   
Although it cannot be denied that maximum harmonisation has the potential 
to remove impediments to cross border trade494, there are concerns as to 
the effect that the resulting approach will have from the consumer’s 
protection perspective.  The question turns to the position of consumers and 
whether they will be better off after the transposition of the Consumer Rights 
Directive within their domestic regimes.  Local preferences and long-
standing traditions have to be sacrificed owing to the new harmonised 
standard and this takes place irrespective of whether there are obvious 
common local preferences among the various Member States.495  Differing 
national standards are advantageous in the sense that they accord to the 
preferences of consumers of a given Member State even if they do not serve 
cross border trade to the full.  Retaining national standards and thus legal 
barriers in place which are an unavoidable consequence of the diversity that 
emerge from cross border trade may not always be disadvantageous.  While 
the opportunity for protection to be adapted to the societal national 
preferences of consumers towards particular products or services496 is 
considerably important from the consumer’s perspective, it seems that the 
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internal market needs more and which the European Commission has been 
particularly willing to give. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this Chapter has not been to argue that the Consumer 
Rights Directive will not bring any improvements in terms of consumer 
protection as this an issue that will be examined in the subsequent Chapter 
of this thesis which will deal with the substantive provisions of the Directive 
in more detail.  Chapter 5 was limited to an examination of the level of 
harmonisation.  What has been more importantly attacked in this Chapter is 
the Commission’s overdependence on increasing consumer confidence 
through the shift to maximum harmonisation.  The increased importance 
placed on harmonisation for increasing consumer confidence implies an 
automatic link between consumer protection and consumer confidence 
which is not the case in reality.  As it has been showed, this equates to 
disregarding the complexity involved.  Consumer’s decision making process 
is a much more complex issue and the perplexities involved make it difficult 
to accept that such a horizontal relationship between consumer confidence 
and maximum harmonisation exists.  Minimum harmonisation not only 
accords with national values and preferences but it also provides an 
opportunity for national legislators to expand protection even further.  
Accordingly, there is no strong indication why the particular approach has 
been regarded by the European Commission as a reason for low consumer 
confidence.  Eurobarometer surveys have also showed that this is not 
actually the case.  On the other hand, maximum harmonisation by imposing 
a ceiling of protection deprives Member States the opportunity to go beyond 
the Directive in order to provide greater protection to consumers which can 
in essence be regarded advantageous from the consumer’s perspective. 
In addition, consideration of factors affecting consumers’ choice and 
therefore confidence has thrown light on the complex entity of consumer as 
well as on the fact that a direct, horizontal relationship between consumer 
confidence and maximum harmonisation does not exist.  What consumers 
lack is perhaps awareness and adequate education in relation to the wider 
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issues involved.  In an era where constant technological developments take 
place and where consumers are offered with vast opportunities and choices 
that are only a click away from them, it is the time to focus on educating 
consumers and raise their awareness in relation to the peculiarities of online 
cross border trade and make them trust it as a means of purchasing.  
Consumers’ awareness should not be taken for granted as consumers 
comprise of not only reasonable and confident shoppers but also old, less 
educated, vulnerable people. 
The legislative efforts of the Commission were focused on safeguarding the 
level of harmonisation which is the reason the Directive ended up as a 
compromise.  The eventual choice to provide for the maximum 
harmonisation of only two aspects of the Consumer Rights Directive is 
regarded in this study as an indication of the actual objectives pursued at the 
European level and which are hidden behind European Consumer 
Protection legislative efforts.  Maximum harmonisation was limited to 
information requirements and the right of withdrawal.  Although the 
provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive will be individually dealt with in 
the next chapter, as regards the decision to maximise them in full, it suffices 
to say that not only consumers struggle with the overload of information and 
rarely pay regard to them but also there is an evident reluctance on the part 
of consumers to exercise their right of withdrawal due to costs that they may 
have to incur in order to return products as well as due to the risk involved in 
returning products.  Nevertheless the harmonisation of those two particular 
aspects is not considered as random as it ensures certain advantages for 
businesses wishing to trade across their border.    
This Chapter has apart from presenting certain flows within the 
Commission’s argumentation, focused on the European Consumer Law 
legislative efforts from a politics point of view to further support the concerns 
in relation to maximum harmonisation and full targeted harmonisation.  More 
importantly, Chapter 5 altogether provides further evidence for the main 
contention of this study that European Consumer Law has been used to 
achieve means other than consumer protection, namely the completion of 
the internal market through promoting cross border trade.  Considerations in 
relation to the position of traders have predominated over those of the 
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position of consumers in an effort to facilitate cross border trade, albeit in the 
name of consumers. 
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Chapter 6 – The Consumer Rights Directive as adopted 
Introduction  
Law-making at the European level has been characterised by an 
instrumentalist nature with the primary aim and driving force behind 
legislation being the completion of the internal market.497  The same seems 
to be the case for European Consumer Law which based on a neo-classical 
approach, has as its aim to empower consumers by facilitating consumers’ 
decision making process in order to make choices that are beneficial to 
them.498  Empowering consumer does not seem to be an end in itself but it is 
rather important for the eventual benefits that widely accrue in the market.  It 
could be argued that consumers are not only passive beneficiaries of the 
internal market but at the same time incidental beneficiaries in the whole 
process of legislating within the area of consumer protection.499  The 
concern voiced in this thesis supports that consumer protection seems to 
have turned into a secondary role of European Consumer Law.500  The 
examination of the actual provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive adds 
to this argument by showing the instrumental nature of the directive as 
emerging from the approach followed. 
Micklitz has been amongst those who have rightly argued that consumer 
legislation at the EU level has turned from consumer protection law to 
consumer law. 501  Consumer policy should be perfectly conceptualised as 
an area of law with its aim being to provide protection to the end users of 
                                            
497 Katalin J Cseres, ‘Consumer Protection in the European Union’ in Roger J Van Den 
Bergh and Alessio M Pacces, Regulation and Economics (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 
2012) 203. 
498 Geraint Howells, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ 
(2005) 32(3) Journal of Law and Society 349, 355.  
499 Cseres, ‘Consumer Protection in the European Union’ in Van Den Bergh and Pacces, 
Regulation and Economics (n 497) 204. 
500 ibid 203. 
501 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law 
and the Return of Social Elements in Civil Law – A Bittersweet Polemic’ EUI Working 
Papers 3/2012, 1, 8 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20374/LAW_2012_03_Micklitz.pdf?sequence=
1> accessed 18 April 2016. 
157 
 
products and services. 502  Although this envisages active regulatory 
protection, the majority of European consumer law instruments have 
amounted to consumer policy of the hidden type503, in the form of providing 
the means to consumers to make informed choices.  There has been an 
overtly shifted reliance on the information paradigm with the emphasis being 
on providing the various information obligations as a way to facilitate the 
conclusion of consumer contracts.504  The prevailing approach at the EU 
level has presumed some standard skills for consumers and at the same 
time the existence of an “omnipotent multinational market actor”505 as 
Micklitz refers to him.  The shift of focus from protecting the weak towards 
protecting the well-informed and circumspect consumer undoubtedly has, as 
it will be seen from the provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive, 
implications for consumers.506  
Although the effect of the Consumer Rights Directive will be examined in 
Chapter 7 dealing with its transposition in the domestic regimes of UK and 
Cyprus, this chapter considers the actual provisions contained in the final 
version of the Directive and also provides a critical consideration of the 
approach followed.  The scope of the directive was eventually significantly 
narrowed down by only repealing the Distance Selling Directive and 
Doorstep Selling Directive as opposed to the four directives, including the 
Directive on Unfair Contract Terms and the Consumer Sales Directive which 
was the initial purpose of the initial proposal.  The Consumer Rights 
Directive as eventually adopted constitutes a more conservative approach 
due to the fact that maximum harmonisation did not prevail in all respects.  
Although complete harmonisation was better adjusted to the market needs 
and a step closer towards eliminating national variations which increase 
transactions costs of businesses, due to the political and economic choices 
embedded therein the two areas were eventually dropped.  However, 
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maximum harmonisation still constitutes the default position of the directive 
with the exception of some clauses which allow Member States to go 
beyond the Directive.  This chapter will eventually determine whether the 
Consumer Rights Directive as finally adopted can really make a change for 
increasing consumer confidence or whether it merely constitutes another 
weapon in the armour of European Consumer Law that aids to provide 
protection to a standard type of consumer, a competent consumer, who has 
the potential to aid in the internal market project.  Answering this question in 
the affirmative will provide additional evidence for the main argument 
formulated in this thesis by which the primary objectives of the European 
Commission are being deployed.  
Distance Selling and Doorstep Selling  
To begin with, an important observation that may be made is the decision to 
merge Distance Selling Directive and Doorstep Selling Directive under the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  The two types of concluding a transaction for 
the purchasing of goods or services greatly differ between them, a decision 
which raises concerns for choosing to include of them in one piece of 
legislation.  According to Recital 20 of the Consumer Rights Directive, 
distance selling refers to the conclusion of a contract entered between a 
trader and a seller for the purchase of goods or services by using one or 
more means of distance communication such as internet, mail order, 
telephone or fax. While this type of purchasing does not entail the face to 
face presence of the trader and the consumer in the same place, off-
premises contract on the other hand includes contracts concluded although 
they are concluded with the simultaneous physical presence of the trader 
and the consumer but outside the business premises of the trader.  While 
the need to protect consumers in distance selling arises from the fact that 
consumers are seen as being in an inferior position, in off premises 
contracts the possibility of the consumer being surprised or under 
psychological pressure is what gives rise to the need to protect consumer.  
This need arises, according to Recital 21 of the Directive, from the fact that 
consumer may be under psychological pressure or may be confronted with 
an element of surprise irrespective of whether or not the consumer has 
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solicited the trader’s visit.  However, the argument that is put forward here is 
that from their very nature the two types of contracting greatly differ between 
them.   
As it has been seen from the preceding chapters of this study, distance 
selling has formed the major type of transacting that European actors have 
been concerned with.507  Most of the questions asked in the various 
Eurobarometer surveys were also concerned with distance selling and 
issues around it including consumers’ concerns and their levels of 
confidence when buying at distance.  The European Commission’s 
Consumer policy strategy documents have showed that the European 
Consumer Law legislative amendments have been informed by the findings 
of the Eurobarometer surveys.508  On the other hand, reference to doorstep 
selling remained minimal.  Reference to it was limited to questions asking 
whether consumers have returned a product that they have bought at their 
doorstep or simply whether consumers were aware of the right to 
withdraw.509  Even the question in relation to the right of withdrawal was only 
asked after the Consumer Rights Directive was proposed and adopted which 
poses a question as to whether the amendments in relation to doorstep 
selling were actually based on sufficient well-grounded evidence or even 
whether there was a real concern for the European Commission in the area. 
It cannot be denied that doorstep selling may not be as common nowadays 
as it was in the 1970s.  Due to the rise of internet and online shopping, 
doorstep selling has become less popular510 and as the Eurobarometer 
Survey of 2006 has showed, an evidently high percentage of 91% of the 
consumers that participated in the particular survey did not purchase 
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anything via doorstep selling in the earlier year.  While there was no attempt 
to determine consumers’ concerns in relation to doorstep selling and while 
the particular type of contracting did not seem to have attracted the same 
concern as distance selling, it is striking that both were combined under a 
single piece of legislation.  Distance selling constitutes a much more 
complex way of transacting due to the means involved for its attainment.  It 
accordingly seems that the Commission may have perhaps opted for a belts 
and braces approach to ensure to more easily secure the adoption of the 
Consumer Rights Directive and therefore the amendments to the Distance 
Selling Directive.  The inclusion of doorstep selling which, contrary to 
distance selling has a rather limited potential to increase cross border trade 
in the internal market which seems to be the primary concern of the 
European Commission has perhaps served as a diversionary tactic to drive 
attention away from the actual force behind the Consumer Rights Directive.  
The inclusion of doorstep selling in the directive could more easily give the 
false presumption that the purpose is to achieve protection across the board 
while in reality consumer protection was perhaps a by-product of the 
particular piece of legislation.  
The provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive 
Having made an initial observation in relation to the Consumer Rights 
Directive, the focus of this Chapter will now turn on examining a number of 
the substantive provisions of the directive.  This will pave the way for the 
subsequent Chapter that will deal with the transposition of those provisions 
in the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus.  There will not be reference to 
every single Recital and Article of the Directive but only to those that bear 
some importance and that have brought changes.  Such examination has as 
its aim to contradict the Commission’s repeatedly made claims to increase 
consumer protection and will provide further evidence as to where EU 
consumer legislation really focuses on. 
To begin with, Recital 5 refers to the cross border potential of distance 
selling and to the fact that it should be one of the main tangible results of the 
internal market which is not yet fully exploited.  It is stated that although 
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domestic distance selling has grown considerably, the growth of cross 
border distance sales has been rather limited.  This discrepancy is according 
to Recital 5 significant particularly for Internet sales whose potential for 
growth is high.  A less expansive reference to off premise contracts is made 
in a simple line mentioning that the cross border potential of contracts that 
are negotiated away from business premises is constrained by factors such 
as the different national consumer protection rules.  Recital 5 is but an 
indication of the emphasis that is being put on distance selling and 
particularly electronic cross border transactions.  At the same time, doubts 
exist as to the cross border potential of contracts negotiated away from 
business premises and this is the reason that it has been earlier argued that 
the inclusion of doorstep selling served a further purpose, to hide the internal 
market considerations that have constituted the actual driving force behind 
the Directive. 
Recital 6 provides that certain disparities, by thus referring to differences in 
Member States domestic regimes, undermine consumer confidence and 
increase compliance costs for traders who wish to engage in cross border 
trading.  While both constitute the aims that the European Commission 
makes an attempt to address through the Consumer Rights Directive, as it 
has already been argued the latter objective, for the sake of the internal 
market, seems to be the actual driving force.  As regards the aim of 
increasing consumer confidence, preceding chapters of this thesis has 
showed legal disparities is just one factor among other more important 
factors that affect consumer confidence and contrary to the Commission’s 
conceptions legislation may not be a determining factor in consumer’s 
decision making at all.  This thesis has viewed consumer confidence as the 
smokescreen which the European Commission has used throughout the 
Consumer Rights Directive.     Recital 7 additionally states that the effect of 
harmonisation will be to eliminate barriers stemming from fragmentation of 
rules and to complete the internal market and barriers can only be eliminated 
by establishing uniform rules at Union level.  Recital 7 portrays the increased 
emphasis that is being placed on the level of harmonisation by presenting it 
as the optimal solution which the European Commission has passionately 
tried to increase. 
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Subject matter, Definitions and Scope 
Article 1 determines the subject matter of the Directive by determining that 
the purpose of it is through the achievement of a high level of consumer 
protection to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market.  The 
contribution of consumer protection towards the internal market project was 
not per se referred to in either Distance Selling or Doorstep Selling 
Directives.  However, reference to the internal market was totally absent in 
the Doorstep Selling Directive which was adopted back in 1985 although not 
from the Distance Selling Directive which was adopted years later in 1992.  
This also demonstrates the development of the internal market and the 
move towards what is witnessed today.  Distance Selling Directive was in its 
Recitals referring to the need to take measures for the consolidation of the 
internal market as well as to cross border trading that could be one of the 
tangible results flowing from the internal market.  Evidently, reference to the 
relationship between the two in the Consumer Rights Directive constitutes 
an indication of the importance of consumer protection for the internal 
market and the fact that the two are interconnected. 
Article 2 provides the relevant various definitions of key terms found under 
the Directive.  As far as the definitions of consumer, trader (which was stated 
as supplier in the Distance Selling Directive) and distance contract which 
were also included in the Distance and Doorstep Selling Directive, no actual 
changes were made.511  However, the definition of trader seems to capture 
only those acting in some business, or professional, capacity.  Attention 
should be drawn to the fact that in the online environment, consumers can 
never be sure about the identity of the trader and whether they are indeed 
entering a transaction with a professional or with a non-professional with the 
latter depriving them of the protection provided under the Directive.512  
Equally, this raises questions as to the position of people on e-Bay that 
make use of the platform as one time sellers to sell goods.  Despite the fact 
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that the contracts concluded on e-Bay under those circumstances bear all 
the characteristics of ordinary online contracts where the consumer only 
becomes aware of the nature of the goods once he receives it, consumers 
are nevertheless deprived of their right to withdraw513.  
As regards the rest of the definitions, the list was further expanded to 
provide the definitions of goods, goods made to the consumer’s 
specifications, sales contract, service contract, off-premises contract, 
business premises, digital content, financial service, public auction, 
commercial guarantee, ancillary contract.  An important improvement to be 
highlighted is the expansion of the protection of the Directive to all off 
premises contracts and not only those concluded at the consumer’s home or 
workplace.  
Further on, Article 3 determines the scope of the Directive by determining 
the contracts to which it applies and to those that it does not apply.  It 
generally provides certain exceptions to which the Directive does not apply 
as well as provides discretion to Member States not to apply the Directive to 
off-premises contracts that do not exceed the amount of EUR 50.  Although 
this has been informed by relevant practicalities and the costs for 
businesses who would have to accept low value goods back, there is at the 
same time the risk of depriving the protection of the Directive to consumers 
who might enter a contract whose value is below the particular threshold.  
Although one may regard the threshold as a satisfactory and reasonable 
one, it should not be disregarded that there are categories of consumers for 
whom an amount of up to EUR 50 constitutes a considerable amount.  
However, the economic status of a person can be a reason for rendering him 
vulnerable and at the same time affects his activity in the market.  Poorer 
consumers and undoubtedly elderly people who do fall under the category of 
vulnerable consumers are often more prone to doorstep selling and should 
not be deprived of the protection provided under the Directive as a result 
ofthe threshold inserted.  This to some degree contradicts the purpose of the 
Directive as that expressed by the Commission, to provide for a high level of 
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consumer protection.  Consumer protection should be achieved for all and 
the protection of the Directive should cover at least all doorstep selling 
instances irrespective of the value of the contract.  A threshold could be 
maintained in relation to the rest of off premises situations, but as regards 
doorstep selling instances where the consumer encounters traders at his 
house, the protection of the Directive should perhaps be compulsory. 
Article 4 which probably constitutes the most debated provision since the 
initial proposed version of the Directive was put forward deals with the level 
of harmonisation.  Although the initial proposal provided for maximum 
harmonisation, the eventual approach is that of targeted full harmonisation 
which is a combination of maximum harmonisation with some exceptions 
where there is otherwise provided in the Directive.  Maximum harmonisation 
is accordingly the prevailing approach in almost all respects of the Directive.  
Two noteworthy examples are the important areas of the right of withdrawal 
and the various formalities in relation to it as well as information 
requirements in relation to distance and off-premises contracts that are fully 
harmonised.    In those areas, Member States cannot go beyond what the 
Directive provides by providing additional protection in their national 
legislation.  However, in relation to certain, although limited, instances 
Member States can go beyond what the Directive provides.  For example, 
they can extend the application of the Directive to legal persons or even 
natural persons that are not regarded as consumers within the meaning of it.  
Member States can provide a lower threshold for low value off premises 
contracts to which the protection of the Directive will apply.  Equally Member 
States have the opportunity to either maintain or introduce in their national 
laws language requirements in relation to contractual information and 
contractual terms.  Penalties are also an area that is not fully harmonised 
and Member States can lay down penalties for infringements of the 
Directive.    
 
Information Requirements 
Chapter II of the Directive deals with consumer Information for contracts 
other than distance or off-premises contracts which constitute new 
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requirements have not been part of either Distance or Doorstep Selling 
Directive.  Information requirements and the right of withdrawal for distance 
and off-premises contracts are covered in Chapter III of the Directive.  
Information requirements are in more particular found under Article 6 and 
Article 6(1) contains a list of information that need to be provided in a clear 
and comprehensible manner to the consumer and which shall form an 
integral part of the distance or off-premises contract.  Article 6 replaces what 
was before covered by Article 4 of the Distance Selling Directive.  As 
regards Doorstep Selling Directive, no list in relation to information 
requirements was actually provided.  Consumer had to be merely informed 
about his right to withdraw.   While information requirements had not formed 
an important part of the Doorstep Selling Directive, off premises contracts 
have now resulted in being governed by an extensive list of information 
requirements.  As it has already been argued, the fact that the two types of 
contracting which greatly differ in nature were combined in a single piece of 
legislation but more importantly under the same Article in relation to 
information requirements is striking.  The reason for this is the different sort 
of information that may be required in each situation or perhaps the more 
information needed in the instance of distance selling due to its nature. 
The list of information under the Distance Selling Directive was considerably 
narrower and comprised of only 9 different pieces of information while the 
Consumer Rights Directive has expanded the list to 20.  Information 
requirements under the Consumer Rights Directive include among others 
the duty on the part of the trader to inform the consumer about the main 
characteristics of the goods or services, identity of trader, his geographical 
address and contact information, the total price of goods or services 
including taxes as well as delivery or postal charges or any other costs.  
Information regarding the cost, if any, of using the means of distance 
communication when that is not calculated at the basic rate as well as 
information regarding payment arrangements, delivery, performance or the 
trader’s complaint handling policy where applicable also have to be provided 
to the consumer.  More importantly, the conditions, time limit and procedures 
for exercising the right of withdrawal and the model withdrawal form as well 
as information regarding the costs for returning goods.  Where the trader 
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fails to inform the consumer about additional charges or any other costs that 
apply, the consumer shall not bear those charges or costs.   
The list has evidently been extended which there are doubts as to whether 
this is really beneficial for consumers514, it cannot be denied that there are 
requirements that do go beyond those contained under the previous 
legislation.  A good example is the latter requirement in relation to hidden 
charges which now expressly frees the consumer of any obligation to pay in 
such circumstances.515  However the problem with regard to additional 
charges and Article 6(1)(e) is where the charges cannot be calculated in 
advance, the Directive leaves a degree of freedom on the trader to simply 
state that additional charges may be payable but cannot be calculated.  This 
leaves open the possibility for rogue traders to exploit this provision by 
expressly stating that additional charges may be payable516 and once the 
consumer enters the contract he automatically becomes bound to pay.   
Any information regarding the circumstances in which consumer will not 
benefit from the right of withdrawal or under which circumstances the 
consumer may lose his right of withdrawal also need to be provided to the 
consumer.  In addition to that, the existence of a legal guarantee in the case 
of non-conformity goods or any other after sale customer assistance, after-
sales services and commercial guarantees.  The trader shall also provide 
the consumer, where applicable, any information regarding the functionality 
or technical protection measures of digital content or about the possibility of 
having recourse to an out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism to 
which the trader is subject and the methods of having access to it.   
The provision of adequate information to the consumer has been rested on 
the assumption that the more information the consumer receives the better 
he is protected.517  The provision of information which has constituted a 
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central element of consumer policy as a means of enhancing consumer 
protection has been seen as the way to address the information asymmetry 
between the trader and the consumer which is in this way addressed by 
giving consumers the means to protect themselves through better informed 
decisions and choices.  However, there are evident limitations to this as 
consumers either not read in full or do not pay attention to the information 
provided at all518.  Even in cases where consumers do read information, this 
does not guarantee that they will respond to rationally.519  There are 
limitations regarding the ability of consumers as human beings to process 
information.520  
The potential of information provision to address consumer inequality has 
been considerably overrated by European legislators and this is yet further 
exaggerated by the fact that the list has been considerably expanded under 
the Consumer Rights Directive.  Although there has been some 
improvement with regard to information requirements, the extensive list may 
nevertheless lead to a situation where consumers are lost in the sea of 
information.  The not insignificant amount of information that is provided to 
consumers actually overwhelms rather than always helping consumers.  Not 
providing consumers with information is not the option but it is not realistic to 
expect consumers reading all information provided to them.  “Consumers 
have lives to lead and consumption is only part of their daily routine”521 as 
Howells interestingly notes.  This renders it unlikely for consumers to spend 
adequate time to read and evaluate all information to them.  This leads to 
the situations where consumers may blindly bind themselves to contracts 
which are ignorant of their terms and conditions which may not even accord 
to their preferences.522  The extension of the list of information requirements 
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may prove to be detrimental upon consumers and the lengthy and perhaps 
unnecessary pieces of information may adversely affect instead of improve 
the quality of the consumer’s final decision.523 Consumers may feel 
overwhelmed and instead of spending time to read through all the 
information provided, they may on the contrary base their decisions on 
grounds that are not sound.524 
Valuable information for example in relation to the withdrawal right which is 
perhaps the most valuable piece of information that does make the 
difference for consumer to know runs in this way the risk of being lost within 
the sea of information.525  The result may be one of a dysfunction as 
opposed to the desired outcome expected by the provision of information.526  
Although this is not to argue that the provision of information is altogether 
useless, the potential of this policy tool should not be overestimated and its 
limitations should be acknowledged.527  
There is not much clarity as regards the actual status of information 
requirements in the contract.  Although Recital 5 states that they should form 
an integral part of the contract, it remains unclear as to what status they will 
have under the contract.  This remains an issue for national laws to 
determine and it will probably lead to differences in approach between 
national laws.528  Taking a strict interpretation and treating information 
requirements as essentialia negotii, failure to provide such information or 
failure to provide them in an appropriate means or at the correct time may 
lead to the contract not being validly concluded.  This has onerous 
                                            
523 Luzak, ‘Online Consumer Contracts’ (n 512) 4. 
524 Nordhausen Scholes, ‘Information Requirements’ in Howells and Schulze (eds), 
Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (n 516) 214; Iain Ramsay, 
Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets (3rd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2012) 59. 
525 Micklitz and Reich, ‘Cronica De Una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission Proposal for 
a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (n 358) 496. 
526 Howells, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 498) 
369. 
527 Catherine I Garcia Porras and Willem H Van Boom, ’Information disclosure in the EU 
Consumer Credit Directive: opportunities and limitations’ in James Devenney and Mel 
Kenny, Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 22. 
528 Nordhausen Scholes, ‘Information Requirements’ in Howells and Schulze (eds), 
Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (n 516) 223. 
169 
 
consequences for the consumer who may be unable to obtain contract law 
remedies on the ground that there exists no contract.  Although the 
Consumer Rights Directive makes express reference to the fact that it does 
not affect Member States contract law, it remains uncertain as to whether 
Recital 5 and the phrase “integral part” indeed accords to this limitation.529  
This may some bring uncertainty as to whether failure on the part of the 
trader to provide such information will have an effect on the validity of 
contract. 
Further on, as regards the consequences for breaching information 
requirements are nonetheless not individually addressed under the particular 
article of the Directive.  An important improvement for the consumer’s 
position can be found in Article 6(6).  The particular paragraph provides that 
where the trader fails to inform the consumer as to the price of the goods or 
any costs that cannot be calculated in advance as well as where the trader 
fails to inform the consumer prior to the conclusion of the contract that he will 
have to bear the cost of returning the goods when by their nature they 
cannot be returned by post, the consumer shall not bear those charges or 
costs.  This can secure some sort of protection for consumers against rogue 
traders who may attempt to exploit consumers.  As regards, the 
consequences for breaching Article 6 though, there is no explicit reference 
made under the particular Article.  It is accordingly presumed that Article 24 
which deals with the penalties for the infringement of the Directive is 
therefore applicable.  Article 24, which will be discussed in greater detail at a 
later point, leaves it to Member States to adopt rules on penalties for the 
infringements of the national provisions implementing the Consumer Rights 
Directive. 
Articles 7 and 8 provide for certain formal requirements in relation to off-
premises and distance contracts respectively.  Amongst others, Article 7 
requires the pre-contractual information in off-premises contracts to be 
provided either on paper or any other durable medium and should be legible 
and in plain, intelligible language.  A copy of the signed contract or the 
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confirmation of the contract on paper or any other durable medium is also 
required and shall be provided to the consumer within a reasonable time.  As 
regards distance contracts, Article 8 requires information to be in intelligible 
language and to be made available to the consumer in a way appropriate to 
the means of distance communication used in a given instance.  According 
to Article 8, so far as information is provided on a durable medium, it shall be 
legible.  In addition, what Article 8 provides is that the obligation to pay as 
well as the means of payment accepted need to be made clear. Doorstep 
Selling Directive did not contain a relevant provision which renders Article 7 
a considerable improvement.  Prior to the adoption of the Consumer Rights 
Directive, the provision governing the particular issue in relation to distance 
contracts was Article 5 of the Distance Selling Directive which required the 
provision of a written confirmation or another durable medium to the 
consumer in good time and at least at the time of delivery.  The improvement 
made under current Article 8 is that the provision of confirmation to the 
consumer is saved for the consumer at an earlier point of time. 
Article 8 dealing with the provision of information in distance contracts has 
loosened the duty of the trader to inform the consumer into a duty to reach 
consumers530   Article 8 provides that the traders shall give or make the 
information contained under Article 6(1) available to the consumer.531 The 
trader can thus simply make information available and in this way fulfil his 
obligation and free himself from any further action.  This means it will 
subsequently rest upon the consumer to engage to some kind of activity in 
order to access the information.  This signifies that protection no longer 
focuses on the passive consumer but rather on the active consumer and 
which equates to a reduction in the online disclosure standards.  Hyperlinks 
and ticking off boxes that have been so far provided by traders as a way to 
comply with their disclosure obligations532 have proved insufficient and 
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Article 8 will instead of providing an effective solution, will further this.533  The 
only type of add-ons that are addressed under the Consumer Rights 
Directive are contained in Article 22 and relate to those that impose 
additional payments upon the consumer which require the express consent 
of the consumer.  The trader cannot in those circumstances infer the 
consumer’s acceptance by using default options which the consumer has to 
reject in order to avoid extra payments.  As regards any other type of 
information imposing extra conditions on consumers, traders may continue 
to hide them in complex hyperlinks or add-on windows as there is no 
express reference in relation to them under the Directive.  A provision that 
would at least require the trader to direct the consumer’s attention towards 
such information could perhaps provide some degree of certainty to 
consumers in this regard. 
Right of Withdrawal 
The cooling off period in which a consumer, without giving any reasons for 
this decision, is able, to exercise his right of withdrawal has been under 
Article 9 extended to 14 days which constitutes a welcome improvement for 
consumers as the extended length now exceeds not only the length that was 
provided under the previous legislation but also that provided by most 
Member States national laws.534  More importantly, Recital 41clarifies that 
this refers to calendar days which also improves consumers’ position who 
will in this way have more time in their disposal to change their mind and 
withdraw from a distance or an off-premises contract. Enabling the 
withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts has been rested on the 
assumption that the consumer is better positioned after having direct 
experience with the goods ordered in a distance contract to have second 
thoughts as well as in a less stressful environment away from the seller in an 
off premises situation.  Article 6 of the Distance Selling Directive provided for 
at least 7 working days in which the consumer could withdraw from a 
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distance contract while Article 5 of the Doorstep Selling Directive provided 
for a period of not less than 7 days.  In both situations, this period could be 
extended by the national provisions of Member States.  The fact that the 
length of the cooling off period has been extended and what is more that is 
has been fully harmonised will bring to an end inconsistencies between the 
differing levels that have prior to the Consumer Rights Directive existed in 
national regimes and will consequently remove uncertainty for consumers.  It 
is in addition made clear under Article 9(2) of the Directive that it starts to run 
from the day of the conclusion of the contract in contracts for the sale of 
services and in sales contracts when the consumer or a third party, other 
than the carrier, indicated by the consumer, acquires physical possession of 
the goods.  Also Article 9(2) clarifies situations where multiple goods ordered 
or where a good consisting of multiple lots or pieces is ordered, it starts to 
run on the day which the last good or the last lot or piece is acquired.  It 
cannot be denied that the right of withdrawal constitutes an effective remedy 
in cases of asymmetry of information.  However the problem with 
consumers’ reluctance to use it should not be disregarded.535 
Article 10 which deals with the situation where the trader fails to provide 
consumer with the information on the right of withdrawal, it is stipulated that 
the withdrawal period shall expire 12 months from the end of the initial 
period.  However, if the trader has provided the consumer with the 
information provided within 12 months from the day that the withdrawal 
period expires, then the withdrawal shall expire 14 days after the day upon 
which the consumer receives the relevant information.  Under Distance and 
Doorstep Selling Directives, the withdrawal period was extended to 3 months 
and the fact that the Consumer Rights Directive extended it to 12 months 
makes it a considerable improvement in terms of consumer protection. 
Although there was no express provision in relation to the formalities for the 
exercise of the right of withdrawal, Article 11 now deals with this issue by 
providing that the consumer may either use the model withdrawal form - to 
which Member States shall not add any formal requirements other than 
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those set out- to withdraw from the contract or may make any other 
unequivocal statement setting out his decision to withdraw from the contract.  
There is also the possibility for the trader to give the option to the consumer 
to electronically fill in and submit either the model withdrawal form or any 
other unequivocal statement on the trader’s website.  The fact that there is 
not a single and definite option may lead to some confusion for consumers 
but more importantly what could be emphasised in relation to the standard 
withdrawal form is that it will not be a significant contribution for 
inexperienced consumers who may exercise their right to withdraw from a 
contract by merely returning the goods to the trader or by exercising their 
right in a verbal form.536  This again leads back to the position of vulnerable 
consumers with inexperienced consumers, a special category falling under 
the umbrella of vulnerable consumers.  The question posed is whether the 
introduction of the withdrawal form, being a limitation, is a necessary step 
that had to be made537 or whether it constitutes another measure of ensuring 
greater certainty for traders. 
Article 12 refers to the effects of withdrawal and states that the parties are 
freed from their obligations under the contract or to conclude the contract 
where an offer was made by the consumer.  Renunciation was according to 
Doorstep Selling Directive to be governed by national laws while Distance 
Selling Directive made no reference to the issue.  One could perhaps argue 
that this constitutes an unnecessary provision as this constitutes a 
reasonable and an inevitable consequence.  This observation as well as the 
fact that the right of withdrawal which was prior the Consumer Rights 
Directive covered by only one provision has now been replaced by a whole 
section comprising of 8 different provisions signify an evident approach to 
include every aspect in relation to the right to withdraw under the Directive. 
Further on, Article 13 refers to the obligations of the trader in the event of 
withdrawal.  Particularly, the trader has to reimburse all the payments 
received from the consumer including, if applicable, the costs of delivery, by 
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using the same means of payment as the consumer used without delay and 
not later than 14 days from the day on which the trader has been informed of 
the consumer’s decision to withdraw.  Although, reimbursement was left by 
Doorstep Selling Directive to national laws, Article 6 of the Distance Selling 
Directive required traders to make reimbursement as soon as possible and 
within 30 days.  Accordingly, the fact that the period has been reduced to 14 
days means that consumers have the possibility to receive their money back 
within a shorter period of time.  In cases where the consumer has asked for 
a type of delivery other than the least expensive type of standard delivery 
offered by the trader, the trader has no obligation to reimburse such 
supplementary costs.  The trader may withhold reimbursement until he has 
received the goods back or until the consumer has supplied evidence of 
having sent back the goods.   
On the contrary, Article 14 enumerates the obligations of the consumer in 
the event of withdrawal.  The consumer shall send back the goods or hand 
them over to the trader or to a person authorised by the trader to receive the 
goods without undue delay and not later than 14 days from the day on which 
he has communicated his decision to withdraw.  When exercising his right of 
withdrawal, the consumer according to Article 14 shall only bear the cost of 
returning goods unless the trader has agreed to bear them or the trader 
failed to inform the consumer that the consumer has to bear them, a 
provision which does not differ from the relevant provision of Distance 
Selling Directive, particularly Article 6.  The consumer shall only be liable for 
any diminished value of the goods resulting from the handling of the goods 
other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and 
functioning of the goods but shall not be liable for any diminished value of 
the goods where the trader has failed to provide notice of the right of 
withdrawal.  This constitutes a newly inserted provision which was not 
contained under either Distance Selling Directive or Doorstep Selling 
Directive.  The purpose of this provision is twofold, on the one hand to 
prevent the situation where consumers might indiscriminately make use of 
their withdrawal right to the detriment of traders and at the same time it 
evidently protects the interests and position of trader.  However, it should not 
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be disregarded that the task of drawing the line as to the use that is 
necessary to simply establish the nature of the goods is a difficult one.   
In the case of digital content, the consumer shall not bear the cost of supply, 
either in full or in part, of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible 
medium where the consumer has not given his prior express consent to the 
beginning of the performance before the end of the 14 day withdrawal 
period, the consumer has not acknowledged that he loses his right of 
withdrawal when giving his consent.  Digital content is also covered Recital 
19 which provides further clarification in relation to digital content which is 
finally included within the scope of the Directive and the right of withdrawal.  
Consumer enjoys the right of withdrawal unless the consumer has 
consented to the beginning of the performance of the contract during the 
withdrawal period and has acknowledged that he will consequently lose the 
right to withdraw from the contract.  In addition to general information 
requirements, the trader should inform the consumer about the functionality 
and the relevant interoperability of digital content.  Although those constitute 
considerable improvements from the consumer protection perspective, they 
were nevertheless not included from the early beginning when the proposed 
version of the Consumer Rights Directive was brought forward.   
As regards penalties for failure on the part of the trader or the consumer to 
fulfil the obligations relating to exercise of the right of withdrawal will 
according to Recital 48 be determined by national law.  Equally to the 
infringement of information requirements, it is presumed that this is 
additionally covered by Article 24 which generally deals with the 
infringements of the Directive. 
Article 15 clarifies that any ancillary contracts are terminated once the right 
of withdrawal is exercised while Article 16 contains a list of exceptions from 
the right of withdrawal.  Although there was no respective under Doorstep 
Selling Directive in relation to exceptions, Article 3 of the Distance Selling 
Directive provided for 5 exceptions to the right of withdrawal.  However the 
Consumer Rights Directive has added to this list by including 13 different 
situations in which the right of withdrawal does not apply.  Not all of the 
exceptions contained under Article 16 will be examined and while some of 
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them can be regarded as reasonable, a number of them should be 
questioned from the perspective of consumer protection.  For example, 
according to Article 16, consumers cannot withdraw from contracts for the 
supply of goods made to the consumer’s specifications or clearly 
personalised.  Those goods are not subject to the right to withdraw due to 
the inability of the trader to resell them.  However, regard should in this 
instance be paid to the fact that especially in distance contracts the 
consumer acquires actual knowledge of the real nature of a good when he 
receives it for this reason there may be situations where the good ordered at 
the consumer’s specification may not accord to what has the consumer 
expected.  However, this is not such a straightforward issue as consumers 
could in this way exploit their right and could withdraw with great ease with 
such products once they were not fully satisfied with the personalised goods 
received.  In exceptional circumstances where the goods are not in 
conformity with what has been presented, withdrawal could be allowed.  In 
addition, consumers cannot withdraw from contracts for the supply of sealed 
audio or sealed video recordings or sealed computer software which were 
unsealed after delivery as well as from contracts for the supply of digital 
content which is not supplied on a tangible medium if the performance has 
begun with the consumer’s prior express consent and his acknowledgement 
that he thereby loses his right of withdrawal. 
Other Consumer Rights 
Chapter IV dealing with other rights that consumer enjoy in distance and off 
premises contracts by providing general clarifications as to the scope of the 
Directive, in relation to delivery, fees for the use of means of payment and 
any additional payments as well as in relation to communication by 
telephone between the parties.   Article 18 determines that, unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise, the trader shall deliver the goods by 
transferring the physical possession or control of the goods to the consumer 
without undue delay but not later than 30 days from the conclusion of the 
contract.  It is additionally provided that if the trader fails to fulfil his obligation 
to deliver the goods within the time or agreed or within the 30 days period, 
the consumer shall call upon him to make the delivery within an additional 
period of time appropriate to the circumstances.  If the trader fails again, the 
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consumer shall be entitled to terminate the contract and the trader shall 
without undue delay reimburse all sums paid under the contract.  In addition 
to the termination of the contract, the consumer may also have recourse to 
other remedies provided for by national law, also referred to in Recital 53, 
and which together constitute another example where remedies have been 
left to national law.  However, remedies could perhaps have been one of the 
areas where some uniformity would be advantageous for consumers as 
what consumers care about after all is what they will get in the end.  What 
could also be highlighted at this point is the fact that there is not automatic 
termination available provides a second chance for traders to restore their 
position but at the same time results in undue delay where consumers have 
to wait long to acquire their goods. 
Article 19 provides that Member States shall prohibit traders from charging 
consumers in respect of the use of a given means of payment, fees that 
exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of such means.  Further on, 
Article 20 deals with the passing of risk by clarifying that where the trader 
dispatches the goods to the consumer, the risk of loss or damage to the 
goods passed to the consumer when he or a third party indicated by the 
consumer, other than the carrier, has acquired the physical possession of 
the goods.  However, the risk is passed to the consumer upon delivery to the 
carrier if the carrier was commissioned by the consumer to carry the goods 
and this option was not offered by the trader.  In addition, Article 21 provides 
that Member States need to ensure that where the trader operates a 
telephone line for the purpose of contracting him by telephone in relation to 
the contract concluded, the consumer is not bound to pay more than the 
basic rate when contacting the trader.  Both Article 20 and 21 contain 
welcome improvements and while the former clarifies a long-standing 
uncertainty in relation to the passing of risk, the latter can protect consumers 
against traders who might have exploited consumers by imposing additional 
unreasonable charges in the given instance.   
General Provisions 
Chapter V of the Consumer Rights Directive contains general provisions in 
relation to enforcement which is provided under Article 23 as well as in 
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relation to the imperative nature of the Directive under Article 25.  As regards 
penalties, , Article 24 provides Member States shall lay down rules on 
penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Directive and penalties adopted must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.  However, no further reference is made in the 
Directive regarding any suitable penalties even for certain infringements of 
the Directive.  The particular Chapter also includes Article 26 which provides 
that Member States shall take appropriate measures to inform consumers 
and traders about the national provisions transposing the Directive however 
it does not make any further reference as to what measures suffice for these 
purposes.  According to Article 28, Member States shall adopt and publish 
by 13 December 2013 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive and they shall apply those measures 
from 13 June 2014. 
The final chapter, Chapter IV, clarifies that the Directive repeals Directive 
85/577/EEC on Doorstep Selling and Directive 97/7/EC on Distance Selling 
while Articles 32 and 33 include certain slight amendments to Directive 
93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms and to Directive 1999/44/EC on 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees. 
Discussion of the Consumer Rights Directive approach 
The consumer envisaged under EU Consumer policy, is an observant and 
circumspect consumer, an active information seeker538  who has all required 
skills and expertise, willingness to shop across border as well as resources 
and the provision of the appropriate information will enable him to make a 
right and informed decision.539  This approach is also clearly reflected in the 
Consumer Rights Directive itself.  The provisions of the Directive deal with 
all issues that actually facilitate the conclusion of distance, and primarily 
online, purchases.  That is too much emphasis has in fact been given on 
providing consumers firm grounds which will facilitate their decision 
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making.540  Not only this approach fails to provide protection to all European 
consumers but in essence portrays the real focus of European Consumer 
Law and the wider objectives that are sought. 
The argument made in this thesis does not seek to deny the importance of 
providing consumers with information altogether.  There is on the contrary 
an attempt to draw together a number of concerns in relation to the 
approach that the Consumer Rights Directive follows which primarily relies 
on the information paradigm.  Concerns in relation to this approach have 
been repeatedly expressed with Annette Nordhausen Scholes questioning 
as to whether this is the appropriate approach to improve consumer 
protection.541  The answer to this question is that too much reliance on the 
informational approach does not actually fit within the aim of improving 
consumer protection and its potential to help all consumers is rather limited. 
542     
The informational paradigm points towards a change in approach, while 
consumer protection has been seen as an intervention to deal with power 
imbalances between the consumer and the trader it has in the context of 
European law and under the particular directive turned into an intervention 
aiming to address informational asymmetries.  Information imbalances 
between the consumer and the trader are thus seen as the source of market 
failures which is actually not the case.  Relying on the information paradigm 
in fact equates to contemplating exogenous factors as being central the 
aspects of consumer’s decision making.543   Nonetheless, as Chapter 5 has 
shown, there is a range of wider factors that do exert influence on 
consumer’s decision making.  Consumer behaviour has thrown light upon 
the fact that disclosure of information is not a highly valued factor by 
consumers.  Consumers who have lower income are not expected to greatly 
benefit from the disclosure of information.  Due to their limited resources, 
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they are likely to confine themselves to pattern of shopping that they feel 
sure about544 as experimenting with new products perhaps available at the 
internet is not option due to the risks involved. 
Increased reliance on the information paradigm should accordingly be 
treated with caution545 due to its evident limitations that have already been 
referred to in this Chapter.  The possibility of consumers not understanding 
or perhaps not even reading information it remains, as it has been seen, 
open.546  This is an activity that requires both time and energy and given the 
busy lives that consumers lead reading through all pieces of information may 
not be feasible.  Consumers have blindly ticked off numerous boxes in their 
lives in order to complete an online purchase in the rush without any 
awareness as to what they agree to.547  The excessive reliance being placed 
upon information disclosure by European legislators is indeed worsened by 
the overburdening of consumers with information and reasonably raises 
concerns as to the effectiveness of this approach.   
The information paradigm constitutes a technique that is in fact directed at 
certain categories of consumers as information are an important tool in the 
hands of the rational market participant who is conscious of his needs and 
who can by making use of the information be the best positioned to satisfy 
those needs.548 This is not the case for all pieces of information that are 
contained under the Directive.  For example, information in relation to the 
main characteristics of the products as well as details regarding the price 
and how the price is actually calculated cannot be regarded as information 
aimed to reach the well informed, observant and circumspect consumer.  549   
Those are rather vital pieces of information which the consumer needs in 
order to make an informed purchase by knowing what exactly his buying as 
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well as to be in position to make a comparison respectively.550  This further 
confirms the type of consumer upon which the European Commission 
seems to be focused and the success of such a technique thus may 
reasonably be questioned in the case of less-alert consumers while it 
becomes even more problematic in the case of vulnerable consumers where 
it does not seem to function at all.551 
The information paradigm is proof of the fact that the European Consumer 
Law has more or less focused on a standard model of consumer, on the 
average consumer who is presumed to take note of all information provided 
but more importantly who can rationally process it.  Consumers have 
perhaps been too optimistically conceived as being above the average, well-
informed, observant and circumspect.  However, the cognitive ability of 
consumers does differ between them and should not be taken for granted.  
The mass of consumers is an heterogeneous one which renders it uncertain 
as to whether the provision of information can be always effective, especially 
for vulnerable consumers.552   
While the Preamble and in particular Recital 34 acknowledges the possibility 
of some kind of vulnerability in the form of specific needs that a consumer 
may have because of some mental, physical, psychological infirmity or due 
to its age or credulity, which the trader has to take into account, the same 
Recital makes clear that this should not lead to different levels of consumer 
protection.  This is not just a clear recognition that this will not provide further 
protection, perhaps in the form of lenient obligations or special provisions for 
vulnerable consumers but at the same time it deprives Member States the 
opportunity to provide specific legislation and thus provide further protection 
for vulnerable consumers.553  There has been not even been the slightest 
attempt to deal with the position of vulnerable consumers by for example 
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indicating what are the different circumstances giving rise to vulnerability, 
and not even an attempt to provide minimum special safeguards in the form 
of targeted responses that have the power to either eliminate or limit to some 
extent vulnerability.554  Failure to distinguish between the various categories 
of consumers or at least to provide some further guidance regarding the 
extent and cause of their vulnerability may result in vulnerable consumers 
being under-protected.555   A consumer may for example face difficulties in 
processing information which subsequently raises the question as to what 
alternative remedy, given the importance being placed upon the provision of 
information, can enable vulnerable consumers to make their own informed 
choices.556  
Generally under EU law there is minimal reference to specific protection for 
vulnerable consumers and the protection of the weak and vulnerable 
consumers has never been high in the Community agenda557 and thus a 
priority for EU legislators.  Reference to vulnerable consumers exists, as in 
the case of the Consumer Rights Directive, only in non-binding preambles558  
which poses questions to whether such reference is capable to provide 
additional protection to them.  A single reference to vulnerable consumers as 
in the case of the Consumer Rights Directive is unlikely to be particularly 
effective in order to provide with adequate safeguards.  Full harmonisation 
would be impaired had greater protection been provided to consumers and 
had traders been required to differentiate between consumers in order to 
treat them based on their individual abilities. 559  Such an approach would 
automatically mean extra standards for traders to meet when wishing to 
enter a national market which would undermine the very purpose of the 
internal market.  EU legislation has proved that there is no scope and no 
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willingness to turn into a social regulation560 by raising, instead of removing, 
barriers within the internal market.  The needs of vulnerable consumers 
come in second place with the needs of the market predominating over 
them.  The weakest consumers are not those in need of protection in their 
internal market and this is due to their inability to aid in its completion while 
on the other hand it is the confident, well-informed and empowered 
consumer perfectly fits with the wider and primary objective of having a 
perfect internal market in place.561 
However, despite the fact that EU takes a superficial approach towards 
vulnerability, it is important to note that consumers, as human beings, are all 
to a certain degree vulnerable especially in distance selling.  What should 
also not be disregarded is that vulnerability is not only a consequence of 
some personal conditions that a consumer may have but more importantly it 
can arise as a result of someone losing his job or becoming someone else’s 
carer which lead to economic constrains.  It is accordingly a “fluid state” as it 
has been characterised and which may arise in any consumer’s life at some 
point due to certain events.562  Although low income and affordability are 
rather critical issues which cannot be addressed through legislation, the 
situation of vulnerable consumers being faced with lengthy and complex 
information and at the same time traders being free of further obligations is 
an issue that could be addressed through legislation.  The task of following 
an effective approach towards consumer vulnerability nevertheless 
constitutes a significant challenge for legislators.  At the same time, it is of 
utmost importance given the purpose of protecting consumers’ interests at 
large if they wish to successfully perform their duties as envisaged in 
legislating within the area of consumer protection. 
The average consumer constitutes a central theme under the relevant EU 
legislative measures.  However this one size fits all approach is not effective 
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to provide protection for and thus lead to a general increase in consumer 
confidence.  What this means is that the EU measures aim at increasing the 
confidence of consumers that are already confident while it remains to be 
seen how the confidence of vulnerable consumers can be boosted.  But the 
European market is need of more above the average consumers and it is 
questionable as to whether vulnerability will gain considerable ground at the 
EU level.  Information obligations have been considerably elaborated under 
the Consumer Rights Directive563 and any improvement that has been 
achieved may be lost as a result of the wide ambit provided.  Greater skills 
and efforts will be required from consumers to deal with all pieces of 
information provided which is for the time being questionable whether this is 
a real possibility.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Although the effectiveness and success of information disclosure has not so 
far been proven564 and although it fails to protect all European consumers 
and especially the weaker ones, this continues to be the preferred approach 
at the European level.  What should also not be regarded is that businesses 
do have incentives to disclose information as this frees them from any 
further obligation and possible liability.565 The more information the traders 
provide to consumers prior to the conclusion of a contract, the more 
protected he is against possible claims of consumers arguing that they have 
not been sufficiently informed before entering into a particular contract.  
Information requirements that existed under the different national laws of 
Member States have been regarded as barriers to trade as traders had to 
comply with specific national obligations in order to enter a national 
market.566  In this line of argument, it follows that providing maximum 
harmonisation of information requirements can make cross border trading 
and generally trading for businesses, particularly those engaged in the 
online sector, not only more safe but also easier and more predictable.  It will 
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be far more beneficial for traders to rely on a single standard for trading 
across the EU who will in this way feel more confident by know that once 
they have provided all required information, the possibility of consumers 
bringing claims against them that they have not been provided with certain 
information will be considerably low.  Traders, in an effort to comply with 
their disclosure obligations, have so far provided for consumers a massive 
load of terms in small prints and all found under small boxes567 which the 
consumer has to tick as a proof that he has read them.   
Conclusion 
The current chapter has enumerated the main provisions of the Consumer 
Rights Directive as well as the approach reflected therein.  What could 
accordingly been argued is that the prevailing techniques used by the 
European legislators has a limited potential to provide an all embracing and 
adequate protection for all consumers.  What could be maintained is that the 
Commission has made an attempt to secure the adoption of a piece of 
legislation touching details in relation to distance and off premises contracts 
without major changes from a consumer protection perspective.  Through 
information disclosure and the right of withdrawal forming the major rights 
available to consumers the Commission seems to be focusing on 
empowering the ideal market participant.568  However, as it has been 
argued, his existence should not be taken for granted and expecting that all 
consumers will reap the benefits of the internal market is an illusion upon 
which the Commission has developed the Consumer Rights Directive.  In the 
same line of arguments, the Consumer Rights Directive seems to constitute 
a piece of legislation that traders and the most powerful consumers can 
benefit from.   
Not only the information requirements provided and the right of withdrawal 
signify the presence of an ideal consumer but generally the whole idea and 
aim of increasing consumers’ confidence do not in itself envisage vulnerable 
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consumers at all.  The primary purpose of the Commission has been to 
make cross border trading appealing by providing a regime that safeguards 
traders’ interests and provides some basics for the most powerful 
consumers.  However, a piece of legislation aiming at consumer protection 
should more than that and the Consumer Rights Directive should be a piece 
of legislation that does not merely update the previous legislation but it 
should address issues that consumers are really concerned with.  Europe 
has focused on market regulation rather than social regulation, consumers 
only matter and are important for the role they play in the market.569   
The eventual approach and techniques contained under the Consumer 
Rights Directive aiming at helping consumers to make informed choices 
indicate how consumer is viewed as a “specific market participant” who more 
particularly has specific needs and interests.570  Consumers are thus 
important only to the extent they contribute towards completing the internal 
market.571  Even if the Commission still advocates for the need to provide a 
high level of consumer protection to consumers, the emphasis has in 
essence shifted from protecting consumers towards empowering 
consumers.572  The information paradigm, upon which the Consumer Rights 
Directive is primarily based, is live evidence for this and also portrays how 
the informed consumer constitutes a central and recurring idea within the EC 
Consumer policy. 573  However this fundamental change in the EU approach 
raises questions as to how acceptable is that in the particular area which 
should aim at providing protection for all, even the weakest in the society.574 
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The Consumer Rights Directive has accordingly been focused on enabling 
consumers make an informed choice without providing actual protective 
rights.  This nevertheless forms part of the wider reorientation that European 
Consumer law has been subjected to. 575 With consideration to the 
limitations and concerns of the informational approach in general and its 
evident little ability to protect consumers that are below the average 
standard, the question turns to the question whether European consumers 
need more protective rules in the form of minimum harmonisation to protect 
as opposed to extensive information requirements.576  The ultimate question 
posed is whether this approach is capable of achieving the aim of improving 
consumer protection at all.  The fact that the focus of the Consumer Rights 
Directive and of the European Consumer Law in general has shifted on a 
standard consumer who is empowered, circumspect, omnipotent, is not in 
line with the needs and abilities of vulnerable consumers at all. The weak 
and disadvantaged consumer is not the one in need of protection at the EU 
level as this would go contrary to the objectives of the internal market.577  
The purpose of completing the internal market cannot be attained with too 
much focus being put on weak consumers578 but it is rather the active, 
informed and omnipotent that can aid in achieving this purpose.579  The 
overall conclusion arising from considering the Consumer Rights is not to 
deny the fact that some improvements have indeed been achieved but 
rather that it should be treated with caution.  It is perhaps not the solution 
that European actors, including the European Consumer Commissioner 
Meglena Kuneva, have been talking about and its limitations should 
accordingly be acknowledged. 
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Chapter 7 – The transposition of the Directive into the UK 
and Cypriot Regimes 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on the transposition of the Consumer Rights Directive 
in order to test the main hypothesis of this thesis.  This Chapter determines 
the effect of the directive in practice and what it really achieves through 
examining its transposition into the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus by 
further showing how increasing consumer confidence through providing a 
high level of consumer protection has been no more than a smokescreen.  
The comparison between the transposition of the Directive in the two 
regimes not only provides an opportunity to test whether the concerns 
already voiced in this thesis as to the real focus of European Consumer Law 
may be well justified but also sheds light upon the differences in approach 
between the two Member States and what lessons there are to learn from 
these.   
While the proposed Consumer Rights Directive was ambitiously brought 
forward to increase consumer’s confidence in cross border trade, as this 
Chapter will show the Directive in its final form failed for two reasons.  First 
of all, despite some improvements, there has been no major increase in 
consumer protection.  This contradicts the ambitious statements made by 
European actors such as Meglena Kuneva who had been the European 
Commissioner on Consumer Protection for the period of 2007-2010 has 
made.  In her speech at the French Presidency Conference in Paris580, she 
characterized the Directive as “the most far reaching overhaul of consumer 
rights in 30 years.”  Secondly, the final version of the Consumer Rights 
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Directive has even failed in meeting the Commission’s objectives and the 
breaks that were put on the Commission have resulted in the Directive being 
a major compromise.  It is however important to consider not simply the 
results of the Directive as adopted but also the sweeping consequences that 
the proposed Directive would have had in its original form which show how 
the emphasis was from the beginning wrong or to better put it, “misplaced”.  
The fact that the scope of the Directive was considerably narrowed down 
has prevented a reduction to the level of consumer protection and also the 
moral panic created around consumer confidence from taking its full effect.  
However this does not mean that the Consumer Rights Directive can still be 
regarded as a success. 
 
The Directive as finally adopted does not of course pose the same problems 
due to the fact that its scope was considerably narrowed down.581  However, 
its transposition into the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus and particularly 
paying regard to the method and process involved in relation to each 
Member State in the first part of this Chapter can help to throw light upon 
deeper issues involved as well as to draw some further conclusions.  As this 
part will show the directive was easily transposed in the case of Cyprus 
while this was not the case for the UK regime.  Not only a number of 
concerns emerged in the case of the UK transposition, but in addition the UK 
Government considered it important to provide their own approach where 
that was possible in transposing the Directive as will become apparent 
through assessing the changes achieved.  The purpose of the first part of 
this chapter is to show how the final Directive does not achieve much and 
fails to bring an overhaul for consumer protection – however honest that 
objective has been.  On the other hand, the second part will examine in what 
respects the proposed Directive would have affected the UK and Cypriot 
regime.  Although the final version constitutes a major compromise which in 
no way achieves the Commission’s “actual” objective to perhaps provide 
lenient, or “convenient” standards for traders, the effect of the initial proposal 
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which has fortunately been avoided, cannot be disregarded.  This provides 
an opportunity to unveil some further issues emerging from the approaches 
of the two Member States. 
 
Part One - The transposition Of the Directive  
Member States are under no obligation to copy out the exact wording of 
directives but they need to ensure that national provisions implementing 
directives achieve the desired result.582  The copy out technique, as its name 
suggest, involves the implementation of a directive by either strictly following 
or mirroring its wording as closely as possible.583  Although the wording of 
Directives indeed leaves some scope for national implementation, it is in 
most instances the case for Member States to use the copy out technique.  
As Martijn W Hesselink has argued the advantage of the copy out is that it 
makes the transposed law more visible rather than letting it disappear into 
national legislation and it can in this way be more easily determined that the 
result desired by the directive has been achieved.584  The reason behind this 
is because it constitutes the safest route for Members States as it minimises 
the risks involved in the transposition585 such as for example ending up with 
faulty transposition.  Evidently this ensures the avoidance of conflicts with 
the Directive586 that is being transposed.  At the same time, it also 
constitutes an effective way to confine any further “cross-infection” of a 
Member State’s national legal order by European law.587  Member States 
may prefer to transpose a directive using the copy out technique in order to 
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prevent the large number of European initiatives from being amalgamated 
with national legislation which makes it difficult to distinguish but which also 
has a greater effect for national traditions.  Given the legislative hyperactivity 
of the European Union588 in the form of Directives, this becomes even more 
understandable as implementing directives into national law is a costly and 
timely process.  National Parliaments would otherwise struggle to keep up 
with the number of European Directives especially when choosing to depart 
from the copy out technique which requires extra work from national 
legislators. 
Cyprus has employed the copy out technique for the transposition of the 
Directive by simply reproducing it in the Greek language.  Cyprus has simply 
transposed the Consumer Rights Directive in its domestic law with no actual 
changes and departures from it.  The Consumer Rights Law of 2013 has 
replaced The Law for Consumer Contracts Concluded Away from Business 
Premises of 2000 and The Law for the Conclusion of Consumer Distance 
Contracts of 2000.  However, the fact that the Cypriot transposition has 
followed the copy out technique and the particular approach can hardly be 
attributed to reasons such as limiting the cross contamination of the Cypriot 
legal regime by European law or as a way to cope with European initiatives. 
Cyprus did not show any resentment to European initiatives and has since 
its accession to the European Union, worked hard to conform to European 
legislation589 and has impliedly accepted the fact that consumer policy at the 
European level is a necessary adjunct to the internal market.590  Cyprus is 
perhaps among those Member States that have showed their trust in the 
European approach and which have also exhibited an evident willingness to 
transpose European legislation.   
Cyprus constitutes a monist system and monist systems, contrary to dualist 
systems, are characterised by a unitary perception which views international 
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and national law as being part of the same legal order. 591  International law 
resources, in the current situation European law, are placed at the same 
level with or even above their national legislation.592  Monist systems may 
even acknowledge international law as being superior to national law.593  In 
the case of Cyprus, the Supremacy of EU Law over the Cyprus Law was 
determined in 2006 with the 5th Amendment of the Constitution Law Number 
127(I) 2006.  In addition, with the adoption of the European Union (ratifying) 
Law Number 2003, Cyprus is under an obligation to uphold and implement 
EU Law.  Although all Member States have to presumably conform to 
European legislation, it could be argued that monist systems do exhibit a 
greater degree of susceptibility towards sources of international law and that 
may be one of the reasons the transposition of the Directive gives rise to 
some differences between the two Member States.  EU Law is in Cyprus 
regarded as supreme and according to Chrysthia Papacleovoulou this 
influences the field of consumer protection as well.  To her view, it comes as 
no surprise that Cypriot laws in relation to consumer protection are guided 
by the European approach.594  It is accordingly not surprising that Cyprus 
uses the copy out technique to transpose European directives, including the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  For Cyprus, the copy out technique is perhaps 
the most suitable approach to transpose European legislation and achieve 
the best possible result.  Their preference to the copy out technique should 
in no case be regarded as a way to cop out with European legislation. 
On the other hand the transposition of the Consumer Rights Directive into 
the UK regime was achieved through two Regulations. Those are The 
Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 which were 
initially adopted to implement Article 19 of the Directive dealing with fees for 
                                            
591 Goerge Slyz, ‘International Law in National Courts and International Tribunals’ New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 28(1-2) (1995-1996) 65, 67; Peter 
Malanczuk, Akekurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997) 
63.  
592 Andreas Føllesdal, Ramses A. Wessel, Jan Wouters, Multilevel Regulation and the EU: 
The Interplay Between Global, European and National Normative Processes (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 346. 
593 Slyz, ‘International Law in National Courts and International Tribunals’ (n 591) 67; 
Malanczuk, Akekurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (n 591) 63. 
594 Papacleovoulou, ‘Cyprus Consumer Protection’ in Campbell (ed), International 
Consumer Protection (n 589) 3. 
193 
 
the use of means of payment and The Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 which implemented 
the remaining provisions of the Directive.  At that point, the Consumer Rights 
Bill which is now the Consumer Rights Act was being debated by the UK 
Parliament.  The Consumer Rights Act deals with some issues found under 
the Consumer Rights Directive595 by thus making the UK transposition of the 
Directive, “a bolt-on transposition”596 and spreading the Directive into three 
different pieces of legislation.  Nonetheless, the Consumer Rights Act does 
not seek to implement the Directive and in reality covers the areas that were 
initially contained in the proposed Directive and it interestingly follows a 
different approach from that of the proposed Directive.  It is interesting 
though that the UK has been particularly categorical against the 
amendments that were proposed in the two areas which were eventually 
dropped.  The Consumer Rights Act shows the difference between the 
European and the UK approach in this respect. 
Under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, EU obligations can 
be implemented into English Law by the use of either primary or secondary 
legislation.  However, despite the possibility of implementing Directives 
through primary legislation, there has been a tendency to use secondary 
legislation under the general power that Ministers enjoy under Section 2(2) 
of the European Communities Act.  While this may be partly attributed to the 
Parliament’s limited time, the political dimension to it should not be 
disregarded. 597  Secondary legislation is of low-visibility598  and makes the 
task of implementing contentious EU measures easier as this does not 
involve either pressure from the Parliament or the press.599   
                                            
595 This refers to Sections 11, 12, 28, 29, 30 36, 37 and which cross refer to the Directive’s 
provisions in relation to among others, the pre-contractual information, passing of risk and 
delivery etc. 
596 This refers to the situation where in addition to the main legislation transposing the 
Directive into the domestic regime, there are also different bits of the Directive found under 
other pieces of national legislation.  
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UK, like Cyprus, has been also amongst those Member States adhering to 
the copy out technique.  However the motives behind using the copy out 
technique seem to differ for each Member State.  UK constitutes one of 
those Member States whose motive behind following the copy-out approach 
is as Ewan McKendrick argues to avoid liability for possible failure to 
properly implement the Directive.600  This was the case with the Consumer 
Rights Directive as well for the UK.601  While for Cyprus, this was part of 
showing their zeal to European initiatives, as regards the UK, resorting to the 
copy out technique could hardly be regarded as a willingness to implement 
the directive.  On the contrary, as it has been argued the copy out approach 
represents a rather “cop out” approach.602  UK is possibly amongst those 
Member States which resorted to the copy out technique as a way to avoid 
State liability while retaining the effect of European law at the possible 
minimum.  This could be considered against the fact that UK constitutes a 
dualist country and which perhaps additionally shows its relationship with as 
well as its receptiveness to International and European law.  Contrary to 
monism, the dualist approach regards national and international law, here 
European law, as two separate sources603 and in no case acknowledges 
international law as being automatically superior to national law.  It could 
accordingly be said that the dualist approach constitutes a more reserved 
approach towards sources beyond national law as for example European 
initiatives. 
Despite academics’ concerns that that the copy out technique prevents 
national Parliaments from taking steps further to improve the quality of a 
Directive or even to clarify obscure issues contained under a Directive604, as 
this Chapter will show, this has not been the case in the current situation.  
UK took the opportunity to go beyond the Directive to address local recurring 
issues provided its own approach in issues where a degree of flexibility 
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existed.  As this Chapter will show UK made a great effort to increase 
consumer protection in areas which it is particularly needed and thus 
achieve a satisfactory level of consumer protection and which in some 
regards does not resemble the original Consumer Rights Directive. 
 
The Cyprus Approach 
It is perhaps easier to begin with examining the transposition of the Directive 
into the Cypriot regime where it was more easily transposed.  The Directive 
proved to be particularly welcome with no evident concerns or difficulties 
emerging.605  One year after the adoption of the Consumer Rights Law of 
2013 which has transposed the Directive in the Cypriot regime, the first 
anniversary of the Directive’s implementation has been marked with 
particular gratification.606  However, the fact that the Directive has been seen 
as a success in the case of Cyprus should not automatically mean that it is a 
successful story but rather calls for a need to consider any contextual factors 
that may play a role in this regard.  The process preceding the adoption as 
well as the way in which the Directive was eventually adopted, show a 
degree of acquiescence on the part of Cyprus.  Nonetheless, it remains to 
be seen whether this is because of indifference or because of trust in the 
European approach.  This part of the chapter will not only determine the 
changes that the Directive has brought to the Cypriot regime but also what 
lessons there are to learn even for the wider development of European 
Consumer Law. 
The task of transposing EU Directives in the Cypriot Legislation is assigned 
to the different Ministries based on the area involved.  The Draft Legislation 
is then sent to the Law Office which exercises a technical legal control of it to 
examine whether it achieves the purpose of the Directive by implementing all 
provisions contained therein into the Cypriot Legal Regime.   Following that 
                                            
605 Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry Deb, Consumer Rights Law of 2013 
(Parliament of Cyprus, I Parliamentary Period – Session C – 24 October 2013). 
606 George Markopouliotis, ‘EU Consumer Rights’ in-cyprus (20 June 2016)  <http://in-
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stage, the Draft Legislation is sent back to the relevant Ministry which puts 
the Draft Legislation to the Council of Ministers for approval and 
subsequently to the Cyprus Parliament for voting.607  The Parliamentary 
Committee on Energy, Trade, Industry and Tourism was the responsible 
Committee for exercising scrutiny on the draft Consumer Rights Law of 2013 
implementing the Consumer Rights Directive in the Cypriot Legal Regime.608  
The Parliamentary Committee examined the Draft Bill in just two sessions on 
the 24th of September 2013 and 15th of October 2013 where different 
stakeholders were called to attend the two Committee Sessions.  There 
were representatives from the Ministry of Energy, Trade, Industry and 
Tourism, from the Cyprus Employers and Industrialists Federation, from the 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, from the General 
Confederation Pancyprian Organization of Professional Craftsmen and 
Shopkeepers, from the Cyprus Consumers Association as well as from the 
Cyprus Consumers’ Union and Quality of Life.  Contrary to the disquiet that 
the Directive caused in the UK, only two meetings were needed to discuss 
the implementation of the Directive into a primary legislation and 
interestingly no particular problems emerged.609   
Although minutes of the Parliamentary Committees’ meeting are not kept in 
the case of Cyprus, according to the relevant Parliamentary Committee 
Report, the stakeholders present at the two Committee sessions did not 
express any particular concern for any of the provision contained under the 
Consumer Rights Law implementing the Directive.  The only concern 
expressed by the Representatives of the Cyprus Employers and 
Industrialists Federation and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry related to the administrative fines that may be imposed by the 
Department responsible for the enforcement can impose when the 
                                            
607 Information as to the procedure followed taken from 
<www.law.gov.cy/law/lawoffice.nsf/All/9483C617996ED452C22573E20034D72E?OpenDoc
ument&highlight=%CE%BF%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%B3%CE%AF%CE%B1> accessed 19 
April 2016. 
608 Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry Deb, Consumer Rights Law of 2013 
(Parliament of Cyprus, I Parliamentary Period – Session C – 24 October 2013). 
609 ibid. 
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provisions of the Consumer Rights Law are infringed.610  However, the rest 
of the Representatives present at the two Parliamentary sessions 
interestingly did not express any disagreement with the scope and purpose 
of the Bill.  The Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Trade, Industry and 
Tourism then suggested to the Cyprus Parliament to vote on the bill in the 
form that this was submitted by the Executive power as no actual changes 
were suggested.611  The Consumer Rights Directive was accordingly 
transposed with the adoption of the Bill into a legislative act, namely the 
Consumer Rights Law of 2013 which constitutes a primary legislation, as 
opposed to the use of secondary legislation which is the case for the UK 
transposition. 
Assessment of changes brought 
The Directive has been seen as a success for the Cypriot consumer 
protection from actors such as Giorgos Markopouliotis, the Head of the 
European Commission Representation in Cyprus who also characterised 
European consumer protection policy as one of the Union’s success 
stories.612  One year after its transposition in the Cypriot regime, Giorgos 
Markopouliotis talked about the key improvements that the Directive 
brought.613   He not only referred to the clearer information that consumers 
will now have when buying digital content, but also to the fact that 
consumers will now have to confirm that they accept any additional 
payments before those are imposed on them which means no more cost-
traps and pre-ticked boxes.614   Amongst the notable improvements brought 
by the Directive was that traders cannot charge consumers for using a 
particular means of payment with fees exceeding the cost for using such 
means and also that traders operating hotlines for dealing with consumer 
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complaints or question cannot impose charges that go beyond the basic 
rate.  For Giorgos Makroupoliotis, amongst the notable improvements that 
the Directive contains is the extension and harmonisation of the withdrawal 
period from 7 to 14 days as well as the 14 day period in which the trader has 
to reimburse any payment to the consumer in the event of cancellation.615  In 
determining the changes that the Directive has brought to the Cypriot 
consumer protection regime, a question that needs to be answered is which 
parts of the Directive constitute actual improvements and which perceived 
improvements simply constitute a clarification and harmonisation of what 
was already in place.  
The ambit of the Directive  
To begin with, it is important to consider the ambit of the Directive and the 
effect that this will have on the Cypriot legislation.  The list of exceptions to 
the Consumer Rights Directive has been considerably expanded.  As a 
consequence, the adoption of the Consumer Rights Law of 2013 has greatly 
extended the list of exceptions that The Law for Consumer Contracts 
Concluded Away from Business Premises of 2000 and the Law for the 
Conclusion of Consumer Distance Contracts of 2000 contained.  This means 
there will from now be more areas in which consumers will technically be 
deprived the protection offered by the Directive.  Contracts concluded off 
premises and which involved the construction and sale of immovable 
property, the supply of foodstuffs, beverages and other goods that are 
intended for current consumption were the only areas that were exempted 
prior to the adoption of the Consumer Rights Law.  As regards contracts 
concluded by means of distance communication, the exempted contracts 
before the adoption of the Consumer Rights Law were auctions, financial 
services, contracts concluded by automatic vending machines, construction 
and sale of immovable property as well as the supply of foodstuffs, 
beverages and other goods for current consumption.  The two lists have now 
been merged into one under the Consumer Rights Law and the new areas 
that have been added to the list include social services, healthcare services 
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when those are sold by regulated professionals, timeshare contracts, travel 
package contracts, the passenger transport services (however, the 
provisions in relation to additional payments do apply to those contracts), 
contracts concluded with telecommunication operators through public 
payphones for example and last but not least off-premises contracts whose 
value is below €20.   
While the reason for extending the list of exceptions to the Directive has 
been the existence of sector specific legislation at the Union level dealing 
with the exempted areas, in some respects the eventual approach should be 
considered with greater caution.  As regards healthcare services, when 
those are purchased from regulated professions who include according to 
the European Directive 2011/24/EU on patient rights in cross border 
healthcare, doctors, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, they are exempted from 
the scope of the Consumer Rights Directive.  On the contrary, commercial 
traders selling healthcare goods and services including for example mobility 
aids, vitamin supplements, diet and care plans, will be covered by the 
Directive.616  A segmented market is accordingly likely to emerge in the area 
of healthcare services in the case of Cyprus.  This means Cypriot 
consumers will have to distinguish with whom they are contracting when 
they enter into distance or doorstep contract for the purchase of healthcare 
services.  This is likely to give rise to complexity and uncertainty in an area 
of particular vulnerability.   
Low value off-premises contracts constitute perhaps the only example in 
which the Cypriot transposition departs from the Directive which provides for 
a threshold of €50.  The Directive has under Article 3(4) provided Member 
States with discretion to define a lower value in their national legislation and 
Cyprus has chosen to reduce the threshold to €20. This decision has been 
more or less informed by local factors such as the economic situation of 
Cyprus or even the level of average salary which is considerably lower in 
Cyprus in comparison to Member States such as UK617, this automatically 
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means that contracts falling between the range of €20 and €50 which are 
particularly common in off-premises situations will be covered by the 
protection offered by the Consumer Rights Law implementing the Directive, 
that is the right to withdraw from the contract, the provision of information as 
well as the provisions in relation to additional payments and charges.  
Concerns in relation to the threshold for low value off premises contracts 
were previously expressed in this thesis.  Particularly the view has been that 
setting the threshold too high poses risks for vulnerable consumers.  If one 
considers the case of an old man in Cyprus receiving a pension fund of 
€300, having to live with a loss of €40 because of a bad choice made in an 
off-premises situation, the adverse result that may be caused by setting the 
threshold perhaps too high can be better understood.   
As regards digital content, the provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive 
may indeed constitute an improvement for the Cypriot regime as prior to the 
implementation of the Directive under the Consumer Rights Law of 2013, 
digital content was nowhere addressed under the Cypriot legislation.  Not 
only digital content now falls within the ambit of the relevant Cypriot 
legislation, but also the definition of digital content is clarified under Article 
2(1) of the Consumer Rights Law of 2013 –by following the wording of the 
Directive- that “digital content means data which are produced and supplied 
in digital form”.  In addition, owing to Article 6 of the Directive containing the 
information requirements that the trader has to provide to the consumers in 
distance and off premises situations, the trader now needs to inform the 
consumer where applicable, as to the functionality of digital content and any 
technical protection measures as well as, where again that is applicable, any 
relevant interoperability of digital content with hardware and software that 
the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected to have been aware of.  
The particular information requirements have been faithfully transposed by 
Article 5 of the Consumer Rights Law of 2013 by following the exact wording 
of the Consumer Rights Directive and they may reasonably be regarded as a 
novelty for the Cypriot regime. 
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Provision of Information  
As it has already been put forward, information requirements have been 
given particular prominence in European Consumer Law and particularly 
under the Consumer Rights Directive.  The importance that is being placed 
upon the provision of information as the best way to increase consumer 
confidence is also evident in the European Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-
2013 where one of the objectives stated is to have “better informed and 
educated consumers”.618  The provision of information has been regarded as 
a powerful weapon in the hands of consumers which enables them to protect 
themselves by thus further diminishing the role of the paternalistic approach 
in protecting consumers.619    In the case of Cyprus, prior to the transposition 
of the Consumer Rights Directive, there were three pieces of information that 
the trader had to provide to consumers in the case of off-premises contracts 
while nine different pieces of information were required for distance 
contracts.  With the adoption of the Consumer Rights Law, the list of 
information requirements has been greatly extended with 20 different pieces 
of information.  For the concerns that have already been put forward in this 
thesis as to the effectiveness of the information requirements and the 
problem with the overload of information, the increase of information 
requirements should not automatically been regarded as novelty that will 
benefit consumers.  The Cypriot transposition has faithfully followed the 
structure of the Directive both in relation to the provision of information but 
also in relation to the whole Directive.  There has been no attempt to 
address the problem with the overload of information by perhaps providing a 
clearer structure which could be easier for consumers to follow or permit 
important pieces of information, such as the right to withdraw for example, to 
stand out.  In addition, the Consumer Rights Law simply states that 
information requirements form an integral part of the contract, as the 
Consumer Rights Directive provides without determining what part they have 
in distance or off premises consumer contracts, it remains uncertain as to 
whether they constitute terms of the contract or not.   
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Harmonisation of different timeframes 
Notably, the Directive harmonises the different timeframes across national 
legislations such as the period in which a consumer has the right to 
withdraw, the period in which traders have to fulfil their obligations, that is to 
perform their duties under the contract, as well as the period to return any 
money received back to the consumer.  As it has already been stated in 
Chapter 6, the Consumer Rights Directive has increased and harmonised 
the withdrawal period from 7 days that the Distance and Doorstep Selling 
Directives to 14 days.  However this constitutes the same approach which 
has been followed under the Cypriot regime prior to the implementation of 
the Consumer Rights Directive as both the Law for Consumer Contracts 
Concluded Away from Business Premises of 2000 and the Law for the 
Conclusion of Consumer Distance Contracts of 2000 provided for a 14 day 
period in which consumers could withdraw from contracts concluded either 
at the doorstep or distance.   
Nonetheless, concerns as to the limitations of the approach taken have 
already been voiced in this thesis.  Particularly, it has been questioned as to 
whether simply the existence of the withdrawal period constitutes a change 
that all consumers can be benefited from and whether it has the potential to 
bring an overall increase in consumer confidence.  This should perhaps be 
considered against the fact that in Cyprus where cross border online 
shopping is more prevalent that domestic online shopping620, the 
geographical position of the island which is one could say in a rather remote 
area when compared to other central European Member States may 
dissuade Cypriot consumers from exercising their right to withdraw.  The fact 
that it may prove less easy and not infrequently costly for consumers in 
Cyprus to return products may make the exercise of the right less likely.  
While this is in no case an attempt to deny the importance of the right to 
withdraw for consumers, but it is rather an attempt to set its limitations in 
context.   
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As regards the provisions in relation to traders’ obligations, the Consumer 
Rights Directive provides for a maximum of 30 days in which the trader has 
to perform his duties under the contract, although this can be contracted out, 
as well as a 14 day period in which the trader has to reimburse any payment 
received back to the consumer.  Both provisions constitute improvements to 
the Distance Selling Directive which provided in both instances for a 30 day 
period –the Doorstep Selling Directive left both issues to be governed by 
national laws.  However, in both instances the Cypriot approach provided for 
a period of 14 days in which a trader has to perform his duties as well as in 
which he has to reimburse any payments received in the event of 
withdrawal, this mean that the period in which consumer has to wait for the 
contract to be performed is increased in that regard.  However, as it is the 
case with the withdrawal period, the harmonisation and the reduction of the 
time in which consumers have to await for reimbursement of their money to 
be made in the Consumer Rights Directive, does not constitute any 
improvement for the Cypriot regime as both provisions were already in place 
before the transposition of the Consumer Rights Directive.  Accordingly, one 
of the perceived improvements made by the Directive, that is to harmonise 
issues of a rather practical nature such as the different frames, are of limited 
importance in the case of Cyprus. 
Additional charges 
Under Article 18 of the Consumer Rights Law as this transposes Article 19 of 
the Directive, traders are now forbidden from charging consumers fees for 
the use of particular means of payment that exceeds the actual costs borne 
by them.  In addition, Article 21 of the Consumer Rights Law now requires 
the express consent of the consumers before any additional payments going 
beyond what has been agreed upon for the trader’s main contractual 
obligation.621  Pre-ticked boxes that consumers have to untick will no longer 
be permissible and consumers will be entitled to reimbursement of those 
additional payments.  However, while both changes constitute improvements 
for the Cypriot level of consumer protection, some concerns exist due to 
their limited applicability.   While both provisions are applicable under the 
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original wording of the Directive to the passenger transport sector and 
therefore the same approach is followed under the Consumer Rights Law of 
2013 implementing it, none of those provisions applies to the package travel 
sector which might give rise to a gap in the legislation.  This may leave a 
number of consumers purchasing travel packages, especially unprotected 
from fees for the use of certain means of payment. 622 
This is unfortunate if one considers the fact that the transport sector 
constitutes the most common sector which Cypriot consumers use the 
internet for.  In 2014, 47% of the complaints received by the European 
Consumer Centre in Cyprus related to the transport sector.  Although there 
is no actual indication as to the number of package travel bookings that were 
made, the number of complaints show how generally the travel sector is an 
area of particular concern for Cypriot consumers and also not unlikely for 
Cypriot consumers to be purchasing travel packages when traveling.  A 
separate directive in the particular area exists since 1990 while in May 2015 
agreement was reached for the adoption of a new Package Travel Directive 
which was eventually published in autumn 2015 in the EU’s Official Journal 
and will be transposed into national laws within the next two years.  While 
the Directive was not even agreed at the point of transposing the Consumer 
Rights Directive, it is important to note that neither the original directive nor 
its revised version of 2005 deal with fees for the use of means of payment so 
as to prevent dip pricing623 for travel package contracts by thus creating a 
gap in the legislation.     
Nonetheless, a new requirement that has been brought by the Directive is 
found in Article 21 which is transposed by Article 20 of the relevant Cypriot 
legislation and which provides that consumers are not bound to pay more 
than the basic rate when contacting the trader regarding the contract through 
the telephone line operated by the trader.  As regards telephone charges, 
the position before under the relevant Cypriot regime in relation to distance 
                                            
622 The Package Travel Directive of 1990 which was in force both at the time of the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive as well as its transposition in the Cypriot regime 
did not refer to this issue. 
623 Dip pricing refers to those situations where consumers after filling their details on a 
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contracts provided for an obligation on the part of the trader to inform the 
consumer when the rate for the use of a means of distance communication, 
which telephone calls are part of, is other than the basic rate.  However the 
Directive perhaps made a slight improvement by making more powerful a 
provision that was already there by making a step forward and clarifying that 
consumers will not bear those additional costs. 
 
The UK approach 
While Cyprus has faithfully followed the Directive, even the exact structure of 
it, the UK has been more creative in transposing the Directive and made an 
effort to address certain issues by following their own approach.  
Interestingly, the comparison between the transposition of the Consumer 
Rights Directive in the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus shows how the 
maximum harmonisation provided in most parts of the Directive did not 
prevent the UK from exhibiting a degree of legal creativity and go beyond the 
approach followed at the European Level.  This was actually the case for 
those areas where there was a degree of flexibility or some possible 
loophole left open which the UK did not hesitate to provide a different 
approach.  The task of transposing the Consumer Rights Directive was 
assigned to the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) which 
led to the two sets of Regulations implementing the Directive.  The BIS 
consultation process proved how the transposition of the Directive was not 
easy and straightforward for the UK government at all.  There were certain 
options with regard to its implementation that had to be carefully considered.  
The BIS wanted to gather the various stakeholders’ views as to the possible 
options available and as to whether further clarity was required in order to 
achieve a good piece of legislation.624  Some of those views are referred to 
below in relation to the choices made in transposing the Directive. 
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Assessment of changes brought 
The ambit of the Directive 
Low value off-premises contracts 
Off premises contracts whose value is below €50, equivalent to £42, are 
exempted from the provision of information as well as the right to withdraw 
provided by the Directive.  Member States have accordingly the option not to 
maintain or introduce corresponding provisions for off premises contracts 
which do not exceed the threshold of €50 which according to Recital 28 
seeks to ensure that insignificant purchases of sufficiently low value are 
excluded.  Although Article 3(4) provided Member States with discretion to 
define a lower value in their national legislation, the UK has not resorted to 
this option but rather opted for the value of £42 which is the equivalent of 
€50 provided under the Directive.  This constitutes a diminishing of the level 
of protection that was prior to the implementation of the Consumer Rights 
Directive as the relevant threshold was £35.  This decision is of course 
informed by arguments supporting that traders and especially small traders, 
should not be overburdened in low value contracts.625  The BIS also 
expressed that there was no evidence that removing the threshold or 
maintaining at £35 would benefit consumers626.    
Removing the information requirements in low value off premises contracts 
was not seen as particularly problematic from consumers and consumer 
groups that participated in the BIS consultation process.627  However, 
reservations were expressed for depriving consumers of the right to 
                                                                                                                           
Consent for Additional Payments – Impact Assessment (August 2012) ; BIS, Stakeholders 
Responses to the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive through the Consumer 
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Final  (August 2013); BIS, Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Harmonising Consumer 
Law – Consultation on the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU 
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withdraw in the relevant situations.628  Nonetheless, it should not be 
disregarded that it is not rare for house bound people, especially old people 
who are more prone to this type of selling as the preceding part has shown, 
to come across sellers at their doorstep for the purchase of example a 
household or kitchen appliance whose value may range from £30 to £40 and 
who will in this way be deprived of the protection offered by the Directive.  
This may leave vulnerable and in most of the times house bound people, 
especially elderly people, having to live with a product they have purchased 
but regretted afterwards.  The Consumer Rights Directive could prevent the 
creation of this gap by not allowing the exception of low value off-premises 
contracts or by not reducing the threshold themselves.  This could ensure 
that least contracts, for example in relation to the purchase of household and 
kitchen appliances, which has always been a common phenomenon in off-
premises situations, are covered by the directive.   
The UK has in addition decided to apply Regulations 40 and 41 of the 2013 
Regulations dealing with additional payments under a contract and 
additional help-line charges to low value off-premises contracts below 
£42.629  Although this step was made in an effort to align this situation with 
the respective requirements of distance selling where no such exemption 
applies, it is particularly important for transparency which is vital for 
consumers irrespective of the value of the contract in question.  Closing this 
loophole constitutes a choice of great significance as otherwise hidden costs 
imposed by traders would increase the price that consumers would have to 
eventually pay.630  This means unscrupulous traders will be prevented from 
offering goods or services at a considerably low price in order to avoid the 
relevant protection offered by the Consumer Rights Directive to consumers 
in those instances but subsequently adds high costs by way of additional 
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payments.631  Applying the rules regarding additional telephone charges will 
help to ensure that consumers, even those in the most remote areas, will be 
able to exercise their rights and contact traders at a reasonable cost.  As it 
has already been put forward, consumers who make off-premises purchases 
and particularly a doorstep purchase are those who are more likely to be 
home bound and thus  the ones that will accordingly use telephone as a 
means to contact traders once such a need arises.  Therefore, ensuring that 
consumers can legitimately exercise their rights even for low value off 
premises contracts is but a step to increase the confidence of this category 
of consumers. 
Social and Healthcare Services sold off-premises or at distance 
The UK Government decided to include social and healthcare services 
where those are sold either off-premises or at distance by regulated 
professionals to consumers as well as by non-professionals (which means 
normal traders that are obviously already covered in the Directive) under the 
ambit of the 2013 Regulations.632 Information and cancellation provisions 
found under Regulations 7 to 27 as well as Regulations 40 and 41 of The 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013 dealing with additional payments under a contract and 
additional help-line charges accordingly apply to social care services and 
healthcare services sold either off-premises or at a distance will thus apply 
to those instances.633  To the view of the BIS, the provisions of the 
Consumer Rights Directive should apply in the relevant sector when goods 
and services are sold off-premises or at a distance by regulated 
professionals.634  As it was stipulated in the BIS Impact Assessment of 
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2012635, “extending the provisions to all sellers of healthcare will help ensure 
clarity and consistency”. 636  Regulated professionals which include 
according to the European Directive 2011/24/EU on patient rights in cross 
border healthcare doctors, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, are exempted from 
the scope of the Directive while commercial traders selling healthcare goods 
and services including for example mobility aids, vitamin supplements, diet 
and care plans, are covered by the Directive.637  Had the Regulations been 
not extended to cover healthcare and social services provided by 
professionals, a complex and confusing regime would thus be put in place.  
This would require consumers to be careful with whom they are contracting 
as they would have otherwise different rights for identical services 
depending on who they have purchased them from.638  Consumers would 
have to understand the distinction between the supply of a good or service 
by a healthcare professional and the supply of a good or service by a 
business which might also include professionals.639   
To the BIS view, those constitute areas of particular vulnerability640 and 
exempting the two sectors from the application of the 2013 Regulations 
would deprive consumers their information and cancellation rights that have 
been provided by the Off-premises Regulations641 as well as the cancellation 
right that the Distance Selling Regulations have provided.642  This would not 
only lead to a reduction of the existing level of consumer protection but at 
the same time it would provide consumers with greater protection when 
purchasing a vacuum cleaner than when making important purchases such 
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as a long term care plan in off premises situations.643  The Consumer Rights 
Directive had in essence excluded the two areas from its scope in order to 
allow Member States the opportunity to provide for a higher level protection 
than what the maximum harmonisation Directive provides644 but the BIS was 
however not willing to see the particular exemption being used as a 
loophole.  While there is under UK law, the Health and Social Care Act of 
2012645, the particular piece of legislation does not deal with the issue of 
how contracts are concluded but simply with the quality of care that 
customers receive.646  Consequently this is likely to lead to a reduction of 
consumer protection in the UK in an area of particular consumer 
vulnerability.647   
The situation would indeed be worsened with consideration to the fact that 
there is no alternative relevant protection in the particular areas to protect 
consumers “who may well be vulnerable”. 648  As regards off premises 
situations and particularly doorstep selling, the BIS has acknowledged that 
the consumer involved is more vulnerable than the average consumer and it 
is in most instances people who are unable to use any other method for their 
purchases. 649  A sound example is old people who are dependent on 
doorstep selling and thus susceptible to detriment.650  According to a GHK 
report of 2004 for the Office of Fair Trading 44% of consumers above the 
age of 70 did not have access to any alternative type of purchasing651 
                                            
643 BIS, EU Consumer Rights Directive: Information Requirements and Extension of the 
Right to Withdraw for Off-premises contracts – Impact Assessment (August 2012) 4. 
644 BIS, Implementation of the EU Consumer Rights Directive (2011/11/83EU) Impact 
Assessment: Final (August 2013) 10. 
645 Health and Social Care Act 2012 
646 BIS, EU Consumer Rights Directive: Information Requirements and Extension of the 
Right to Withdraw for Off-premises contracts – Impact Assessment (August 2012) 18. 
647 BIS, EU Consumer Rights Directive: Information Requirements and Extension of the 
Right to Withdraw for Off-premises contracts – Impact Assessment (August 2012) 18; BIS, 
Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Modernising Consumer Law – Consultation on the 
implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU (August 2012) 31, 33. 
648 BIS, Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Modernising Consumer Law – Consultation 
on the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU (August 2012) 31. 
649 BIS, EU Consumer Rights Directive: Information Requirements and Extension of the 
Right to Withdraw for Off-premises contracts – Impact Assessment (August 2012) 11. 
650 Ibid. 
651 The BIS refers to the GHK report for the OFT entitled: ‘Evaluating the impact of the 
2004 OFT market study into doorstep selling’ (unpublished). 
211 
 
although the numbers may have changed with the passing of years.  It 
suffices to state at this point that for people of the particular age range, the 
most common purchases involved either home services or the purchase of 
mobility aids.652  Accordingly, in considering the extension of the information 
requirements and the right to withdraw to off premises contracts in the areas 
of social and healthcare services, the BIS has expressly acknowledged the 
fact that it is the older, disabled and generally more vulnerable people are 
those who are in most of the times the targets of off-premises selling653 and 
the decision to cover healthcare and social services becomes important to 
ensure that protection is provided in those situations where it is particularly 
needed.  There are of course other measures prohibiting material misleading 
statements or omissions as well as aggressive selling practices.654 
Nonetheless, the important right of withdrawal would disappear by depriving 
vulnerable and old people the opportunity to withdraw from a contract which 
eventually they do not want in an off-premises scenario. 
It is in addition interesting to note that from the 9141 queries that Consumer 
Direct655 had received in the 2011-2012 financial year in relation to medical 
goods and services, 31% of the queries were related to the distance sale of 
medical goods and services.656  Although, there is no distinction made 
between those goods or services sold by regulated professionals and those 
by commercial traders, the high number of queries received nevertheless 
shows how the distance selling of those goods and services also constitutes 
subject of frequent consumer concern.657  The sale of such goods and 
services by means of distance communication is nowadays more and more 
prevalent, not only optician services are now provided online but also local 
care workers that provide care to those in need can now be booked online.  
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More importantly, in remote access instances the relatives of an aged 
person can for example arrange the home care of their parent or relative by 
means of distance communication.658 
The valuable protection thus offered by the current Regulations would 
accordingly go away at a point when there is a need to expand the ambit 
legislation due to the fact that way people pay for their care and support 
services evolves659 with an increase in care and support services providers 
offering their services directly to the individual as well as online.660  
According to an Alzheimer’s Society Report, 62% of carers who participated 
in the research expressed how the person they care for had been 
approached by doorstep sales people who offered them care while 70% of 
them reported that the person they care for was approached through a 
phone call and was offered care.661 The distance and off premises selling of 
healthcare and social care services directly to the consumer is also expected 
according to the BIS, to increase because of the way people now pay for 
care and support services.  UK Government provides as it has already been 
stated a personal budget to individuals who can then exercise their 
independent choice about the services they would like to have.662  
Accordingly, providing both the information and cancellation rights in those 
circumstances is of utmost important to provide clarity and transparency and 
it is an area of particular vulnerability which the UK does not fail to address 
in implementing the Consumer Rights Directive.  This is of course likely to 
become more of a problem as the population gets older and in the case of 
the UK as the Later Life in the United Kingdom survey of 2016663 has 
showed the average age of population has evidently increased which leads 
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to an ever increasing need to ensure that adequate protection exists in place 
for the aging population. 
The choice to also extend the provision preventing excessive fees for the 
use of means of payment and hidden costs from being imposed on 
consumers in the particular sector is of equal importance.  It will in this way 
be ensured that those who are more likely to be considered as vulnerable 
purchasing their health and social care services at home will enjoy the same 
level of protection especially against excessive call charges or any other 
hidden costs that may be imposed on them.  In concluding a distance 
purchase, the existence of pre-ticked boxes or implied consent formulations 
may be puzzling for them and for this reason they opt out to telephone 
contact with the trader.664  Consumers need not, according to the BIS, pay 
more than the basic rate telephone charge when contacting the trader after 
their contract is concluded.665  Ensuring that consumers in those 
circumstances who are also likely to be house bound or elderly people and 
thus reliant on using telephone as a means of contact will not have to incur 
additional charges for it.666  More importantly, this choice aims at bringing 
clarity and certainty as the hidden costs can be prevalent in the relevant 
areas.667   
 
Provision of Information Requirements  
The provision of information has attracted some concerns in the case of UK 
with the House of Lords European Union Committee expressing their 
reservations about the increased reliance on the information paradigm.  In 
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particular, there was acknowledgement of the long standing concern with the 
overload of information as well as reference to problems such as the lack of 
guidance for traders on how to best arrange information or the lack of a 
deterrent for traders who fail to comply with information duties.668  As 
regards the layout of information, the Office of Fair Trading has in addition 
referred to the importance of providing information in a way that will enable 
consumers to benefit from them rather than being bombarded with 
information that they cannot really digest.  Consumer Focus suggested the 
use of summary boxes as a way to enable consumers get the most 
important pieces of information in a quick and easy manner without getting 
lost in the lengthy legal language.669  The final version of the Directive 
addresses neither the issue of how information could be best provided to the 
consumer nor does it provide any deterrent for traders.  However, the UK, in 
transposing the relevant Articles, made some structural changes to the 
information requirements by separating the two types of transacting, namely 
distance and off-premises contracts, which are under the Directive covered 
by the same Article, which provides a better opportunity to address their 
individual peculiarities.  Part of this is the important decision to adopt 
criminal sanctions in off-premises situations where the traders fail to inform 
consumers for the existence of the right to withdraw.  
While 2013 Regulations implementing the information requirements found 
under Article 6 do not depart from its wording, they nonetheless differ in 
structure.  Regulation 10 provides that before the consumer is bound by an 
off-premises contract, the trader must give the consumer the pieces of 
information that are contained under Schedule 2 in a clear and 
comprehensible manner and if the right to cancel exists, the trader must also 
give the consumer a cancellation form as set out in Schedule 3.  What is 
interesting is that the information in relation to the existence of the right to 
cancel and the cancellation form stand out from the long list of information 
requirements in the case of UK transposition.  The Directive could have 
drawn a distinguishing line between those pieces of information that bear 
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more importance and those which simply provide further details to the 
consumer but it has not.  For this reason, the decision on the part of the UK 
may be regarded as an attempt to prevent the right to withdraw from being 
lost in the sea of information requirements.  The same approach was also 
followed by the UK transposition with regard to the information requirements 
in relation to distance contracts with Regulation 13 cross referring to the 
information requirements contained in Schedule 2 while it specifically refers 
to the right to cancel and the cancellation form in the main body of the 
Regulations.  Under paragraph 4 of the Regulation, there is an attempt to 
ensure that the most important information relating to the main 
characteristics of the goods, the identity of the trader, the total price inclusive 
of taxes, delivery, the total costs of each billing period when a contract is of 
indeterminate period, the conditions, time limit and procedures for exercising 
the right to cancel as well as the duration of the contract  will definitely be 
displayed to the consumer despite the limited space and time involved in the 
particular type of contracting through means of distance communication.  
Another important clarification brought is that information required under 
those Regulations will be treated as terms of the contract which will bring an 
end to concerns, also expressed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, as to the place 
of information requirements in the contract.   
Relevant here is Regulation 19 which makes a trader’s failure to inform the 
consumer of his right to cancel in off-premises contracts an offence.  The 
possible factors behind this decision may be not only the desire to include a 
deterrent for traders who do not comply with their information requirements 
under the Directive, and particularly the right to withdraw but also the implicit 
recognition of the general degree of vulnerability of consumers in off-
premises situations.  Accordingly in transposing Article 24 dealing with 
penalties, the UK government seems to have made an attempt to take 
benefit of the areas in which Member States enjoyed a degree of flexibility.  
Accordingly Regulation 19 of the 2013 Regulations determines that the 
trader is under those circumstances guilty of an offence and is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine.  Regulation 21 and 22 of the 2013 Regulations 
provide for the liability of a person other than the principal offender as well 
as for offences committed by bodies of persons respectively.  Not only is this 
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choice consistent with the desire to provide a deterrent for traders but at the 
same time shows the unwillingness on the part of the UK to allow 
unscrupulous traders to trap consumers in off-premises contracts where 
consumers are particularly more likely to be old and vulnerable.  The choice 
to impose criminal sanctions in off-premises situations of course leaves 
consumers entering into a distance contract and who find themselves in an 
analogous situation at a less favourable situation but it may be regarded as 
an acknowledgment of the greater degree of vulnerability.   
Certain acts or omissions cannot simply be categorized as criminal per se 
but rather it is their harmful effect and their interference with an individual’s 
private rights that leads to their categorization as such.  It is upon this 
premise that the UK Parliament has accordingly chosen to criminalize any 
attempt on the part of the trader to withhold the existence of the right to 
withdraw from the consumer in an off-premise scenario.  As in an ordinary 
criminal proceeding, claims under Regulation 19 will also be enforced by the 
State in the form of prosecution.  This may be seen as an indication of the 
fact that the protection of the rights of consumers is taken seriously at the 
national level.  Cyprus has on the other hand been limited to the extension of 
the withdrawal period to 12 months as the Directive provides without 
employing any further measures that will act as deterrents for doorstep 
sellers who attempt to trap consumers in off premises contracts.  This should 
be considered against the fact that doorstep selling has been particularly 
common in Cyprus especially in rural areas where old people residing in 
villages were often visited by doorstep sellers for the sale of goods.  While 
under the EU approach information requirements are seen as the best way 
forward in addressing the inequality of position between the trader and the 
consumer, for the UK simply providing information to consumers is as it has 
been seen not enough.  The fact that criminal sanctions were used as a 
means to provide further protection could be regarded as a manifestation of 
the enhanced approach taken by the UK to provide consumers with 
protective measures that are more likely to work in practice.   
217 
 
Harmonisation of different timeframes 
As regards the harmonisation of the different timeframes achieved by the 
Consumer Rights Directive, an increase to the period in which consumers 
can exercise their right to withdraw can be noted for the UK regime.  Both 
the Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work 
Regulations 2008 and the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) 
Regulations 2000 provided for 7 day period in which consumers could 
withdraw from both distance and doorstep contracts.  By implementing the 
Consumer Rights Directive, a 14 day period is now in place under 
Regulation 30 of the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and 
Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 and it obviously constitutes an 
improvement.  As regards the period in which the trader has to perform his 
obligations under the contract, Article of the 2013 Regulations provides that 
the trader has to deliver the goods within 30 days which is the same position 
that was provided under the UK regime prior to the transposition of the 
Directive.  Improvement can nonetheless be noted in harmonising and 
shortening the period in which the trader has to reimburse any payments 
received back to the consumer in the event of withdrawal within, according 
to Article 13 of the Directive, 14 days.  This led to Regulation 34 of the 2013 
Regulations shortening the 30 day period in which the trader had to return 
any money received back to the consumer under the 2000 Regulations to 14 
days which is likely to reduce waiting time for reimbursement to consumers 
when exercising their right to withdraw. 
Additional Charges 
It is important to note at this point that while all Articles found under the 
Consumer Rights Directive were transposed by the 2013 Regulations, Article 
19 has been an exception.  This was in fact transposed in the UK law by a 
whole set of Regulations, The Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) 
Regulations 2012 which contain ten Regulations along with one schedule.  
One the one hand this constitutes a manifestation of the common style of 
English secondary legislation, they are systematic, they contain detailed 
provisions while the existence of the Schedule, contributes in clarifying the 
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key terms involved.670   But on the other hand the early transposition of 
Article 19 may from others be regarded as willingness on the part of the UK 
to cooperate and implement the Directive earlier.  Nonetheless, this has 
formed part of combating the local long-standing problem of excessive 
charges imposed on consumers and accordingly to avoid further consumer 
detriment.  Accordingly the early transposition of Article 19 constituted a 
reaction to a current concern and a rather local political motivation. 
UK government went beyond its own Guiding Principles which deal with the 
implementation of EU law, according to which any implementing measure 
shall come into force on the transposition deadline and not earlier than that.  
Earlier implementation is reserved for those circumstances where there is a 
reason for doing so.  In the current situation, the debit and credit card 
surcharges that were imposed on consumers, especially from travel 
companies, has been a major issue that went under the microscope of the 
Office of Fair Trading.671  The evidence gathered showed that in the 
passenger transport sector, companies were engaging in “dip pricing” which 
as it has been explained earlier refers to practices by which consumers after 
filling their details on a number of webpages during their purchase, they 
faced added charges.672  Based on this evidence, the Office of Fair Trading 
asked for action to be taken and the early implementation of Article 19 was 
the way to address this problem. 
The Office of Fair Trading had rightly argued that the payment surcharges 
that were being imposed on consumers not only lacked transparency but 
more importantly they resulted in evident consumer detriment.  Consumers 
were found in a deadlock where they could not practically avoid the 
surcharge from being imposed on them.  Jo Swinson, the Minister of 
Consumer Affairs, had also referred to the excessive payment surcharges by 
saying that this had been a problem that was in essence defrauding 
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consumers for quite a long time.673  Accordingly, the whole scenery behind 
surcharges brings to light the deeper issues that have been involved in the 
early implementation of Article 19. 
Jo Swinson expressed her satisfaction that the Regulations will bring an end 
to add-on fees which provided an opportunity for traders to cash in while 
they are not at all a true reflection of the costs involved in processing a 
payment.674  For this reason, the early transposition of Article 19 should not 
be regarded as a sign on the part of the UK to cooperate but it should rather 
be taken as indication of the fact that UK government makes attempts 
through implementing EU law to address local issues arising.  At a time 
when the EU law is primarily focused on increasing cross border trader, the 
UK has its own agenda which involves a desire to act immediately when that 
is required to prevent further consumer detriment by providing specific 
solutions to individual problems that really burden UK consumers. 
The use of pre-ticked boxes as well as premium rate call lines has been a 
widespread issue in the UK.  A survey conducted by Which? has showed 
that 20% of 200 participating travel companies were using automatic opt-ins, 
whether those related to insurance, car hire or an upgrade, while 53% of 
them were using 087 or 084 numbers  which are premium rate telephone 
numbers.675  In addition, according to a research that has been carried out 
by the Office of Fair Trading, airline companies were in particular using pre-
ticked boxes as a way to impose additional charges to consumers.  This will 
no longer be possible as the express consent of consumer will from now on 
be required.  The rules on additional charges will accordingly address the 
long standing problem of businesses gaining revenue as a result of opacity 
in the process but also by manipulating consumer’s inertia.676  Those 
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businesses have been using pre-tick boxes which consumers had to untick 
in order to avoid paying for a good or service which would not have 
otherwise chosen to purchase. 677  The rules will accordingly prevent those 
instances where consumers either did not pay attention to the box or they 
may have forgotten to untick that box and they subsequently found 
themselves bound to pay for a good or service that they did not want or 
actually need.  In this regard, the provisions on charges can of course be 
regarded as perhaps the most important improvement that the Directive has 
brought. 
While the protection of Article 19 clearly applies to passenger transport 
contracts678, there has been a degree of uncertainty as to whether the 
provisions also cover the package travel sector as technically the package 
travel sector is generally excluded from the scope of the Directive.  It is 
important to note at this point that there exists a separate directive in the 
particular area since 1990 but in May 2015 agreement was reached for the 
adoption of a new Package Travel Directive which was eventually published 
in autumn 2015 in the EU’s Official Journal and will be transposed into 
national laws within the next two years.  While the Directive was not even 
agreed at the point of transposing the Consumer Rights Directive, neither 
the original directive nor its revised version of 2005 deal with fees for the use 
of means of payment so as to prevent dip pricing for travel package 
contracts by thus creating a gap in the legislation.  This is possibly one of the 
grounds why the European Union Committee of the House of Lords referred 
to the scope of the Directive as being confusing and narrow in some 
respects.679  The decision to exclude the package travel sector from the 
scope of the Directive was not particularly welcome for UK and as Malcolm 
Harbour expressed having in place a directive which covers a targeted 
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segment of the market would not be logical.680  In reality, the method used to 
conclude both types of contract is the same, both constitute online sales and 
therefore the same rationale applies.  Above all, it could be considerably 
confusing to apply different rules to the same contract based on whether it 
has been sold separately or as a part of a package.681   
Part Two - Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive 
The initial proposal for the Directive that was brought forward in 2008 is 
perhaps the most explicit example of the manipulation of European 
Consumer Law and this part of the Chapter discusses what the original 
proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive would have meant for both the UK 
and Cypriot regime.  This seeks to further support the main argument that is 
put forward in this thesis questioning the primary objectives behind 
legislating in the area of European Consumer Law as increasing consumer 
protection does not seem to be the actual driving force.  The purpose is not 
to examine in detail the changes that the proposed Directive would bring to 
the areas of Unfair Contract Terms and the Consumer Sales themselves but 
rather to appose the most striking regards in which the proposal would lead 
to a reduction of consumer protection.  This leaves us with an evident 
question as to how consumer confidence could really increase with a 
measure whose adoption would simply result in a reduction of consumer 
protection and it is of course a further ground underpinning the concern that 
this thesis has formulated. 
The wide ambit of the originally proposed Directive and the changes that it 
particularly contained in the areas of Unfair Contract Terms and Consumer 
Sales combined with the principle of maximum harmonisation would have 
rather sweeping consequences.  While the initial ambitious proposal resulted 
in a considerable narrow piece of legislation with the most controversial 
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aspects of it having been removed, it is, as it has already been explained 
important for the purposes of this this study, to consider the effect of the 
proposed version of the Directive as well.  This part of the chapter considers 
the effect that the proposal would have in practice but also explains how any 
effort on the domestic level to increase consumer protection in the areas that 
the Directive would initially cover would indeed be impossible.  This would 
be an unfortunate situation for Member States with more sophisticated 
consumer protection regimes in place such as the United Kingdom.  For this 
reason, the Consumer Rights Bill which was already making its way to the 
UK Parliament at the time when the Consumer Rights Directive was 
proposed and was being negotiated, could not be absent from this 
consideration.   
However, before assessing the effect that the proposal would have for both 
domestic regimes, it is interesting to note that the extent of the concern 
caused around the proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive in the two 
Member States greatly differs.  The Cyprus Government and the responsible 
bodies involved, including the Ministry of Energy, Trade, Industry and 
Tourism as well as the Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Trade, Industry 
and Tourism, have remained silent in relation to the proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive by not putting forward any particular views or 
concerns.  Contrary to that, the proposal has been highly criticized and not 
particularly welcome by the UK Government.  The lack of any actual opinion 
stemming from the Cypriot Government is a limitation of this study as it 
deprives the opportunity to reach a more conclusive picture of how the 
particular Member States receive contested EU measures such as the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  The fact that the Cyprus did not express any 
disagreement does not mean that the proposed Directive would not have a 
negative impact on the Cypriot consumer protection regime.  The failure on 
the part of Cyprus to provide any disagreement in the particular case could 
be considered as an indication of their general approach towards European 
initiatives and their receptiveness of European Law.  
On the other hand, in the UK the Directive did not go unnoticed.  The UK 
Government was particularly concerned with the diminishing of the level of 
consumer protection that would accrue had the Proposal been adopted.  The 
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European Union Committee of the House of Lords which prepared a report 
in relation to the proposed Consumer Rights Directive, considered that it was 
of utmost important that the level of protection provided to consumers should 
not be reduced682, this view was shared by the Citizens Advice as well which 
expressed how “existing consumer protections must not be lost in a 
harmonised Directive”. 683  To the Which? View, “the proposal was not 
drafted with consumers as its heart”.684  More importantly, the European 
Union Committee of the House of Lords was not convinced by the very 
underpinning of the European Commission’s argument and the need to bring 
maximum harmonisation as a way to increase consumer confidence in cross 
border which indeed asked for better statistics on cross-border trade.685  Not 
only greater research is required as to the extent to which legal 
harmonisation can indeed lead to an increased use of the internal market by 
consumers but also greater research as to the actual level of desire and 
demand for cross-border shopping.686 UK has been amongst the Member 
States that withheld their agreement with the proposed Directive and 
perhaps amongst the most influential actors that prevented the moral panic 
around consumer confidence and its misplaced connection with maximum 
harmonisation from taking full effect.   
Major points of disagreement in the proposed Consumer Rights 
Directive 
Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods 
Under the Consumer Sales Directive there was again a two tier system of 
remedies in place with repair and replacement found under the first tier and 
price reduction and rescission under the second tier.  Under the Consumer 
Sales Directive, the consumer shall begin first by asking one of the remedies 
found under the first tier while the trader could provide an alternative if one is 
impossible or disproportionate.  Consumer can then move to the second tier 
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remedies if the trader has failed to carry out the repair or replacement within 
a reasonable time687, without actual indication of what a reasonable period of 
time really is.  While the proposed Consumer Rights Directive retained the 
two tier system of remedies, it shifted the choice from the consumer to the 
trader which would in practice make the consumers move from the first tier 
remedies to the second tier remedies particularly difficult.  Consumers would 
thus experience the “fear of becoming locked in a cycle of failed repairs” as 
the Law Commission has rightly argued.688   
Under UK law, there have however been two sets of remedies available for 
consumers.  There have on the one hand been the European Consumer 
Law remedies as provided by the Consumer Sales Directive which the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 was in 2002 amended to include as well as the UK 
traditional common law sales remedies.  Under the traditional sales 
remedies, UK consumers have enjoyed the right to reject non-conforming, 
faulty goods, without having to move from the first to the second tier 
remedies as the Sale of Goods Act remedies have provided.  The common 
law right to reject has been available when one of the implied terms 
contained under sections 13-15 of the Sale of Goods of Act is breached and 
unless the consumer is deemed to have accepted the good under section 35 
of the Sales of Goods Act as the right to reject is in this way lost.  However, 
with the adoption of the proposed Directive the traditional remedies would 
have to be repealed given the maximum harmonisation character of the 
Directive.  Accordingly, UK consumers, despite the fact that they had the 
option to ask the seller to attempt to repair goods, they were under no 
obligation to do so before exercising their right to reject goods following the 
UK traditional sales remedies.689  The Law Commission Consultation Paper 
on Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods which dealt with proposal for the 
Consumer Rights Directive, has showed widespread support for the right to 
reject.  In particular, 89% of the consumers participating stated that the right 
to reject should be retained while 94% of them regarded the right to a refund 
as important.  The proposed Consumer Rights Directive would accordingly 
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remove a fundamental component of the UK regime, a long-established 
remedy690  which in countries such as a Germany such a right is not 
provided but it is on the contrary viewed it as “a rejection too far”.691   
In addition, under the Commission’s proposal, minor defects were totally 
excluded from the right to reject.  This would accordingly have far-reaching 
consequences for UK consumers who would lose not only an important 
remedy provided under UK law but also the opportunity, even when moving 
to the second tier of remedies, to reject goods which have minor defects.  
Accordingly, where the trader was unable to either repair or replace the 
goods in question, consumers would have but to merely accept a reduction 
in price in cases where there is a minor defect.692  The Law Commission has 
interestingly expressed that consumers do care to a great extent about the 
appearance of new goods and spend considerable time selecting goods for 
their appearance.  It is also not rare for consumers to pay extra in order for 
their goods to have a specific appearance.693  Under the changes that the 
proposal would have brought, not only consumers would have price 
reduction as the only remedy for which traders are bound by no clear rules 
as to how price reduction should be calculated but there would also be the 
risk of traders arguing that a defect in the product is minor so as to totally 
deprive consumers from their right to rescind the contract694, even if it is 
generally the remedy of last resort. 
As regards the Cypriot regime, the Consumer Sales Directive has been 
implemented with The Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees Law of 2000695 and Article 5 of the particular law 
contained the two tier remedy that the Directive has provided.  Nonetheless, 
prior to the implementation of the Consumer Sales Directive in Cyprus, 
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under The Sale of Goods Law of 1994696, Cypriot consumers could reject 
goods that were not in conformity with what has been agreed.  Nonetheless, 
under the Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees Law of 2000 was provided that the Sale of Goods Law of 1994 
would continue to apply unless there is disagreement between the two 
where the former applies.  This means that the two tier remedies provided 
under the Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees Law of 2000 would apply by in this way removing the automatic 
right of consumers to reject goods that do not conform to what has been 
promised.  Contrary to UK which retained the right to reject under the 
traditional remedies, the Cyprus approach has since the transposition of the 
Consumer Sales Directive in their national regime in 2000 have surrendered 
the automatic right to reject by thus leaving to the disposal of consumers the 
European remedies.  While the right to reject was not anymore available in 
the case of Cyprus, the fact that the choice would unevenly be shifted on the 
trader and given the maximum harmonisation character of the proposal, any 
opportunity to retain the status quo would be lost by thus causing a reduction 
to the level of consumer protection but to a lesser extent than in the case of 
the UK. 
Given the fact that the aim behind the proposal for the Consumer Rights 
Directive has been to increase consumer confidence in cross border, it is 
perhaps unfortunate that a tool which has the potential to increase 
consumer’s confidence would have been made practically unavailable.  It 
accordingly remains doubtful as to how a reduction in consumer protection in 
the particular area was compatible with the wider aims sought to be 
achieved.  The decision in the proposed Consumer Rights Directive to shift 
the choice on the trader not only makes the right more difficult for the 
consumer to exercise but it also shows how emphasis has shifted on 
traders.  Traders would in this way be in a position to decide and act in the 
way that better serves their interests in each situation where they had to 
decide as to the remedy that they would provide to a consumer.  This would 
indeed provide traders more certainty as consumers would no longer reject 
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goods indiscriminately, especially in situations of minor defects.  Traders 
could accordingly have control in which situations consumers could reject 
goods.  Accordingly, it is fortunate that those amendments were eventually 
withdrawn. 
 
Unfair Contract Terms 
The area of unfair contract terms was under the original proposal dealt with 
under Chapter V of the Directive.  The proposal sought, among others, to 
fully harmonise both the grey and the black list which exist under the 
Directive on Unfair Contract Terms on the basis of minimum harmonisation.  
Member States could no longer be able to complement or update the grey 
list, that is the list containing those unfair contract terms that are not in all 
situations unfair but they could well be unfair in another situation.  This 
would accordingly remove the power from Member States to adapt it697 to 
the national setting and thus address local issues arising.  In addition, there 
have been Member States which had provided for more extensive, than 
those provided in the proposal, black and grey lists in their national legal 
regimes which could neither maintain nor they could add to the lists 
contained in the Directive owing to the maximum harmonisation principle.698  
Accordingly, the abrogation of national lists that long existed under national 
regimes could lead to deterioration of consumer protection in many Member 
States in an effort to comply with the Directive.699  This automatically does 
not leave room for national specificities to be taken into account.700   
Maximum harmonisation would negatively affect the level of consumer 
protection offered under many national laws and the efforts through 
maximum harmonisation to achieve complete uniformity would accordingly 
undermine, as Howells has argued, familiar national instruments of 
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consumer protection701  as well as national instruments that provide greater 
protection to consumers.  The maximum harmonisation of the 
aforementioned lists entails an automatic advantage for traders in terms of 
certainty.  Traders could in this way access the exact list of those terms that 
may be deemed as unfair in all Member States across the Union and thus 
avoid liability by being cautious when using those terms.  An update of the 
black and grey lists harmonised, although minimum, at a high, satisfactory 
level could be a welcome change in terms of consumer protection but there 
is no strong reason why Member States should be prevented from 
increasing national consumer protection.   
UK has not been particular content for further intervention and has exhibited 
their preference towards a degree of discretion that will allow them to update 
parts of the legislation and provide their own approach.  On the other hand, 
the Cypriot approach which have under the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Law of 1996702 faithfully reproduced the Directive, will continue to 
be in force after the proposed amendments in the particular area were 
dropped.  No opinions were expressed in relation to the consequences that 
would follow from the proposal nor any willingness to change the status quo.  
This is the approach primarily followed by the Cypriot Government which has 
been made evident both in relation to the various European Directives that 
have so far been adopted in the area of consumer law.   
In addition, the rules on unfair contract terms under the proposed Consumer 
Rights Directive contained a total exclusion of negotiated terms.  This would 
mean that both Member States would be debarred from including negotiated 
terms in their relevant national regime had they wish so.  Despite the fact 
that the majority of consumer contracts have and still are based on standard 
form contracts, for the UK, totally excluding negotiated terms in all 
circumstances was seen as problematic and as a rejection too far.  As the 
Law Society has rightly argued this would leave UK consumers with no 
protection in those where a slight attempt to negotiate has taken place.  As 
Which? has interestingly noted, even in those cases where negotiation 
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indeed took place between the trader and the consumer, their bargaining 
positions still hardly be regarded as equal.703  Excluding negotiated terms 
would accordingly be a step to the advantage of traders as fraudulent 
traders might in this way be incited to create some negotiation in order to 
avoid a term being assessed as to its fairness.   
Consumer Rights Act 
While the preceding part has showed the most striking examples in which 
the proposed Directive would affect the existing level of protection offered to 
consumers, there is another aspect to consider.  The amendments that the 
proposed Directive would bring and their maximum harmonisation character 
would make impossible any attempt at the national level to increase 
consumer protection.  The UK has been particularly categorical against the 
inclusion of the changes to the areas of Consumer Sales Remedies and 
Unfair Contract Terms.  In both areas, the UK was undergoing its own 
review as part of the wider aim to reform UK Consumer Law.  The Consumer 
Rights Bill which is now the Consumer Rights Act, was making its way to the 
UK Parliament at the same time when the Consumer Rights Directive was 
already being negotiated.  The purpose at this point is not to examine the 
changes achieved that were brought by the Consumer Rights Act in general 
as it does not seek to implement the Directive and this would go beyond the 
purposes of this study.  It is relevant in this part due to the changes that the 
UK Government was able to make in those areas that the proposed version 
of the Directive would cover.  The fact that the amendments to both areas 
were eventually abandoned provided UK the opportunity to provide its own 
amendments with the adoption of the Consumer Rights Act.  While the 
Consumer Rights Act shows the evident willingness on the part of UK to 
provide its own approach and which in no case was ready to accept a 
diminishing of the existing level of protection, it is important to understand 
the negative consequences that the contested amendments combined with 
the maximum harmonisation principle would have on Member States such 
as UK with a more sophisticated consumer protection regime in place.   
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The long-standing remedy to reject faulty goods which would otherwise be 
lost was eventually retained under the Consumer Rights Act. 704  The right to 
reject formed part of the analysis and review that Howells and Twigg Flesner 
have made to UK Consumer Law prior to the adoption the Consumer Rights 
Act.  In the document “Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer 
Law” summarizing their findings, both Howells and Twigg-Flesner stated that 
it constitutes a key remedy under the traditional sales law.705  While with the 
right to reject the trader might thus be deprived of the opportunity to cure the 
breach when consumer confidence in him has been lost706, giving the option 
to the trader to choose between remedies raises cannot guarantee that 
consumers will be well protected.  The fact that the fate of the consumer’s 
refund would be left to the trader could lead to uncertain and 
disadvantageous consequences for consumers.  In addition, the Law 
Commission has rightly argued the right to reject is important as “a short-
term remedy of first instance”707 for consumers as it constitutes “a simple, 
easy-to-use remedy which inspires consumer confidence”708 but it also 
strengthens consumer’s bargaining position.709  This provides consumers 
the assurance that they can receive their money back if the goods do not 
conform to what has been promised.710  Interestingly, the Law Commission 
expressed how the right to reject goods is also a way to make consumers 
more prepared to try brands and retailers that are unknown to them and this 
also conflicts with the choice of the European Commission to render the 
particular remedy as a last resort option with the choice being shifted to the 
trader which would technically make the remedy inaccessible.   
In addition, UK was particularly categorical against the harmonisation of the 
grey list.711 The maximum harmonisation of the area of unfair contract terms 
would indeed have been a negative consequence for the UK Government 
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whose desire to make amendments in the relevant area goes back to 2001.  
Eventually, the efforts to update the law in the particular areas have found 
their road in the Consumer Rights Act.  Not only the grey list remained as an 
indicative and non-exhaustive list as Section 63 of the Consumer Rights Act 
stipulates but in addition three insertions were made under paragraphs 5,12 
and 14712, none of these options would be feasible had the proposal been 
adopted with the maximum harmonisation principle.  To the House of 
Commons Public Committee, whenever a change is made there is a need to 
ensure that consumers will be benefited and the grey list constitutes a vital 
aspect of the relevant consumer legislation and it is of utmost importance to 
get it right, for this reason there was a need on the part of the UK to provide 
its own approach in relation to the list. 713  A degree of flexibility that allows 
the possibility to make changes at a later point and thus adapt it over time is 
also important.  This will provide an opportunity, as the Public Bill Committee 
of the House of Commons have noted to make additions to the list when 
“general issue with types of terms that have significant potential to 
disadvantage consumes” emerges. 714 
The Law Commission had in its Report on Unfair Terms in Contracts 
expressed how their recommendation is to have in place legislation that will 
allow consumers to challenge any term of the contract that is not a core term 
irrespective of whether or not the term was negotiated.715  This 
recommendation that was eventually adopted under the Consumer Rights 
Act aimed at bringing clarity to the two UK pieces of legislation in the area, 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, implementing the European Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts.  The former has primarily contained 
exemption clauses for contracts between businesses and consumers, 
between one business and another and, to a limited extent to “private” 
contracts where neither party is acting for business purposes. Most terms 
that purport to exclude or restrict liability are subjected to the Act while the 
                                            
712 Consumer Rights Act, sch 2. 
713 Consumer Rights Bill Deb 6 March 2014, cols 481,521. 
714 ibid 481. 
715 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) 11. 
232 
 
Regulations have contained the controls applicable to a range of contract 
terms but only those included in consumer contracts.  In addition the former 
covered negotiated terms while the latter did not by thus causing complexity 
and uncertainty.  The Consumer Rights Act nowhere refers to negotiated 
terms as being excluded by increasing protection offered to consumers and 
thus addressing situations where traders attempt to create some negotiation 
in relation to a particular term in order to make it non assessable for fairness. 
This opportunity would nonetheless be lost had the Consumer Rights 
Directive been adopted in its proposed form.   
 
What lessons to learn? 
The above part has discussed those areas in which the proposed Consumer 
Rights Directive would improve trader’s position by deciding about consumer 
remedies as well as by perhaps providing greater certainty for traders in 
relation to unfair contract terms.  Such concerns are particularly intensified 
because of the maximum harmonisation character that the proposal 
provided.  The consequences of course would have been far more onerous 
for Member States with a strong tradition in consumer protection, such as 
the United Kingdom which are always willing to make steps beyond the 
European approach.  There have been real concerns in relation to the 
proposed Directive for the UK Government and the adoption of the 
Consumer Rights Act has simply reconfirmed that those amendments were 
in no case in conformity with the UK legal tradition.  The UK Government 
eventually, and fortunately one would say, made use of the power that was 
left to them to provide their own amendments to the areas that the 
Consumer Rights Directive did not in the end include.  The UK by taking the 
freedom to do things differently in those areas which involved too “trader-
centric” amendments prevented a downgrading of consumer protection.   
The fact that the scope was in the end condensed has prevented not only a 
significant reduction to the level of consumer protection and at the same 
time prevented a major shift to the benefit of traders in the respects referred 
to above.  It remains doubtful as to how consumer confidence could really be 
increased with having such provisions in place.  Accordingly, the fact that the 
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onerous consequences that the proposal would have for the level of 
protection offered in both Member States have in the end been prevented 
constitutes a positive step from a consumer’s perspective.  The moral panic 
which has accordingly been created around the consumer confidence and 
the need for maximum harmonisation failed to take its full effect due to the 
narrowing down of the scope of the Directive.  For this reason, the 
Consumer Rights Directive may reasonably be regarded as a moral panic 
which did not take its full effect.  While it is still doubtful as to how the 
Consumer Rights Directive for the reasons explained in Chapter 5 and 6 can 
really increase consumer confidence, its compromised version and its 
instrumental character is perhaps a safer approach but that neither adds 
much to consumer protection nor it involves the reduction that the proposed 
version would have.   
 
Conclusion 
While it would be unsound to deny that some improvements were indeed 
brought as for example the increase of the withdrawal period, as well as the 
provisions in relation to additional charges, it should not be disregarded that 
the instrumental character of the Directive is simply reconfirmed in Chapter 
7.  Despite the fuss that has been created around its adoption, what the 
Consumer Rights Directive merely does is to consolidate existing legislation 
by updating and harmonising the Distance Selling and Doorstep Selling 
Directive.  Accordingly, the Directive has put under a single piece of 
legislation the provisions that mainly harmonise information requirements, 
the right to withdraw and a number of provisions preventing additional 
charges.  This turns the directive into a means of consumers to make 
informed choices but the limitations of the approach taken have been 
already addressed in Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis. This Chapter has dealt 
with the most important changes that the Directive has brought and what 
they mean for the UK and Cypriot regimes.  In most of areas due to the 
maximum harmonisation principle in place, national provisions do mirror 
what the Directive provides and that is a reason why there has been no 
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reference to every single provision as transposed and also in those respects 
the Directive constitutes an update of what has been provided under the 
prior regime.716   
The consideration of the proposed Directive with the contested changes that 
it contained show how, even if the final version of the Directive does not do 
much in terms of bringing the overhaul in consumer rights that has been 
promised, it is fortunate that a downgrade on consumer protection was 
prevented.  Even if the Consumer Rights Directive as adopted has an 
instrumental character, which as Chapters 5 and 6 have showed will only 
benefit the most circumspect and well-informed consumer, it is perhaps a 
safer but not the best approach.  This equates to say that although the 
eventual approach does not do much, it at the same time does not reduce 
consumer protection.  This shows how the Commission has failed on the 
one hand to increase consumer protection and on the other hand to achieve 
its hidden objective of putting in place a regime that will provide greater 
certainty for traders through the maximum harmonisation.  The fact that the 
scope of the Directive was narrowed down of course prevented the focus of 
the Directive from unevenly being shifted on traders but nonetheless, as 
Chapter 5 and 6 have showed, the traders still gain from the resulting 
approach. 
UK has exhibited some degree of creativity in transposing the Directive.  
Some evident steps beyond what the Directive provides as well as some 
improvements in an effort to achieve a more consistent regime or even to 
address local issues where this seemed required to minimise the risk for 
consumer detriment, were made.  Cyprus on the other hand, has been 
limited to the wording and structure of the Directive without any actual 
departure, apart from lowering the threshold of low value off premises 
contracts for which the Directive expressly provided an opportunity for.  
Sector specific initiatives in the area of consumer protection have in Cyprus 
been developed over the last decade through European initiatives.  The 
fundamental trigger for this development has actually been the accession of 
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Cyprus to the European Union in 2004.717  Although there have been some 
areas which were already subject to special regulations, this was not the 
case for doorstep and distance selling up to 2004 at a time when distance 
and doorstep selling were already dominant.  The only protection available 
for doorstep and distance selling contracts was, prior to the accession of 
Cyprus to the European Union, that provided for contracts in general and for 
contracts for the sale of goods.718 This constitutes the most pre-dominant 
explanation for the fact that Cyprus has in no case made an attempt to 
provide its own approach when transposing the Directive.  It could have 
perhaps been easier to affect Member States such as Cyprus which blindly 
trust the European approach rather than Member States such as the United 
Kingdom with a long tradition in consumer protection as any measure that 
makes an attempt to provide less to consumers can hardly be welcome.   
Nonetheless as James Devenney and Mel Kenny have rightly characterised 
the proposal on the Consumer Rights Directive as not only the most 
controversial step in the Commission’s shift to full harmonisation but also as 
the more ambitious one.719  The ambitious journey of the proposal led to a 
Consumer Rights Directive, which was not eventually a fully successful 
moral panic provided at least an opportunity to see the actual objective 
behind legislating in the area of European Consumer Law.  Although 
Consumer Law has always been a market bound policy at the European 
level, the fact that the internal market objectives have made consumer 
protection a by-product should alarm us as to the whether this is the case for 
other areas of European legislation as well.  At the same time, the lesson 
learned from the UK approach is that for some Member States the European 
approach is not the preferred way forward and there would always be desire 
to do things their own way, provided that European intervention is kept at the 
minimum.  It should thus not surprise us that at a point when the UK was 
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categorical against the proposed Consumer Rights Directive and the areas 
that it included, the Consumer Rights Bill was already making its way to the 
UK Parliament simply to confirm the willingness on the part of UK to provide 
their own approach and of course prevent the downgrading of consumer 
protection that would otherwise be witnessed. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
Introduction 
While originally consumer protection did not fall in the areas that European 
Union could legislate in, with gradual changes through Treaty revisions720, 
the European Commission not only acquired competence but it has more 
importantly become a key player in legislating in the particular area.  
However, European Consumer Law never stood on its own.  Reference to 
the internal market has since its development been and does remain integral 
to it.  Accordingly, any measure adopted in the area unavoidably needs to 
contribute to the completion of the internal market.  The current thesis has 
showed how the balance between completing the internal market and 
providing a high level of consumer protection, as Article 169 of the TFEU721 
providing the legislative basis for the particular area stipulates, has unevenly 
been shifted on the former consideration.   Benefiting the internal market 
has, as this thesis has argued, been the actual driving force behind the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive by thus turning consumer 
protection into a secondary consideration and at the same time a by-product 
of European Consumer Law.   
The aim of this thesis has been to show the manipulation of European 
Consumer Law for the purposes of the internal market.  Arguments 
supporting that consumer policy is gradually turning into an internal market 
policy are not new.  Nonetheless, this thesis has made a step beyond 
existing argument by unveiling the process in which the European 
Commission has achieved this.  The application of the moral panic theory in 
the area of European Consumer Law accordingly contributes in evidencing 
the central proposition from a new angle.  The examination of the approach 
followed by the European Commission has thrown light upon the uneven 
balance between the two objectives to be achieved.  In addition, this thesis 
                                            
720 The whole process is described in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
721 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/01, art 169. 
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provides a comparison between the transposition of the Consumer Rights 
Directive in the domestic regimes of UK and Cyprus.  The Consumer Rights 
Directive has formed the example against which the hypothesis regarding 
the European Commission’s objectives was tested.  Despite the fact that five 
years have passed since its adoption and already two and half years since 
the lapse of the transposition period, the implementation of the Consumer 
Rights Directive in both Member States, especially in the case of Cyprus, 
has not been the subject of research.722  Therefore, the examination of the 
transposition contributes to the existing literature by drawing upon the moral 
panic which has been formed around the consumer confidence, the effect of 
the Directive in practice and more importantly provides lessons for the 
approach followed by each Member State and what this means for the 
European Commission and its attempts aiming to benefit the internal market. 
Three pertinent issues arise with regard to the Commission’s approach.  The 
consumer confidence justification which the European Commission has used 
for the shift to maximum harmonisation is not more than a moral panic and a 
smokescreen which enabled the European Commission to pursue its 
objective of benefiting the internal market.  The second issue arising has 
been the debate between minimum and maximum harmonisation.  The shift 
to maximum harmonisation has provided further evidence for the fact that 
the consumer confidence justification has been hijacked for the purposes of 
the internal market.  There has been an effort in this thesis to show the weak 
connection between maximum harmonisation and the aim of increasing 
consumer confidence and at the same time the fact that the European 
Commission focuses on a single standard of consumer which can hardly be 
the case in reality.  The third pertinent issue is the Consumer Rights 
Directive itself which, although in a rather compromised form due to the 
objections by Member States, the European Parliament and the Council, has 
comprised the example for testing the main hypothesis of this thesis.  Not 
                                            
722 As regards the UK transposition, two academic articles have so far focused on this 
issue.  The first one is Cristian Twigg-Flesner, ‘SomeThoughts on Consumer Law Reform – 
Consolidation, Codification, or a Restament?’ (2014) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686683> accessed 25 April 2016.  
The other academic who has focused on the transposition of the Directive in the UK regime 
is Paula Giliker which has been considered in this thesis. 
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only the eventual approach followed in the Directive is consistent with the 
internal market objectives but it also constitutes further evidence for the 
single standard of consumer on which the European Commission focuses 
on.  Last but not least, the transposition of the Directive has not only 
provided an opportunity to examine its effect in practice but provided some 
important lessons emerging from the differences in approach between the 
two Member States and what this means for the European Commission’s 
objectives.  
The consumer confidence justification – An emerging moral 
panic? 
The need to increase consumer confidence has served as the justification 
for legislating in the area of consumer protection through the years in the 
form of minimum harmonisation directives as well as the shift to maximum 
harmonisation in 2008 in the Consumer Rights Directive.  The increased 
concern around consumer confidence and the shift to maximum 
harmonisation have constituted the trigger for examining the driving force 
behind European Consumer Law.  The ability of maximum harmonisation to 
increase consumer confidence has already been the subject of concern and 
criticism put forward by various academics.  Thomas Wilhelmsson has been 
amongst those who have argued that maximum harmonization relates only 
minimally to the actual creation of consumer confidence.723  Nonetheless, 
this thesis has made a step further by arguing that the increased concern 
around the low levels of consumer confidence in cross border trading is in 
reality a rather constructed problem.  The moral panic theory has in this case 
been used to examine the supposed efforts of the European Commission to 
increase consumer confidence.   
Moral panics may arise in situations where influential people, politicians, 
legislators as it is the case being examined here, create concern around a 
given problem, whether real, exaggerated or even constructed, which 
enables them to intervene in order to address and combat that perceived 
                                            
723 Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC 
Consumer Law’ (n 4) 318. 
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social problem through for example a change in legal or social policy.724  By 
applying the moral panic theory in the current case, the purpose has been to 
show how the consumer confidence justification has been hijacked for the 
purposes of the internal market with a moral panic thus emerging.  The 
consideration of the individual characteristics of moral panics has 
contributed towards better examining the consumer confidence argument 
and thus proving the argument that it constitutes an example of a moral 
panic.   
The constant reference to the need to increase consumer confidence has 
heightened the concern around the issue and led to its conceptualisation as 
a social problem that needs to be addressed.  At the same time, this also 
turned the particular argument into a convincing justification for the shift to 
maximum harmonisation.  In moral panic situations, the concern created is 
disproportionate to the actual magnitude of the problem and this constitutes 
a process by which the real objectives to be achieved can be hidden behind.  
Equally, there was an effort to create a “bitter feeling” towards the 
discrepancies that are found amongst the various national regimes across 
the Union which have accordingly been “blamed” for the low levels of 
consumer confidence.  Maximum harmonisation was accordingly presented 
as the way to address the problem.  However, this called for an examination 
of the the weak connection between maximum harmonisation and consumer 
confidence which further unveils the misrepresentation of the real objectives 
that were sought as well as the actual driving force behind the Commission’s 
approach.  The Consumer Rights Directive was used to test the main 
hypothesis of this thesis and eventually determine whether the current moral 
panic has in the end been successful or not.   
 
                                            
724 Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State 
and Law and Order (n 21) 5. 
241 
 
Maximum harmonisation and the aim of increasing 
consumer confidence – A reality? 
The level of harmonisation has been the most contentious issue with regard 
to the Consumer Rights Directive.  The debate between minimum and 
maximum harmonisation has evidently attracted the attention of various 
academics who have expressed their concerns in relation to the shift to 
maximum harmonisation and the adverse consequences that this would 
have for European consumers.725  The role of the European Parliament and 
the Council has as this thesis has showed proved to be valuable in the 
process of the Consumer Rights Directive.  Both European institutions were 
not satisfied with the Commission’s proposed Directive and particularly with 
the fact that maximum harmonisation would lead to a reduction of the 
existing level of consumer protection, especially in the areas of unfair 
contract terms and consumer remedies.  The whole process that preceded 
the adoption of the Directive has accordingly led to a trimming down of its 
ambit and thus a reduction of the effect of maximum harmonisation.  The 
most onerous consequences that would result in the areas of unfair contract 
terms and consumer remedies, particularly due to their maximum 
harmonisation character, were eventually not included in the final version of 
the Directive.   
While the level of harmonisation that has prevailed is supposedly targeted 
full harmonisation, the default position is still maximum harmonisation with 
the exception of some limited issues that have already referred to in which 
Member States can go beyond the Directive.  The final Consumer Rights 
Directive primarily provides for the maximum harmonisation of information 
requirements and the right to withdraw.  Nonetheless, this thesis has argued 
that there are still doubts as to whether maximum harmonisation, as it has 
prevailed in the Consumer Rights Directive, is really connected with the 
desire to increase consumer confidence as the European Commission has 
advocated. 
                                            
725 There is a discussion on the debate between maximum and minimum harmonisation in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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By going beyond a simple comparison between the two levels of 
harmonisation, this thesis has showed the presumed, ill-conceived 
connection between maximum harmonisation and the objective of increasing 
consumer confidence.  The misplaced character of the consumer confidence 
justification was firstly considered against the wide array of issues that affect 
consumers’ attitudes and decision to buy.  Consumer’s decision making is 
evidently affected by factors that go beyond a simple consideration of the 
legislation that is in place.  Increasing consumer confidence does not 
evidently depend on the extent to which legislation is harmonised, therefore 
the examination of factors affecting consumers from a consumer behaviour 
perspectives has led to the conclusion that increasing consumer confidence 
can hardly be as straightforward as presumed with a shift to maximum 
harmonisation.  Consumers’ confidence does not for example depend upon 
their own views but can also be affected by external factors accruing from 
their wider environment.  To add to this, consumers exhibit a degree of bias 
and predisposition to their habits in order to avoid possible risks726 and 
positive first-hand experience can possibly increase their confidence727 in a 
product or way of purchasing, as for example distance shopping.  The wide 
array of factors involved not only show how the maximum harmonisation of 
legislation cannot guarantee a definite increase consumer confidence but 
they also constitute a possible explanation why cross-border trading has not 
greatly increased.    
The resulting approach in the Consumer Rights Directive with the shift to 
maximum harmonisation has in addition provided an interesting lesson 
regarding the standard consumer that is to be protected at the European 
level.  The connection between maximum harmonisation and a definite 
increase of consumer confidence in cross border shopping has given rise to 
a single standard of consumer who once all consumer protection rules are 
harmonised, the European consumer envisaged will be ready and confident 
to engage into cross border trading.  The consumer to be protected at the 
European level is above the average consumer by being perceived as 
                                            
726 De Groot, Antonides, Read and van Raaij, ‘The effects of direct experience on 
consumer product evaluation’ (n 406) 510. 
727 ibid. 
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reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect.  The way European 
consumer is perceived does not correspond to the reality as consumers are 
not in all situations well-informed or observant.   With the approach followed, 
the consumer who is in the focus of the Consumer Rights Directive 
constitutes an active market participant willing to engage in cross border 
trade.  However, there is a further aspect to this which should not be 
disregarded.  The definition of consumer accruing simply provides further 
indication of the increased regard being paid to the internal market.  In order 
to benefit the internal market, it is of course consequential to focus on active 
market participants whose economic activity is vital for the smooth 
functioning of the internal market.  
In essence, the various information requirements as well as the right to 
withdraw are tools which aim at facilitating the conclusion of consumer 
contracts.  This constitutes a shift away from a protective policy to a policy 
that seeks to empower consumers.  Empowering consumers is nonetheless 
not an end in itself.  The rather instrumentalist character of the Consumer 
Rights Directive purports at inciting an increase in cross border consumer 
activity which brings evident advantages for the internal market.  
Accordingly, the focus is on consumers who are willing to play the game of 
the Commission and engage in cross border shopping.  With the resulting 
approach, not only certain skills are presumed to be in the possession of 
consumers which further confirms that the European consumer envisaged is 
in no case the weak consumer in need of protection but on a consumer who 
has the willingness, and of course the resources, to engage into cross 
border trading.  The examination of the approach followed in the Consumer 
Rights Directive has added to the debated around the definition of consumer 
as accruing from the shift to maximum harmonisation and the European 
Commission’s focus and also to what Hans-W Micklitz has rightly supported.   
European consumer is presumed to possess some standard skills while he 
is at the same time considered as an “omnipotent multinational market 
actor”.728   
                                            
728 Micklitz, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the 
Return of Social Elements in Civil Law – A Bittersweet Polemic’ (n 501) 2. 
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The Consumer Rights Directive – A successful moral panic 
or not? 
The Consumer Rights Directive has been the example used to test the main 
hypothesis of this thesis.  The transposition of the Directive in the two 
domestic regimes has showed how what was achieved was not more than a 
simple update and harmonisation of what was already in place.  Consumer 
protection has not really increased contrary to what the legislative basis in 
the area under Article 169 TFEU provides and which expressly mentions the 
objective to achieve a high level of consumer protection.  However, this is 
even more striking with consideration to the fact that the initial proposal 
would even reduce the level of protection that was already offered and thus 
negatively affect the domestic regimes of the two Member States.  This 
leads to an initial conclusion, that the Commission has partly failed to 
achieve its real objectives as the Directive constitutes a major compromise.  
Accordingly, the fact that the sweeping consequences that the Commission’s 
initial proposal would bring have in the end been avoided729  suggests that 
the emerging moral panic did not take its full effect.  The fact that the level of 
consumer protection would have negatively been affected simply constitutes 
evidence of the fact that the objectives behind the Consumer Rights 
Directive were from the very beginning misplaced.   
 
The main argument developed throughout this thesis was further 
underpinned by examining the effect of the Consumer Rights Directive in 
practice and what it really means for national regimes.  Its transposition has 
                                            
729 Of course, it is interesting that the Commission, four years after its “defeat” with the 
Consumer Rights Directive and failing to put through the amendments in relation to the 
Consumer Sales Directive has made new proposal.  The proposal for a Directive on certain 
aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods brought 
forward in May 2015, brings back the changes to the list of remedies for lack of conformity 
and once again based on maximum harmonisation provides the two-tier hierarchy of 
remedies that the UK Government was particularly concerned with.  Perhaps this is an 
indication of the fact that defeat is not an option and the Commission makes a second 
attempt to make the right to reject as a last resort remedy in all Member States 
irrespectively. 
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provided evidence that consumer protection has not really increased with the 
overhaul in consumer rights that Meglena Kuneva has promised for the 500 
million European consumers when talking about the Proposal for the 
Consumer Rights Directive730 hardly being the case.  Although some 
improvement and clarification has in some points been achieved and the 
onerous consequences that the proposed version of the Directive would 
have for both Member States were prevented, this does not automatically 
make the Directive a success.  In spite of that, the comparison of the 
transposition of the Directive in the two domestic regimes has thrown light 
upon important differences in approach between the two Member States and 
what lessons there are to learn from them.   
The transposition of the Directive in the Cyprus regime was achieved with 
The Consumer Rights Law of 2013, in the form of primary legislation, while 
in the UK the Directive was transposed through two pieces of Regulations, 
The Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations of 2012 and The 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013.  The Directive was in the case of Cyprus easily 
transposed without giving rise to any evident concerns or difficulties.  
Available options left by the Directive were not really considered and one 
year after its transposition, the Directive has been characterised as a 
success for the Cypriot regime and its implementation was praised with 
content.    On the other hand, for the UK, the transposition of the Directive 
did not prove as easy and straightforward.  Different available options with 
regard to its implementation had to be careful considered and balanced 
against their advantages and disadvantages.  While in both situations, a 
consultation process took place, in the case of UK the various stakeholders 
expressed their concerns in relation the Directive contrary to the case of 
Cyprus in which, interestingly, no particular concerns were put forward 
regarding any of the provisions of the Directive.  This is an indication of the 
                                            
730 Meglena Kuneva, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (French Presidency 
Conference "What Kind of Protection for European Consumers?", Paris, 5 December 2008) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-681_en.htm> accessed 19 April 2016. 
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receptiveness in the case of Cyprus towards the European legislation and 
their evident trust towards the European paradigm. 
Both Member States have employed the copy out technique for the 
transposition of the directive.  However their decision was perhaps informed 
by different reasons in each case.  For Cyprus, which has since its 
accession to the European Union, worked hard to comply with EU 
legislation, this was the way to ensure the best possible results in 
transposing the Directive.  On the contrary, for the UK, this was a way to 
prevent the Directive from being amalgamated in national legislation and 
thus make it more difficult to be identified.  The comparison between the two 
Member States has interestingly showed how Cyprus has faithfully followed 
the Directive, even the structure and wording, while the UK has exhibited 
some degree of creativity.  The UK Government identified parts of the 
Directive that contained ambiguities and possible loopholes for which there 
was a respectful attempt to address and thus avoid the creation of gaps in 
the legislation.  There was accordingly an attempt on the part of the UK to 
increase the level of protection by in some respects going beyond the 
Directive where that was of course possible.  While some limited 
improvements have been achieved for both domestic regimes, the Directive 
did not do much beyond clarifying and harmonising what was already in 
place.  
The comparison made in relation to the transposition of the Directive and the 
differences in approach between the two Member States have raised some 
questions as to what may lie behind their stance.  UK constitutes one of the 
biggest and most powerful Member States of the European Union with 
interestingly a strong tradition in consumer protection while Cyprus is on the 
other hand a small Member State which has entered the European Union, 
much later than the UK.  Sector specific consumer protection has in the case 
of Cyprus been developed through European initiatives and has therefore 
been influenced by the European paradigm.  After its accession to the 
European Union, the Cyprus Government has worked with great devotion to 
comply with European legislation.  Perhaps, those evident contextual 
factors, provide justifications for the emerging differences between the two 
approaches.  The approach followed on the part of UK exhibits an 
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unwillingness to compromise with any less that what is already provided to 
consumers and the UK government has made an effort to provide their own 
approach where that was possible.  On the other hand Cyprus, without any 
disagreement towards any part of the Directive, has blindly followed the 
European paradigm by failing to identify any flaws or points of where 
improvement could be made. The fact that Cyprus consumer protection has 
in the particular area developed through the transposition of European 
directives has led the Cyprus Government to look up to European legislation 
as the best approach.  Unwillingness to compromise is not unlikely to be 
expressed from other Member States who, as the UK, provide for a high 
level of consumer protection.  At the same time, it is not unlikely for Member 
States in the same position as Cyprus, to accept contentious EU legislative 
measures which leave room for improvement without any effort to go beyond 
what is provided.  Of course, the latter situation makes the job of the 
European Commission easier to achieve its objectives, if in the end 
successful. 
The real driving force – Final Remarks 
Maximum harmonisation as it has prevailed in the Consumer Rights 
Directive still constitutes evidence of the Commission’s focus and desire to 
benefit the internal market.  The eventual approach seeks to empower 
consumers who are omnipotent, well-observant and finally willing to be 
active in the internal market.  Consumers who are below the standard 
envisaged by the European Commission cannot really help in the internal 
market project.  European Consumer Law and the Consumer Rights 
Directive in more particular does not have a social character but it rather 
seeks to ensure that economic activity in the internal market is flowing.  
Ultimately, this approach aims at increasing cross border trade within the 
internal market.  However, it is not only vital to empower the standard 
consumer on whom the European Commission focuses, but it becomes of 
utmost importance to provide legislative incentives for traders too.  
Increasing cross border trade can only be materialised with first of all 
willingness on the part of traders to expand their activity beyond their 
national borders.   
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The proposal for Consumer Rights Directive indeed provided such incentives 
for traders and had unevenly shifted the focus on traders.  As it has been 
seen, it would for example give traders the opportunity to choose between 
consumers’ remedies in relation to faulty goods while at the same time it 
would bring more clarity for traders had the list of unfair contract terms been 
adopted on the basis of maximum harmonisation.  With the risk of reducing 
the level of protection in relation to unfair contract terms in a number of 
Member States, traders would have in this way been automatically aware of 
the list of terms that are considered unfair in all circumstances as well as 
rules that should be deemed to be unfair in all Member States without thus 
running the risk of being surprised by the various national legislations.  
Although those two areas were not included in the final Consumer Rights 
Directive, maximum harmonisation which has prevailed in relation to 
information requirements and the right to withdraw is also important from the 
traders’ perspective.  To some degree this approach also provides a 
legislative incentive for traders, as the Commission has from the very 
beginning hoped to achieve.  There is nothing to deny that traders will in this 
way avoid costs from having to obtain legal advice or the costs accruing 
from the need to update their websites in order to comply with the national 
regime of a Member State they would like to start trading in.  Knowing that 
the same information requirements as well as the same withdrawal period 
exists across the Union also provides legal certainty to traders and removes 
legislative surprises for traders who would otherwise be reluctant to face.  
Therefore, the importance of the maximum harmonisation of the two issues 
and the benefit that this can have for traders and consequently for the 
internal market as it ultimately aims at inciting cross border activity cannot be 
disregarded. 
The question turns as to what will in this way be achieved.  Why has the 
European Commission shifted its focus on cross border trading within the 
internal market?  Is cross border shopping what consumers really care 
about?  As this thesis has argued, consumers simply seek to satisfy their 
need, stick to their habits and more importantly avoid risks.  On the other 
hand, it should not be disregarded that cross border trading is, undoubtedly, 
particularly beneficial for the smooth functioning of the internal market and 
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can bring positive advantages to the economy of the European Union as a 
whole.  At the same time, it should not be disregarded that cross border 
trade provides a great opportunity for highly industrialised Member States to 
benefit their economies.  However, for this to become a reality, the 
willingness of traders to expand their trading beyond their national borders is 
highly important and a way to incite such a willingness is through providing 
incentives to traders.  This has perhaps been the ultimate concern behind 
the Consumer Rights Directive, a concern which has interestingly displaced 
consumer protection considerations.  Nonetheless, the process preceding 
the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive has indeed showed that the 
road to its adoption has not been a smooth one.  The concerns of Member 
States and the dissenting positions of the European Parliament and the 
Council is what has, perhaps fortunately, prevented the adoption of a 
legislative instrument that would harm consumer protection.  This leads to 
argue that the moral panic which the European Commission fired around the 
consumer confidence justification did not eventually take its full effect, the 
consequences of this moral panic could have been worse. 
Benefiting the internal market has accordingly formed the driving force 
behind the Consumer Rights Directive, the question is nonetheless whether 
this is the case with any measure adopted in the area of European 
Consumer Law.  Although measures adopted in the context of consumer 
protection needed from the very beginning to contribute to the internal 
market, is it really acceptable for internal market considerations to override 
consumer protection considerations?  While both objectives stand side to 
side since the development of consumer policy at the European level, this 
gives rise to another question, had the internal market not existed, would the 
European Commission care about consumer protection?  Would European 
Consumer Law exist independent from the internal market project?  As the 
whole process of the Consumer Rights Directive has showed, European 
Consumer law has a reason for its development and existence which goes 
beyond simply providing consumer protection. 
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